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In Chapter 1, which is a joint work with E. Han Kim and Yao Lu, we find independent directors 
with CEO experience in a closely-related industry can improve firm value by improving the 
efficiency of capital expenditures and R&D investments. However, the effectuation of the potential 
contribution requires sufficient interaction with management. When the interaction is active, the 
industry-CEO experience has an economically and statistically significant positive impact; 
otherwise, the impact is insignificant. The interaction is proxied by competitive and dynamic 
challenges in product markets, the level of new business initiatives, or the frequency of board 
meetings. All proxies yield consistent evidence. Our findings demonstrate that active management-
board interaction is essential to bring out the potential value independent directors can add to the 
firm.   
In Chapter 2, I propose the fraction of experienced independent directors as a better measure 
of board monitoring than board independence. Serving as an independent director requires skills to 
effectively interact with management in a short period of time and obtain information necessary to 
perform the advising and monitoring duties. Skills to perform may be obtained through relevant 
experience, and inexperienced directors may have difficulty gaining efficiency until they learn by 
doing. Based on a sample of non-regulated S&P 1500 firms over the period 2000-2010, I find that 
independent directorship experience, measured by the fraction of independent directors among the 
board who have at least five years of independent directorship experience in any firm in the past, is 
a better measure of board quality than the board independence. Independent director experience 
increases firm value when a firm operates in a non-competitive industry, when the need for board 
monitoring is high. I find no evidence that board independence, the traditional measure of board 
quality, has such beneficial influence on firm performance after controlling for the independent 
directorship experience. Independent directorship experience also increases CEO turnover-
performance sensitivity, muting the influence from board independence. While past independent 
directorship experience is not helpful in setting CEO compensation, past compensation committee 
experience can significantly reduces total CEO compensation. My results are robust to the use of 
firm- and year fixed effects, IV regression, alternative measures of independent director experience, 
and various board quality measures as control variables.  
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In Chapter 3, which is a joint work with E. Han Kim and Yao Lu, we empirically investigate 
determinants and performance implications of appointing affiliated directors. Contrary to the 
prevalent view that it is independent directors that may enhance corporate governance, we find that 
affiliated directors are also positively related to better governance and firm performance: affiliated 
directors are appointed when firms suffer from underperformance, and increase CEO pay-for-
performance sensitivity, reduce managerial entrenchment, and enhance M&A and operation 
performance. The material relation of affiliated directors may provide them better firm-specific 
information and aligned incentives to promote success of appointing firm. Furthermore, we find 
that all affiliated directors are not the same: Based on hand-collected data on the relation between 
affiliated directors and the appointing firms, we find that directors that are affiliated through 
business relationship or blockholding are appointed in underperforming firms, and lead to 
subsequently improved performance. However, former employee director appointments are 
affected by the power of current CEO rather than firm performance, and they are associated with 
lower corporate governance and firm performance. Directors that are precedents or descendents of 
the CEOs are positively associated with strengthened managerial incentives and improved firm 
performance, but other types of family-related directors do not show such beneficial relation. 
These findings demonstrate heterogeneity among the affiliated directors due to the type of relation 





Chapter 1. The Value of Independent Directors’ Experience  
1.1 Introduction 
Extensive research has been devoted to study board composition and director characteristics, 
yielding valuable insights into how board independence and independent director characteristics 
affect firm performance (see Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010)
 
for a survey of the 
literature.) However, it is still unclear whether and how an important aspect of independent 
directors’ characteristics, their experience, affects firm performance and valuation. Fich (2005) 
shows the stock market reacts more favorably to the appointment of directors who are CEOs of 
other firms. However, Fahlenbrach, Low, and Stulz (2010) do not find the presence of current 
CEO-directors improve operating performance. The positive stock market reaction is limited to 
the first appointment of other firms’ current CEOs as directors, which Fahlenbrach et al. attribute 
to a certification effect. In addition, Kroll, Walters, and Wright (2008) argue boards need 
directors with knowledge gained through industry experience to provide useful advice to top 
managers, and Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2013) document independent directors’ industry 
expertise helps facilitate innovative activities. However, our data show independent directors’ 
industry experience alone is unrelated to firm value. We also find, consistent with Fahlenbrach et 
al.’s finding, CEO experience alone does not help improve firm value.  
However, when industry experience is combined with CEO experience – CEO experience 
in a closely related industry – independent directors have an economically and statistically 
significant positive impact on firm value. This positive effect is not due to their individual effects; 
when they serve on other firms’ boards, there is no evidence the same independent directors 
enhance the other firms’ value. We also identify a channel through which the positive value 
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effect takes place. Firms with independent directors with industry-CEO experience have higher 
value-investment sensitivity; that is, capital expenditures and R&D investments have greater 
positive effects on firm value, implying the combined experience helps increase investment 
efficiency.  
These findings suggest the combination of industry and CEO experience provides a 
synergy unobtainable through CEO experience or industry knowledge alone. The industry 
experience provides industry-specific knowledge and CEO experience in that industry helps 
relate the knowledge to important strategic issues, a critical factor in making their advice value-
enhancing. The combined experience also help directors ask relevant questions and detect early 
signs of trouble, empowering them to be more effective monitors.  
The combined experience alone, however, does not necessarily improve firm value. The 
role of independent directors is to monitor and advise management, not to manage the firm. Thus, 
if they bring value to the firm, it is through management; thus, the realization of the value 
requires sufficient management-board interaction. The interaction provides independent directors 
not only opportunities to utilize their advising and monitoring capabilities, but also with more 
access to firm-specific information. Better access to relevant information is important because 
independent directors have limited access to firm-specific information and rely heavily on 
management as their primary source of it (Dominguez-Martinez, Swank, and Visser, 2008; 
Adams et al., 2010). Armed with better information, independent directors will be more 
cognizant of issues in need of advice or closer monitoring, enhancing their effectiveness as 
advisors and monitors.
1
 Consistent with these conjectures, we find independent directors’ 
industry-CEO experience help increase firm value only when management and the board actively 
interact.  
                                                 
1 Consistent with this conjecture, Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2010) find board independence is positively related to firm 
performance when independent directors’ cost of acquiring information is low. 
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Our sample is based on S&P 1500 firms over the period 2000-2010. Because independent 
directors’ primary responsibility is to protect and promote shareholder value, our primary 
measure of firm performance is Tobin’s Q. The industry-CEO experience is measured by the 
fraction of independent directors with CEO experience in firms with the same three-digit SIC 
code. The industry- CEO experience is scarce; only 8.2% of our firm-year observations show the 
presence of at least one independent director with the combined experience. The scarcity is 
perhaps due to conflicts of interest that can arise if an overlapping firm-pair, in which one firm’s 
CEO sits on the other’s board, is about to compete in the same product market. Seventy percent 
of the independent directors with the Industry-CEO experience are former CEOs, who are less 
likely to be subject to the conflicts of interest. It is also a common business practice for current 
CEO-independent directors to immediately resign from the board when the two firms are about 
to become rivals. 
Independent directors with industry-CEO experience can help improve firm value. Our 
estimate implies that if a firm with seven independent directors (the sample median) has an 
independent director with industry-CEO experience, its Q will be higher by 0.19. The positive 
impact is not due to business relationships between the overlapping firm-pairs in which one 
firm’s CEO sits on the other’s board. Our sample includes only directors classified as 
independent by RiskMetrics, which defines a director as “affiliated” if the overlapping firm-pair 
has a material business relationship. We also conduct web searches and find no material business 
relationship between any overlapping firm-pairs in our sample; however, we identify 54 firm-
years in which they have non-material business relationship. The estimation results are robust to 
excluding these observations. 
The realization of the value associated with the industry-CEO experience, however, is not 
automatic. It requires active interaction between management and the board. We use three 
different proxies for the interaction. The first relies on changes in product market environment, 
consisting of Herfindahl-Hirschman index as defined by Hoberg and Phillips (2010); competitive 
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threats coming from rivals as measured by Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala (2013); and demand 
shocks as measured by Li, Lu, and Phillips (2013). When the business environment becomes 
tougher and more challenging, managers may undertake more new business initiatives and 
efficiency-enhancing measures to stay abreast, or get ahead of the competition, which tend to 
require board approval, triggering more management-board interaction. Management also may 
work more closely with independent directors to better utilize their advisory resources. Our 
estimates imply a ten percent increase in the fraction of independent directors with the combined 
experience is associated with a 0.249 higher Q when a firm operates in an industry above the 
median in the toughness of business environment; however, for firms operating in an industry 
below the median, the value impact of the experience is insignificant. 
These results are robust to an alternative proxy based on business initiatives, such as 
equity issues, M&As (including divestitures and spinoffs), capital expenditures, and R&D 
investments. These activities tend to require board approval, generating additional interaction 
between independent directors and management. The third proxy is perhaps most direct but also 
most endogenous; the number of board meetings. We find the industry-CEO experience adds 
value only when a firm is above the median in business initiatives or in the frequency of board 
meetings.  
We address endogeneity concerns by estimating two-stage instrumental variable (IV) 
regressions. Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) find that current CEO-directors come from firms with 
similar size, so our IV for industry-CEO experience is the number of firms with the same three-
digit SIC code with sales within ±10% of the sample firm’s sales volume.  As for management-
board interaction, we use the access to one of top 20 U.S. hub airports within 60-mile radius of a 
firm’s headquarter as the IV for the frequency of board meetings; and the cost of R&D capital 
after state and federal R&D tax credits as the IV for business activities. No separate IV is used 
for the competitiveness and challenging nature of the product market, because that measure is 
based on industry-level data. Our main findings are robust to using these IVs.  
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We also check whether our findings are robust to alternative measures of key variables, 
to outliers, and to alternative sample constructions. Specifically, we re-estimate key regressions 
using buy-and-hold stock returns, asset utilization rate, and return on assets as measures of firm 
performance; a number of alternative measures of industry-CEO experience; and alternative 
sample constructions. All re-estimation results are robust. We also carefully check whether the 
results are driven by outliers. They are not.   
This paper contributes to our understanding of how independent directors’ experience 
help enhance firm performance. A number of studies emphasize the importance of independent 
directors’ industry experience (e.g., Kroll et al., 2008; Faleye et al., 2013) and investigate the 
benefits of having current CEOs of other firms as directors (e.g., Fich, 2005, Fahlenbrach et al., 
2010). We add to these contributions by providing the evidence that CEO or industry experience 
alone is unrelated to firm value, but the combined experience creates a synergy in enhancing 
independent directors’ effectiveness as advisors and monitors. We also point out and document 
an important condition for any independent directors to help improve firm performance – 
sufficient management-board interaction, an important aspect that has received relatively little 
attention in the literature. In this regard, this study is similar to the previous studies suggesting 
the benefits of independent directors vary across operational environments (Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen, 2008), information environments (Duchin et al., 2010), and the need for advice (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2007). We add to this literature by identifying another important factor causing 
heterogeneity in the value of independent directors – the level of interaction between 
management and the board. 
The next section defines key experience variables and describes data and sample 
construction. Section 1.3 estimates relations between different types of experience and firm value 
and identifies a channel through which the industry-CEO experience helps improve firm value. 
Section 1.4 examines the effects of management-board interaction. Section 1.5 explores potential 
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determinants of the presence of the industry-CEO experience in the board, estimates IV 
regressions, and conducts other robustness checks. Section 1.6 provides some implications.  
1.2 Experience Variables, Sample Construction, and Summary Statistics 
1.2.1 Independent Directors’ Experience Variables 
Our focus on experience is on work experience in a closely related industry, experience 
as CEO, and the combined experience. We define three variables. Indu_Exp_Only is the fraction 
of independent directors with only industry experience without possessing CEO experience in 
that industry. An independent director is considered to possess industry experience if she has 
worked for a firm(s) with the same three-digit SIC code for more than five years during the past 
15 years. We require five years of experience because it takes time to accumulate industry-
specific knowledge. We also require a 15-year shelf-life because industry environments change 
over time and industry-specific skills and knowledge may become obsolete after 15 years. The 
experience variable is the number of independent directors with the experience divided by the 
number of independent directors.
2
 
CEO_Exp_Only is the fraction of independent directors with CEO experience in different 
industries but not in the same three-digit SIC code. An independent director is considered to 
possess CEO experience if she has been a CEO of any Compustat firm. We do not apply the 
five-year working experience for CEO experience because being a CEO is an intensive 
experience that builds up relevant managerial skills and perspectives in a relatively short period 
of time. Moreover, CEO skill sets tend to be broad and general in nature, and are less likely to 
become obsolete over time. 
There are overlaps between these two variables because Indu_Exp_Only may include 
those with CEO experience in other industries, and CEO_Exp_Only may include those with non-
                                                 
2 We use the fractional measure instead of an average of independent directors’ experience because, as pointed out by Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006), average characteristics of independent directors may be a noisy measure of board-level characteristics, 
especially when director characteristics are widely dispersed.  
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CEO experience in the same industry. CEO and industry experiences are identified from 
directors’ employment history provided by BoardEx. Firm-level SIC information is taken from 
Compustat.  
The third experience variable is our main focus; the combined industry and CEO 
experience, Indu_CEO_Exp, the fraction of independent directors with CEO experience in a firm 
with the same three-digit SIC code. When an independent director has the combined experience, 
we do not apply the minimum working year experience requirement but still apply the 15-year 
shelf-life, unless the time lapse between the last year as a CEO in the same industry and the first 
year as an independent director is less than 15 years. Since the choice of five years of working 
experience and 15 years of shelf-life is arbitrary, we experiment with three years of working 
experience and ten years or infinite shelf-life, or with no restrictions as in Faleye et al. (2013). 
The results are robust. 
1.2.2 Sample Construction 
We obtain director data from RiskMetrics and BoardEx, financial and accounting data 
from Compustat, stock return data from CRSP, corporate activity data from SDC Platinum, and 
CEO related data from ExecuComp. The sample period is 2000 through 2010. It begins in 2000 
because BoardEx coverage is quite limited prior to 2000. Firms in financial and utility industries 
are excluded. The number of observations varies across regressions due to data availability of 
required variables. 
Table 1.1 tabulates the sample distribution by year. The number of observations is more 
or less evenly distributed over the 11-year period, with a total firm-year observation of 11,050. 
The vast majority of firm-year observations show the presence of at least one independent 
director with industry experience (92%) or with CEO experience (62%). Independent directors 
with those experiences show a steady increasing trend: By 2010, 97% of firms have at least one 
independent director with industry experience; and 69% with CEO experience. The combined 
industry-CEO experience is rather scarce. Only 8.2% of observations show the presence of an 
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independent director(s) with the combined experience. However, they also show an increasing 
trend; the fraction increased from 4.3% in 2000 to 11.8% in 2010. 
The scarcity of the combined experience is due partly to the possibility that the firm-pair, 
in which one firm’s CEO sits on the other’s board, could have a material business relationship or 
become rivals. If they have a material business relationship, RiskMetrics classifies the director as 
affiliated, not independent. Our sample contains 1,069 firm-year-director observations of 
independent directors having the combined experience. Of these, 339 observations involve 
current CEOs; the remaining 730 observations involve former CEOs.  
The 339 firm-year-directors, or 321 firm-years, with current CEO-independent directors 
involve 155 firm pairs. These are of concern because if a firm-pair competes in the same market, 
the current CEO-independent director may affect firm performance by facilitating cooperative 
activities rather than through independent advising and monitoring. However, based on our 
reading of the firms’ 10K filings, we find no pair competing directly with each other. Although 
they belong to the same three-digit SIC code, they focus on related but distinct markets.
3
 When 
firms are about to become competitors, the common business practice for the current CEO-
independent director is to quickly resign from the board of the firm she serves as a director.
4
  
                                                 
3 The case of Cadence Design Systems and Autodesk is illustrative. Carol Bartz, the CEO of Autodesk during 1992-2006, served 
as an independent director on the board of Cadence Design Systems during 1994-2001. Although both firms belong to the same 
three-digit SIC code, they each focus on quite different businesses. Autodesk is specialized in large-scale 3D design software, 
while Cadence Design Systems focuses on micro-scale semiconductor design automation. To the extent that both firms focus on 
developing design software, Carol Bartz may possess the insights to provide valuable advice to, or monitor more effectively the 
management of Cadence Design Systems.  
4 The case involving Eric Schmidt, the CEO of Google from 2001 to 2011, is illustrative. He served at Apple as an independent 
director from 2006 to 2009. Before 2009 both companies focused on different, non-competing businesses: Apple in computer and 
mobile phones, and Google in internet software; Apple’s SIC is 3571 and Google’s SIC is 7370. However, as Google expanded 
its business into the mobile and computer operating systems in 2009, they became competitors, leading to Eric Schmidt’s 
resignation from Apple’s board. Arthur Levinson, who served on both Apple and Google boards in 2009, also resigned from 
Google’s board to avoid potential conflict of interest.  
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We also read company websites and search the internet for each firm-pair-year to see if they 
have any business relationship. We find no business relationship for 267 firm-years. The 
remaining 54 firm-years show non-material business relationships.
5
 To check robustness, we re-
estimate regressions while excluding the 54 firm-years. The results are robust.  
1.2.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 1.2 contains summary statistics of the variables used in this study.
6
 Table 1.A1 
contains their definitions and data sources. According to our definition of experience, about half 
of independent directors have experience in the same industry, about 15% have CEO experience 
in other industries, but only 1.6% has industry-CEO experience. The other experience variables 
in Panel A are alternative measures of experience we will use for robustness checks. On average, 
the board has 9 directors with 70% of directors being independent; CEO own 2.2% of 
outstanding common shares, while independent directors’ total share ownership is 1.5%; and 57% 
of CEOs chair their boards. Other variables, which will describe them later, are not yet defined.  
                                                 
5 Nineteen firm-years show some product-level cooperation; for example, Carly Fiorina, the CEO of Hewlett Packard (HP), 
served as independent director of Cisco during 2001-2003 and Cisco has cooperated with HP in network connectivity. Twenty-
four firm-years show some form of alliance in developing technology or product, but most alliances involve numerous other 
companies. It seems unlikely that allied firms are in a special business relationship even when they send directors to each other. 
Consider the CEO of Autodesk over 1992-2006 who served on the board of Cadence Design Systems during 1994-2001 as an 
independent director. The two companies were participating in an alliance program during part of the overlapping years. 
However, as of 2012, Cadence Design Systems has eight alliance programs, and one of the alliance programs, the System 
Realization Alliance, has 29 collaborating companies. The remaining 24 firm-years show business transactions, such as 
acquisitions and equity investment. However, most transactions occurred when the CEO-independent director was not on the 
board. In only one case did a transaction occur while the current CEO of MKS Instruments was an independent director of 
Rudolph Technologies, Inc. Rudolph acquired selected assets from MKS in 2010, but Rudolph’s 10-K states “the impact of the 
acquisition was not material to the Company’s consolidated financial position or results of operations.” (2011.02.28, page F-13) 
6 Some firm-years’ PPE/TA are greater than one because the PPEs are gross-PPEs before subtracting accumulated depreciations. 
When we use net-PPE, no firm-years show PPE/TA greater than one. One observation is dropped because RiskMetrics shows the 
total share ownership by all independent directors exceeds one hundred percent. 
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1.3 Independent Directors’ Experience and Firm Performance 
We begin by comparing performance changes around the appointment of independent 
directors with the industry-CEO experience against performance changes associated with the 
appointment of those with industry- or CEO-only experience. This helps determine whether the 
combination of industry- and CEO experience generates synergies. It also helps examine a 
selection issue; whether the pre-appointment firm performance differs between those with the 
combined experience and those with separate experience.  Then we investigate the influence of 
each type of experience with multivariate regression analyses using panel data. This latter 
analysis allows us to examine the value each type of independent directors’ experience brings to 
the firm while controlling for various factors that may affect firm performance and the quality 
and composition of the board. 
1.3.1 Performance Changes around Director Appointment 
Table 1.3 examines firm performance changes around the appointment of independent 
directors with each type of experience. It also compares the difference in performance changes 
associated with the combined experience with those associated with industry-only or CEO-only 
experience, i.e., the difference-in-difference in firm performance. This analysis closely follows 
the approach used in Fahlenbrach et al. (2010), except that our focus is on the comparison 
between the combined experience and the separate experience.  
Firm performance is proxied by Tobin’s Q, defined as the market value of common 
equity plus the book value of total liabilities divided by the book value of total assets. Tobin’s Q 
is a widely-used measure to analyze how corporate governance affects firm performance. Panel 
A is based on industry-adjusted Q, the difference between the Q and the median industry Q, 
where industry is defined by the three-digit SIC code. Panel B is based on size, performance, 
industry-adjusted Q, the difference between the unadjusted Q and the Q of a control firm that 
belongs to the same three-digit SIC code with Tobin’s Q in event year -2 within ±10% and is 
closest in sales to the appointing firm. This measure is more refined than industry-adjusted Q in 
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that it also controls for prior performance and firm size. Performance before the appointment is 
calculated as the average over event years -2 and -3; performance after the appointment, the 
average over event years +1 through +3. Thus, to be included in the analysis, the newly 
appointed independent director(s) should remain in the firm until event year 3. The year of 
appointment is event year 0.
7
 
Both Panels show no significant difference in pre-appointment Q between firms 
appointing independent directors with the combined experience and those appointing directors 
with industry- or CEO-only experience. This alleviates our concern for selection, because those 
with the combined experience seem no more likely to be appointed to well performing firms’ 
boards than those with separate experience.  
After the appointment of independent directors with industry-CEO experience, changes 
in Q are significantly more positive than changes in Q following the appointment of those with 
industry- or CEO-only experience (the diff-in-diff reported in third and sixth rows in Columns (3) 
and (5)). This is true regardless of whether or not industry-adjusted Q takes into account of prior 
performance and size. Consistent with our hypothesis, the combination of industry and CEO 
experience seems to generate a synergy in enhancing independent directors’ effectiveness as 
advisors and monitors.   
1.3.2 Panel Regression Estimates 
To examine how each type of independent directors’ experience is related to firm value, 
we estimate the following baseline specification:  
Qit = αi + αt + β1∙Ind_Dir_Expit + β2∙Controlit + μit         (1) 
Qit is firm i’s Tobin’s Q in year t. Ind_Dir_Expit is firm i’s independent directors’ experience 
variable in year t. Controlit include control variables similar to those used in previous studies 
                                                 
7 When firms appoint multiple directors with different experience in a same year, they are excluded from the analyses because 
performance changes may reflect the confounded influence of adding different experience to the board.  
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relating governance mechanisms to Tobin’s Q.
8
 Specifically, we include measures of operating 
performance, financial conditions, organizational complexity, and CEO and board characteristics. 
Operating performance is measured by EBITDA divided by total assets, EBITDA/TA; and 
financial conditions, by a financial distress indicator, Z_Distress, equal to one if the Altman Z-
score is less than 1.81, and zero otherwise (Altman, 1968). Because constructing Z-score 
requires many variables, it is missing for some observations. To avoid reducing the sample size, 
we set missing observations of Z_Distress equal to zero and include Z_Dum, a dummy variable 
equal to one if Z-score data are available, and zero otherwise. This variable captures the mean of 
Z_Distress for missing values.  
Firms’ organizational structure may influence the effectiveness the independent directors 
and the board composition (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008; Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas, 
2010). Proxies for organizational complexity include firm size as measured by the natural log of 
sales, Ln(Sales); asset tangibility as  measured by properties, plants, and equipment divided by 
the book value of total assets, PPE/TA; and firm age, the natural log of firm age, Ln(FirmAge). 
Firm sales, PPE, total assets, and SIC codes are as reported in Compustat. Firm age is counted 
from the year of firm’s IPO as reported in CRSP, or the number of years since its first 
appearance in CRSP or Compustat.  
CEO characteristics include CEO share ownership, CEO_Own, the percentage of 
outstanding common shares held by a CEO, and CEO_Own
2
; and an indicator for CEOs chairing 
the board CEO_Chair. Kim and Lu (2011) show firm valuation and risk taking is related to CEO 
share ownership in a hump-shaped fashion. Board characteristics, which may influence firm 
value and the value of independent directors’ experience, include the total percentage of shares 
owned by all independent directors, Ind_Dir_Own; and the natural log of the total number of 
directors on the board, Ln(BoardSize). Independent directors’ share ownership may align 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), 
Bhagat and Black (2002), Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007), and Kim and Lu (2011). 
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independent directors’ incentives with shareholder value, affecting firm performance. We control 
for board size because Yermack (1996) shows a negative relation between board size and firm 
value.  
Our baseline regression controls for firm- and year fixed effects, αi and αt. However, 
previous studies relating independent directors’ industry experience to firm performance control 
for industry fixed effects based on the two-digit SIC code (e.g., Faleye et al., 2013), and 
Fahlenblach et al. (2010) adjust firm performance by the industry median based on the two-digit 
SIC code and control for industry fixed effects based on Fama-French 48-industry classification. 
To relate our findings to the literature, Table 1.4, Panel A presents estimation results based on 
industry (two-digit SIC)-, state-, and year fixed effects. Then, we present estimation results based 
on firm- and year fixed effects in Panel B of the same table. Observations within the same CEO-
firm pair may be auto-correlated because CEOs tend to have strong influence on firm 
performance; hence, standard errors are clustered at the CEO-firm pair level.  
The first three columns in Panels A and B are motivated by Faleye et al. (2013), who find 
independent directors’ industry expertise (defined as past employment history in firm(s) with the 
same two-digit SIC code) can increase firm value. To distinguish industry-only experience and 
industry-CEO experience within their framework, we construct three industry experience 
variables based on two-digit SIC code: FHH_Indu_Exp, the fraction of independent directors 
with employment history in Compustat firms in the same industry; FHH_Indu_Only_Exp, the 
fraction of independent directors with only non-CEO level employment history in the industry; 
and FHH_Indu_CEO_Exp, the fraction of independent directors with CEO-level employment 
history in the industry.  
Column (1) in both Panels shows results consistent with those of Faleye et al. (2013); 
independent directors’ industry experience is positively related to firm value. However, this 
positive relation is driven by those with the industry-CEO experience. Column (2) reveals that 
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non-CEO level industry experience alone is not significantly related to firm value. The positive 
relation is significant only when the industry experience is combined with CEO experience.  
Columns (4) – (6) are motivated by Fahlenbrach et al. (2010), who examine only current CEO-
directors. Three parallel experience variables within Fahlenbrach et al.’s framework are 
constructed: FLS_CEO_Exp, the fraction of independent directors who are current CEOs of other 
Compustat firms; FLS_CEO_Only_Exp, the fraction of those who are current CEOs of other 
firms with different two-digit SIC code; and FLS_Indu_CEO_Exp, the fraction of those who are 
current CEOs of other firms in the same two-digit SIC code.  
The estimated coefficient of FLS_CEO_Exp is positive and significant with industry-, 
state-, and year fixed effects but become insignificant with firm- and year fixed effects, 
highlighting the importance of controlling for unobservable (time-invariant) firm characteristics. 
The insignificant result with firm fixed effects is consistent with Fahlenbrach et al.’s finding that 
current CEO-directors have no significant effects on improving operating performance. The 
coefficients of FLS_CEO_Only_Exp are insignificant in both Panels. However, the coefficients 
of FLS_Indu_CEO_Exp are positive and significant regardless of the choice of fixed effects. 
Independent director-current CEOs are associated with higher firm value only when they are 
CEOs of firms in a similar industry.   
The last three columns are based on our definitions of independent directors’ experience: 
Indu_Only_Exp, CEO_Only_Exp, and Indu_CEO_Exp. Our definition of industry expertise is 
stricter than Faleye et al. (2013), as we require at least 5 years of work experience obtained 
during the last 15 years in the same three-digit SIC code industry. Our CEO experience also 
differs from Fahlenbrach et al. (2010), as we include both current and past CEOs.  
The results are largely consistent with those in the first six columns, but more precise. 
CEO-only experience shows an insignificant coefficient even with industry fixed effects. 
Industry-only experience has a significant coefficient with industry fixed effects, but it becomes 
insignificant with firm fixed effects. By contrast, the combined industry-CEO experience shows 
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a positive and significant coefficient under both specifications. The magnitude of the coefficient 
is also large. Assuming a board with seven independent directors (the sample median), the 
coefficient of Indu_CEO_Exp in Panel B, Column (9) implies that if one of the seven 
independent directors has the industry-CEO experience, the firm’s Q will be higher by 0.19.  
The coefficients of the control variables are also largely consistent with our priors: firm 
are valued higher when operation is more profitable, not in financially distress, smaller, younger; 
and have fewer tangible assets, smaller boards, and CEOs chairing the board,.  
1.3.3 Industry-CEO Experience or Individual talent? 
The positive relation between industry-CEO experience and firm value may not be due to 
the experience factor.  It could simply reflect the individual’s ability that enables them to 
experience a CEO position; that is, what enhances firm value is the individual talent, not 
industry-CEO experience. To test this individual talent hypothesis against the experience 
hypothesis, we construct two variables. Indu_CEO_Exp_Other is an indicator for other firms 
having independent directors identified as having industry-CEO experience in their boards as 
directors. Since this indicator does not rule out non-independent director positions in other firms, 
we also define Indu_CEO_Exp_Other_Indep, equal to one only when those with industry-CEO 
experience serve on other firms’ boards as independent directors. Our sample contains 677 (425) 
firm-year observations showing the presence of such directors (independent directors) in other 
firms. We estimate the baseline regression with each of the two variables with industry-, state- 
and year fixed effects and with firm- and year fixed effects. The results, reported in Table 1.5, 
show no significant coefficient on either variable, regardless of the choice of fixed effects. The 
higher firm value associated with industry-CEO experience is not observed when the same 
individuals serve on the boards of other firms. The value enhancement seems to arise from the 
experience, not individual talents per se.  
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1.3.4 Investment Efficiency  and the Combined Experience  
If the industry-CEO experience helps improve firm value, how does it do it? A potential 
channel is greater efficiency of corporate investments. An independent director with CEO 
experience in a closely related industry may have valuable insights into what types of 
investments should be promoted or curtailed to provide a competitive edge and/or to put the firm 
in the position of sustainable growth. We explore this channel by estimating the impact of the 
industry-CEO experience on the value-investment sensitivity with the following specification: 
Qit = αi + αt + β1∙Ind_Dir_Expit + β2∙Ind_Dir_Expit∙Invit + β3∙Invit + β4∙Controlit + μit   (2) 
The coefficient of main interest is β2, which measures the impact of independent directors’ 
experience on the value-investment sensitivity. Proxies for investments are capital expenditures 
and R&D expense divided by property, plant, and equipment, Capx/PPE and R&D/PPE, 
respectively. Control variables are the same as before.  
Table 1.6 reports estimation results. Both measures of investments are positively related to 
Q, suggesting capital expenditures and R&D investments are on average value enhancing. More 
important, the interaction between the industry-CEO experience and investment intensity shows 
a positive and significant coefficient regardless of which proxy is used to measure investments 
and the choice of fixed effects. We also examine whether industry-only or CEO-only experience 
also increases the value-investment sensitivity by repeating the estimation with the separate 
experience variables in place of the combined experience. The coefficients on the interaction 
between the separate experience variables and investment intensity are insignificant (unreported). 
Independent directors’ experience seems to require the combination of industry-CEO experience 
to be helpful in enhancing the efficiency of investments.  
1.4 Management-Board Interaction and the Value of Experience  
If independent directors indeed contribute to improving firm value and the efficiency of 
investments, the effect is likely to accrue through interactions with management, as their primary 
roles are monitoring and advising management. Hence, the positive effect of the industry-CEO 
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experience should be stronger when management-board interaction is greater. In this section we 
test this prediction, employing three distinct proxies for the interaction: product market 
environment, management activeness, and the frequency of board meetings.   
1.4.1 Product Market Environment  
Our first proxy for management-board interaction relies on external circumstances: 
product market environment. Competitive pressures and changes in the product market keep 
managers on their toes, prompting new initiatives and efficiency-enhancing measures to stay 
abreast, or to get ahead of the competition. Many of the activities require board approval, 
triggering interactions between management and independent directors. Managers facing fierce 
competition and rapid changes in product markets also need any help they can get. So they may 
better utilize independent directors’ advisory capacity by seeking their advice, generating greater 
interactions with the board.  
The product market environment index, Prod_Env, is based on three components: The 
first is a traditional industry concentration measure; Herfindahl-Hirschman index, HHI, taken 
Gordon Phillips’ website. It is the squared sum of the market shares of the four biggest firms in 
sales among competitor firms in the same year, where market share is calculated based on the list 
of competitor firms defined by Hoberg and Phillips (2010). Lower HHI means less concentration 
and greater competition. The other components are based on fluctuations in the product market, 
measuring dynamic aspects of competitive threat and demand shocks. The second is fluidity, 
Fluid, also taken from Gordon Phillips’ website. It reflects product market threats and 
instabilities surrounding a firm, arising out of competitor actions. Hoberg, Phillips, and Prabhala 
(2013) measure it by how rivals are changing their product descriptions that overlap with the 
firm’s product space. Greater fluidity reflects more actions by the rivals (e.g., new products in 
reaction to technology improvement) and greater competitive threat. The third component 
focuses on the demand side of product market, Vdshock, defined by Li, Lu, and Phillips (2013). 
It is the annual percentage change in NAICS two-digit industry level aggregate demand, 
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measured by the chain-type quantity indexes for gross output from the BEA (Bureau of 
Economic Analysis) website. A larger Vdshock reflects a greater demand increase for the 
industry’s products in a given year. 
Prod_Env is the sum of L_HHI, H_Fluid, and H_Vdshock. L_HHI is equal to one if HHI 
is below the sample median; H_Fluid is equal to one if Fluid is above the sample median; and 
H_Vdshock is equal to one if Vdshock is above the sample median. A higher value of Prod_Env, 
therefore, means greater competition, threats from rivals, and demand shocks in the product 
market. We divide the sample into high- and low product market environment subsamples, 
H_Prod_Env and L_Prod_Env, based on the sample median and re-estimate the baseline 
regressions separately for each subsample.  
The results are reported in Panel A of Table 1.7. The coefficient on the industry-CEO 
experience variable with firm- and year fixed effects is 2.548 for the high product market 
environment subsample, significant at the one percent level. The coefficient implies a ten percent 
increase in the fraction of independent directors with industry-CEO combined experience is 
associated with a 0.255 higher Q. The low product market environment subsample, by contrast, 
shows an insignificant coefficient on the combined experience variable when we control for 
firm- and year fixed effects. 
1.4.2 Management Activeness  
The second proxy for management-board interaction is based on the level of business 
initiatives. Unlike the proxy based on product market environment, this proxy is endogenous but 
is intuitively appealing. We measure management activeness by the frequency and magnitude of 
corporate events such as equity issues, M&As, capital expenditures, and R&D investments. 
Many of these activities require board approval, leading to more management-board interaction. 
The activeness index, Act , is the sum of the following four variables during the fiscal year, each 
divided by total assets: (1) The total amount of equity issued. (2) The total M&A transaction 
19 
 
volume (including divestitures and spinoffs). When M&A transaction volume is missing in SDC, 
this ratio is replaced by yearly sample median. (3) Capital expenditures. (4) R&D expense. 
Higher activeness will lead to more management-board interaction, providing greater 
opportunities to utilize independent directors’ experience. If a firm-year’s Act is equal to or 
greater than the sample median, 
 
it is assigned to the high activeness subsample, H_Act; if less 
than the median, the low activeness subsample, L_Act. Table 1.7, Panel B reports the results. 
Regardless of the choice of fixed effects, the industry-CEO experience variable shows a positive 
and significant coefficient only in the high-activeness subsample.  
1.4.3 Frequency of Board Meetings 
Our final proxy is the most direct and endogenous measure of management-board 
interaction; the number of board meetings held each year. Adams (2003) argues board meetings 
are the focal point of independent directors’ time, energy, and effort. Information on the number 
of board meetings is available in ExecuComp only through 2005 with partial observations in 
2006. (S&P stopped collecting the number of board meetings in 2007.) We hand-collect the 
number of board meeting data after 2005 from company proxy statements.  
As before, we estimate the baseline regressions separately for high- and low frequency 
board meeting subsamples, as defined by the sample median. The results are reported in Table 
1.7, Panel C. The estimated coefficient on the combined experience variable is significant only 
for the high-frequency board meeting subsample.  
Taken together, these results imply the industry-CEO experience adds value only with a 
high level of management-board interaction. This evidence is robust to using different proxies 
for the interaction, including a more exogenous proxy based on product market environment.  
1.5 Endogeneity, IV Regressions, and Other Robustness Checks 
We begin by exploring possible factors affecting the likelihood of having independent 
directors with industry-CEO experience in the board. To address endogeneity issues, we use the 
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instrumental variables approach. We also check robustness to alternative measures of key 
variables, to outliers, and to alternative sample constructions. 
1.5.1 Determinants of Independent Directors’ Experience 
Whether a firm has independent directors with industry-CEO experience is the result of 
matching. Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) articulate the matching process for current CEO-directors by 
considering the supply and demand. We apply their approach to the case of independent directors 
with industry-CEO experience. Intuitively, we expect firms where the potential benefits are 
greatest will more actively recruit independent directors with the combined experience, with 
those directors preferring firms with less reputational risk and unfamiliarity, and more prestige 
and compensation.  
Small and young firms with growth prospects may benefit more from useful advice and 
guidance from independent directors with industry-CEO experience. We proxy the size and age 
by lagged values of sales volume and firm age, Ln(Sales)t-1 and Ln(FirmAge)t-1. Firms with more 
complicated organizational structure may need more effective monitoring and advising (Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen, 2008), leading to more active recruitment of independent directors with 
industry-CEO experience. The natural log of the number of business segments as reported in 
Compustat, Ln(Segments)t-1,  is used to proxy organizational complexity/  
When a firm is more active in new business initiatives, it would benefit more from having 
independent directors with industry-CEO experience. The level of business initiatives is proxied 
by the lagged value of Act, Actt-1. Firms operating in more competitive product markets with high 
fluidity and positive industry demand shocks may benefit more from the advice and guidance by 
independent directors with industry-CEO experience. So we also include Prod_Env as a possible 
determinant. We do not lag this variable because it is an exogenous variable unlikely to be 
subject to a reverse causality. 
Independent directors with industry-CEO experience may have more options (i.e., in a 
greater demand) and, hence, are more likely to avoid underperforming firms and firms in 
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financial distress to protect their reputation. We use EBITDA/TAt-1 to proxy for past firm 
performance, and Altman’s Z-score, Zscoret-1, to proxy for financial condition.  
CEO characteristics may also matter. CEOs with high share ownership have a greater 
incentive to recruit independent directors with valuable experience. Powerful CEOs may feel 
more secure to recruit someone who may challenge them with strong experience. We proxy CEO 
incentives with CEO share ownership, CEO_Own and CEO_Own
2
; and powerful CEOs with 
CEO_Chair and CEO tenure, Log(CEO_Ten). Finally, a larger board with more independent 
directors has more room to include independent directors with unique experience. We 
include %_Independent and Ln(BoardSize) as potential determinants. 
One complicating factor for examining the determinants is that we are considering three 
types of independent directors’ experience. Given that no clear ordering exists among them, we 
follow Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) and estimate a multinomial logit model. In Table 1.8, Model (1) 
focuses on industry experience, while Model (2) is on CEO experience. In Model (1), we group 
all firms into three categories: firms with independent directors with industry-CEO experience 
(the dependent variable equals to zero); industry-only experience but no industry-CEO 
experience (the dependent variable equals to one); or no industry experience (the dependent 
variable equals to two). Similarly, in Model (2), we groups all firms into those with independent 
directors with industry-CEO experience; CEO-only experience but no industry-CEO experience; 
or no CEO experience. All regressions control for industry (two-digit SIC code) and year fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the CEO-firm pair level. 
In Model (1), we are primarily interested in differences between firms with industry-CEO 
experience and firms with industry-only experience. In Column (1), industry-only experience is 
the baseline, and the coefficients are changes in the odds ratio of the presence of industry-CEO 
experience. Firms with independent directors with industry-CEO experience tend to be smaller 
and younger, operate in tougher product market environment, are more active, and have a higher 
percentage of independent directors. Estimates in Column (3) of Model (2) show mostly similar 
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differences between firms with industry-CEO experience and firms with CEO-only experience. 
Overall, smaller and younger firms, operating in tougher product markets with demand shocks 
and taking on more activities, are more likely to have independent directors with industry-CEO 
experience.  
1.5.2      Endogeneity Issues 
The relation between the presence of industry-CEO experience, management-board 
interaction, and Tobin’s Q is subject to endogeneity. For example, higher-valued firms or firms 
with more active management may have greater success in attracting independent directors with 
the valuable experience; and those directors may be more inclined to quit when a firm is about to 
suffer from poor performance. There may also be time-varying omitted variables affecting 
Tobin’s Q, the fraction of the independent directors with industry-CEO experience, and 
management-board interaction at the same time. We address these endogeneity issues with the 
instrumental variable regression approach.  
The relation between the industry-CEO experience and firm value is examined first.  
Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) find that current CEO-directors come from firms with similar size. If 
this pattern extends to the case of independent directors with industry-CEO experience, firms 
with a greater number of similar sized firms within the same industry are more likely to have 
independent directors with industry-CEO experience. We use the number of firms in the three-
digit SIC code with sales within ±10% of the sample firm’s sales volume, Similar_Size, as the 
instrumental variable for the fraction of independent directors with industry-CEO experience. 
This variable is unlikely to have a direct effect on firm performance, other than the indirect effect 
through a higher likelihood of having an independent director with industry-CEO experience, 
satisfying the exclusion restriction. One possible concern is that a greater number of firms in the 
same industry may pose greater competition; however, it is not clear whether such competition 
will increase or decrease Q. Nevertheless, we safeguard against the potential effects through 
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competition by including the HHI defined by Hoberg and Phillips (2010).
9
 The IV regressions 
control for industry-, state- and year fixed effects, because the time series variation in the number 
of similar-sized firms in the three-digit SIC code is too limited to control for firm fixed effects. 
Standard errors are corrected by bootstrapping.  
As expected, the first-stage results, reported in Column (1) of Table 1.A2, show that 
Similar_Size is positively related to the industry-CEO experience variable at the 1% significance 
level. The second-stage results, reported in Column (1) of Table 1.9, illustrate the robustness of 
the positive effect of the industry-CEO experience on firm value. 
In the remaining columns of Table 1.9, we address endogeneity in the interactive effect of 
the experience and management-board interaction. Of the three proxies for management-board 
interaction, endogeneity is of less concern for Prod_Env, which is based on industry-level data. 
However, Act and Meet are subject to endogeneity issues. For example, firms with higher 
Tobin’s Q tend to have more investment opportunities, leading to more corporate financing and 
investment activities, i.e., higher Act. Vafeas (1999) shows board meetings are more frequent 
when performance declines. In addition, omitted variables related to both firm performance and 
management activeness or the number of board meetings are of concern. Thus, we employ 
instrumental variables for H_Act and H_Meet. In instrumenting the interactive effects, we use the 
full-sample with interaction terms instead of subsample analyses. 
In Table 1.9, Column (2), we instrument Indu_CEO_Exp and 
Indu_CEO_Exp*H_Prod_Env using two IVs: Similar_Size and Similar_Size*H_Prod_Env. The 
first-stage results are reported in Columns (2)-(3) of Table 1.A2. The second-stage result in 
Table 1.9 shows a positive and significant coefficient on the predicted value of the interaction 
term, Indu_CEO_Exp*H_Prod_Env.  
                                                 
9 Since the baseline regressions do not control for HHI, we re-estimate all regressions while adding HHI as a control. The results 
hardly change. The IV regression results also remain mostly unaffected when we do not control for HHI.  
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Table 1.9, Column (3) reports the second stage IV regression result on the interactive 
effect of Indu_CEO_Exp and H_Act treating Indu_CEO_Exp, H_Act, and 
Indu_CEO_Exp*H_Act as endogenous. We use three IVs: The first IV is Similar_Size for 
Indu_CEO_Exp. The IV for H_Act is Rho, taken from Wilson (2009). It is a measure of the cost 
of R&D capital after taking account of state and federal R&D tax credits. Because the tax credits 
change the costs of investment, it may affect the investment activities. R&D tax credits also 
apply to other firms at the state- and the nation-wide level, not to a specific firm, and, hence, may 
not have a direct impact on an individual firm performance, other than through their impacts on 
Act. Because firms tend to conduct R&D activities near their headquarters, we use Rho value of 
the state of headquarter location. The third IV is the interaction term of Similar_Size and Rho, IV 
for Indu_CEO_Exp*H_Act. The first-stage results are reported in Columns (4)-(6) of Table 1.A2. 
The second-stage regression result, reported in Column (3) of Table 1.9, shows a positive, albeit 
insignificant, coefficient on the predicted value of the interaction term. The insignificant 
coefficient may be due to multi-colinearity between the predicted values of Indu_CEO_Exp and 
Indu_CEO_Exp*H_Act. Their coefficients are jointly significant at 10% level (F-statistic of 
4.89).  
Lastly, we estimate IV regressions for the interactive effect of Indu_CEO_Exp and 
H_Meet on firm value using three IVs: Similar_Size, AirHub, and Similar_Size*AirHub. AirHub 
is an indicator for whether a firm’s headquarter is located within 60-mile radius of top 20 U.S. 
hub airports by passenger traffic volume. The distance is based on ZIP codes. We use AirHub to 
instrument the number of board meetings, because firms with a convenient access to a large 
airport may hold board meetings more frequently. It satisfies the exclusion restriction, because 
the easy access to top 20 hub airports is unlikely to be directly related to firm value.
10
 The first-
stage results are reported in Columns (7)-(9) of Table 1.A2. The second-stage result, reported in 
                                                 
10 Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2012) use the proximity to U.S. top 20 airports by international traffic as an IV for the fraction of 
foreign independent directors in the board. 
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Column (4) of Table 1.9, also shows a positive, albeit insignificant, coefficient on the predicted 
value of the interaction term. The statistical insignificance seems to be due to multi-colinearity 
between the predicted values of Indu_CEO_Exp and Indu_CEO_Exp*H_Meet. The coefficients 
are jointly significant at the 1% level (F-statistic of 15.34).  
In sum, our findings that (1) independent directors’ industry-CEO experience help 
increase firm value and (2) the effectuation of the value enhancement requires active 
management-board interaction seem to be robust to endogeneity issues.  
1.5.3     Other Robustness Tests   
In this section we test whether our findings are also robust to alternative measures of key 
variables, to outliers, and to alternative sample constructions.  
1.5.3.1 Alternative Measures of Key Variables  
Alternative performance measures 
To examine the sensitivity of our main findings to other measures of firm performance, 
we re-estimate baseline regressions using as the dependent variable buy-and-hold stock returns 
during the fiscal year; asset utilization rate (sales divided by total assets); and return on assets 
(EBITDA/TA). The results are reported in the first three sections of Table 1.10, Panel A without 
reporting control variables’ coefficients.
 11
 The first column reports the results on the total 
sample; and the next six columns, on high and low management-board interaction subsamples 
using different proxies for the interaction. All results are robust, except when ROA is used as the 
dependent variable and the number of board meetings is used to proxy for management-board 
interaction.  
Alternative measures of industry-CEO experience. 
We define the industry-CEO experience based on three-digit SIC code, requiring industry 
work experience for more than five years during the past 15 years. However, Faleye et al. (2013) 
                                                 




construct industry expertise of independent directors based on two-digit SIC code with no 
minimum work experience or shelf life. To examine the sensitivity of our results to their 
definition of industry experience, we redefine industry-CEO experience using two-digit SIC code, 
requiring no minimum work experience or shelf life and re-estimate the regressions. The results 
reported in Section 4 of Panel A are robust.  
Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) consider only current CEO-directors, whereas our definition of 
industry-CEO experience includes former CEOs in the same industry. Some of the former CEOs 
could be former CEOs of the same company, who could be classified as independent after a 
certain passage of time. This is of concern because Fahlenbrach, Minton, and Pan (2011) show 
that firms with their own former CEOs on the board have significantly better operating 
performance. Hence, the industry-CEO experience value effect could be driven by former CEOs 
of the same firm. To address this concern, we construct two alternative industry-CEO experience; 
FLS_Ind_CEO_Exp, which includes only currents CEOs of firms in two-digit SIC code, and 
Indu_CEO_Exp_No_FCEO, which is the same as our definition of Indu_CEO_Exp except that 
all former CEOs of the same company are excluded. The re-estimation results using these 
alternative definitions are reported in Sections 5 and 6 of Panel A. The results are again robust. 
In the last two sections, we redefine Indu_CEO_Exp based on two-digit SIC code and Fama-
French 48 industry groupings. The results are robust.   
1.5.3.2 Outliers 
Since the number of firm-year observations with independent directors with industry-
CEO experience is relatively small, the results on the combined experience are susceptible to 
outliers. We take three steps to examine whether our results are driven by outliers. First, Tobin’s 
Q is winsorized at top 1%. This reduces the maximum value of Q from 55.729 to 8.179. Second, 
we exclude firms with within-firm standard deviation in Q in the top 1%. Third, we exclude 
firms that have within-firm standard deviation in the fraction of independent directors with 
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industry-CEO experience in the top 1%. Re-estimation results based on these modified samples, 
reported Table 1.10, Panel B, show our findings are not driven by outliers.    
1.5.3.3 Alternative Sample Constructions 
Business relationships between appointing and appointee firms  
Our sample includes 321 firm-year (339 firm-year-director) observations in which an 
independent directors is current CEO of another firm in the same 3-digit SIC code. Among the 
321 observations, we find some business relationship between the appointing and appointee firm 
pairs in 54 firm-year observations. These business relationships are not material. If they are 
material, RiskMetrics will not classify the outside director as independent. Our web search also 
confirms that the business relationships are immaterial. Nevertheless, we re-estimate the baseline 
regressions while excluding the 54 firm-years and report the results in Section 1 of Table 1.10, 
Panel C. The results are very similar in both magnitude and statistical significance.  
Are results driven by specific industries? 
Independent directors with industry-CEO experience are over-represented in the industry 
with SIC 7370 (computer programming, data processing, and other computer related services). 
Of the 1,069 firm-year-director observations with industry-CEO experience, 297 are in SIC 7370. 
SIC 2830 (drugs) has 134 observations, and SIC 3670 (electronic components and accessories) 
shows 118 observations. No other SIC contains more than 100 observations.
12
 We re-estimate 
the baseline regressions while excluding all observations belonging to SIC code 7370 and report 
the results in Section 2 of Table 1.10, Panel C. The results are robust.  
Firms in financial distress  
Boards tend to become more active when firms are in financial distress (Vafeas, 1999). 
To check whether the interactive estimates of industry-CEO experience and management-board 
                                                 
12 SIC code 3840 (surgical, medical, and dental instruments and supplies) shows 61; SIC code 3660 (communications equipment), 
41; SIC code 3550 (special industry machinery, except metalworking), 38; SIC code 3820 (laboratory apparatus and analytical, 
optical, measuring, and controlling instruments), 36; SIC code 1310 (crude petroleum and natural gas), 35; SIC code 1380 (oil 
and gas field services), 35; and the remaining 274 firm-year-director observations are spread over 41 other SIC codes. 
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interaction are driven by observations in financial distress, we exclude firms in financial distress, 
which are defined as those receiving the Altman Z-score less than 1.81. The re-estimation results, 
reported in Section 3 of Panel C, are robust.  
Firms affected by the independent board requirement  
The independent board requirement promulgated by NYSE and NASDAQ in 2002 has 
changed board compositions for firms that did not have a majority of independent directors prior 
to the regulation, affecting their likelihood of having independent directors with industry-CEO 
experience. We exclude firms affected by the exchange regulation, and report re-estimation 
results in Section 4 of Panel C. The results are robust. 
1.6 Implications 
We find independent directors with CEO experience in a closely related industry can 
have positive impacts on firm value. However, only a small fraction of firms show the presence 
of such an independent director on their boards, which suggests shareholders may be better 
served by more aggressive recruiting of independent directors with the combined experience. 
However, there may be reasons for the scarcity. Firms may be reluctant to recruit CEOs of firms 
in a closely related industry because they may become rivals in the same product market. Such 
concerns may be alleviated by recruiting former rather than current CEOs; indeed, we find 68% 
of independent directors with industry-CEO experience are former CEOs.  
The beneficial impact of industry-CEO experience is observed only when business 
circumstances call for greater management-board interaction. This evidence provides another 
normative implication: To extract the most value out of independent directors’ experience, 
management should actively engage their independent directors by seeking their advice and 
sharing relevant information. Independent directors also should proactively demand greater 
interaction with management. Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2013) suggest one way independent 
directors can generate more interactions. They examine board and committee meeting minutes of 
11 partially government-owned Israeli firms and find in about 20% of issues discussed during 
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meetings, boards request further information or updates, or take some initiatives. These actions 
will generate more interactions with management and enhance independent directors’ 
effectiveness as advisors and monitors.  
Finally, a caveat is in order. We focus on a specific, rather scarce, independent director 
characteristic. There may be other characteristics that are as valuable. More research on the 
interplay between other independent director characteristics and management-board interaction 







Table 1.1: Sample Description by Year.  
This table reports, by year, the number of observations and the fraction of firms with independent director(s) with relevant 
experience. Column (2) shows the number of firms in each fiscal year. Columns (3) and (4) show the number and fraction of firms 
with independent directors who have at least 5 years of experience in the same industry (three-digit SIC code). Columns (5) and (6), 
and Columns (7) and (8) show the number and fraction of firms with independent directors who have CEO experience, and of 
independent directors with CEO experience in the same industry (three-digit SIC code), respectively.  
    
Independent directors with 
industry experience 
Independent directors with CEO 
experience 
Independent directors with 
industry-CEO experience 
Year Total number of firms Number of firms  Percent of firms  Number of firms  Percent of firms  Number of firms  Percent of firms  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
2000 956 761 79.6 490 51.3 41 4.3 
2001 985 841 85.4 535 54.3 58 5.9 
2002 989 872 88.2 563 56.9 64 6.5 
2003 1,003 900 89.7 586 58.4 73 7.3 
2004 1,007 922 91.6 591 58.7 77 7.6 
2005 980 920 93.9 598 61 79 8.1 
2006 998 947 94.9 630 63.1 85 8.5 
2007 1,010 976 96.6 669 66.2 102 10.1 
2008 950 915 96.3 662 69.7 92 9.7 
2009 1,095 1,056 96.4 743 67.9 113 10.3 
2010 1,077 1,042 96.8 743 69 127 11.8 
Total 11,050 10,152 91.9 6,810 61.6 911 8.2 
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics. 
This table reports summary statistics of variables used in the paper. Variable definitions are provided in Table 
1.A1. 
  Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Variable Name (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Independent directors’ experience variables  
Indu_Only_Exp 0.555 0.6 0.286 0 1 
CEO_Only_Exp 0.149 0.125 0.166 0 1 
Indu_CEO_Exp 0.016 0 0.061 0 1 
FHH_Indu_Exp 0.893 1 0.244 0 1 
FHH_Indu_Only_Exp 0.866 1 0.249 0 1 
FHH_Indu_CEO_Exp 0.027 0 0.075 0 1 
FLS_CEO_Exp 0.068 0 0.11 0 1 
FLS_CEO_Only_Exp 0.058 0 0.102 0 1 
FLS_Indu_CEO_Exp 0.009 0 0.043 0 0.5 
Indu_CEO_Exp_Other 0.053 0 0.223 0 1 
Indu_CEO_Exp_Other_Ind 0.033 0 0.179 0 1 
Panel B: Management-board interaction variables  
H_Prod_Env 0.39 0 0.488 0 1 
H_Act 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 1 
H_Meet 0.551 1 0.497 0 1 
Panel C: Firm performance and characteristics variables  
Tobin's Q 1.989 1.589 1.434 0.389 55.729 
EBITDA/TA 0.132 0.134 0.107 -1.877 0.447 
Z-Score 4.125 2.794 7.598 -57.427 154.743 
Z_Dum 0.834 1 0.372 0 1 
Z_Distress 0.065 0 0.246 0 1 
Ln(Sales) 7.353 7.243 1.555 -1.149 12.96 
PPE/TA 0.516 0.423 0.372 0.005 3.956 
Ln(FirmAge) 2.92 2.89 0.795 0 4.454 
Ln(Segments) 0.574 0.693 0.602 0 2.398 
Capx/PPE 0.118 0.094 0.099 0.001 4.302 
R&D/PPE 0.246 0.063 0.648 0 28.184 
Panel D: Governance variables  
CEO_Own 0.022 0.003 0.058 0 0.761 
CEO_Chair 0.573 1 0.495 0 1 
CEO_Ten 7.3 5 7.385 0 60 
Ind_Dir_Own 0.015 0.004 0.047 0 0.942 
BoardSize 8.936 9 2.283 3 21 
%_Indep_Dir 0.701 0.727 0.164 0 1 
Panel E: Instrumental variables 
Similar_Size 50.586 13 77.826 0 518 
Rho 1.166 1.177 0.044 1.028 1.238 




Table 1.3: Firm Performance Changes Around Appointments Independent Directors with Different Experience.  
This table reports changes in firm performance around appointments of independent directors with different types of experience. 
Tobin’s Q is the measure of firm performance. In Panel A, Tobin’s Q is adjusted by subtracting the industry (three-digit SIC) 
median Tobin’s Q. In Panel B, Tobin’s Q is adjusted by subtracting the control firm’s Tobin’s Q, where the control firm has the 
same three-digit SIC code with Tobin’s Q in event year -2 within ±10% of the sample firm and is closest in sales. Event year 0 is the 
fiscal year a firm appoints independent director(s) with relevant experience. Performance before the appointment is the average over 
event years -2 and -3; performance after the appointment, the average over event years +1 through +3. The third row is the 
difference in the performance before and after the appointment. Columns (1) and (2) show the mean performance of firms 
appointing independent directors with industry-CEO experience and of firms appointing independent directors with industry-only 
experience, respectively, with Column (3) showing the difference between the two types of appointment. Columns (4) and (5) show 
the mean performance of firms appointing independent directors with CEO-only experience and the difference with appointment of 
independent directors with industry-CEO director experience, respectively. T-tests are used to determine whether the mean is 
significantly different from zero, and two-sample t-tests are used to test whether the mean for industry-CEO experience is 
significantly different from that for industry-only or for CEO-only experience. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are 
















(1) and (4) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A: Industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. 
Before 0.415*** 0.549*** -0.134 0.469*** -0.054 
After 0.542*** 0.297*** 0.245** 0.322*** 0.220** 
Difference 0.128 -0.252*** 0.380*** -0.147*** 0.275** 
Panel B: Size, performance, industry-adjusted Tobin's Q. 
Before -0.096 0.009 -0.105 -0.03 -0.066 
After 0.238 -0.001 0.239* -0.021 0.259** 
Difference 0.335* -0.015 0.350** 0.011 0.324** 
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Table 1.4: Independent Directors' Experience and Firm Value. 
Panel A: Controlling for Industry-, State-, and year Fixed Effects. 
This table estimates the relation between various types of independent directors’ experience and firm value. Variable definitions are provided 
in Appendix 1. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. The sample period covers 2000 through 2010. All regressions control for industry (two-
digit SIC), state, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the CEO-firm pair level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients 
marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Tobin's Q 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
FHH_Indu_Exp 0.283*** 
        
 
-0.082 




       
  
-0.085 




      
   
-0.321 
      
FLS_CEO_Exp 
   
0.285** 
     
    
-0.137 
     
FLS_CEO_Only_Exp 
    
0.135 
    
     
-0.138 
    
FSL_Indu_CEO_Exp 
     
1.055** 
   
      
-0.445 
   
Ind_Only_Exp 
      
0.207*** 
  




       
0.089 
 




        
1.185** 
         
-0.466 
EBITDA/TA 5.561*** 5.561*** 5.579*** 5.565*** 5.565*** 5.569*** 5.557*** 5.563*** 5.593*** 
 
-0.601 -0.603 -0.602 -0.602 -0.603 -0.603 -0.6 -0.603 -0.6 
Z_Distress -0.274*** -0.280*** -0.282*** -0.284*** -0.285*** -0.278*** -0.275*** -0.285*** -0.280*** 
 
-0.065 -0.065 -0.065 -0.065 -0.065 -0.065 -0.065 -0.065 -0.065 
Z_Dum -0.830*** -0.828*** -0.828*** -0.822*** -0.824*** -0.829*** -0.832*** -0.823*** -0.824*** 
 
-0.074 -0.074 -0.074 -0.074 -0.074 -0.074 -0.074 -0.074 -0.073 
Ln(Sales) -0.168*** -0.167*** -0.165*** -0.170*** -0.168*** -0.167*** -0.165*** -0.169*** -0.162*** 
 
-0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.021 -0.02 
PPE/TA -0.508*** -0.507*** -0.515*** -0.511*** -0.510*** -0.511*** -0.506*** -0.510*** -0.504*** 
 
-0.082 -0.083 -0.083 -0.083 -0.083 -0.083 -0.082 -0.083 -0.082 
Ln(FirmAge) -0.071*** -0.071*** -0.065** -0.074*** -0.072*** -0.068*** -0.088*** -0.071*** -0.065** 
 
-0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 -0.026 
CEO_Own 0.318 0.309 0.374 0.357 0.338 0.325 0.223 0.358 0.372 
 
-0.818 -0.819 -0.821 -0.823 -0.821 -0.82 -0.814 -0.82 -0.821 
CEO_Own2 -0.604 -0.574 -0.636 -0.618 -0.595 -0.556 -0.429 -0.638 -0.644 
 
-2.05 -2.05 -2.052 -2.066 -2.057 -2.054 -2.02 -2.046 -2.048 
CEO_Chair 0.018 0.019 0.021 0.019 0.019 0.021 0.02 0.019 0.02 
 
-0.036 -0.036 -0.037 -0.037 -0.037 -0.037 -0.036 -0.037 -0.037 
Ind_Dir_Own 0.549* 0.542 0.572* 0.556* 0.549 0.563* 0.522 0.551* 0.568* 
 
-0.333 -0.334 -0.334 -0.333 -0.334 -0.337 -0.331 -0.333 -0.334 
Ln(BoardSize) -0.157* -0.159* -0.161* -0.160* -0.161* -0.162* -0.148* -0.163* -0.169** 
 
-0.085 -0.086 -0.086 -0.086 -0.086 -0.086 -0.085 -0.086 -0.085 
Constant 2.810*** 2.943*** 3.060*** 3.102*** 3.083*** 3.081*** 2.971*** 3.093*** 3.041*** 
 
-0.25 -0.258 -0.251 -0.252 -0.252 -0.252 -0.253 -0.252 -0.25 
Observations 9,937 9,937 9,937 9,937 9,937 9,937 9,937 9,937 9,937 




Table 1.4: Independent Directors' Experience and Firm Value. 
Panel B: Controlling for Firm- and Year Fixed Effects. 
This table estimates the relation between various types of independent directors’ experience and firm value. Variable definitions are provided 
in Appendix 1. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. The sample period covers 2000 through 2010. All regressions control for firm-, and year 
fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the CEO-firm pair level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** 
are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Tobin's Q 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
FHH_Indu_Exp 0.165** 
        
 
-0.074 




       
  
-0.085 




      
   
-0.364 
      
FLS_CEO_Exp 
   
0.258 
     
    
-0.157 
     
FLS_CEO_Only_Exp 
    
0.007 
    
     
-0.153 
    
FSL_Indu_CEO_Exp 
     
1.615*** 
   
      
-0.578 
   
Ind_Only_Exp 
      
-0.012 
  




       
-0.12 
 




        
1.301** 
         
-0.538 
EBITDA/TA 3.974*** 3.976*** 3.973*** 3.980*** 3.977*** 3.984*** 3.976*** 3.976*** 3.971*** 
 
-0.414 -0.414 -0.411 -0.413 -0.414 -0.41 -0.414 -0.414 -0.409 
Z_Distress -0.198*** -0.199*** -0.202*** -0.201*** -0.200*** -0.197*** -0.200*** -0.199*** -0.199*** 
 
-0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 -0.045 
Z_Dum -0.404*** -0.405*** -0.405*** -0.405*** -0.405*** -0.406*** -0.405*** -0.406*** -0.407*** 
 
-0.074 -0.074 -0.073 -0.074 -0.074 -0.073 -0.074 -0.073 -0.073 
Ln(Sales) -0.617*** -0.616*** -0.616*** -0.618*** -0.615*** -0.620*** -0.615*** -0.613*** -0.612*** 
 
-0.087 -0.087 -0.087 -0.088 -0.088 -0.087 -0.087 -0.088 -0.086 
PPE/TA -0.227* -0.229* -0.244* -0.235* -0.231* -0.244* -0.232* -0.231* -0.237* 
 
-0.134 -0.135 -0.135 -0.134 -0.134 -0.134 -0.134 -0.134 -0.134 
Ln(FirmAge) -0.153* -0.150* -0.151* -0.146* -0.149* -0.146* -0.146* -0.151* -0.153* 
 
-0.088 -0.088 -0.088 -0.087 -0.088 -0.087 -0.087 -0.088 -0.088 
CEO_Own 0.744 0.75 0.698 0.729 0.747 0.704 0.753 0.765 0.662 
 
-0.691 -0.693 -0.694 -0.692 -0.693 -0.692 -0.694 -0.693 -0.694 
CEO_Own2 -2.881* -2.877* -2.803* -2.873* -2.869* -2.805* -2.878* -2.887* -2.776* 
 
-1.555 -1.565 -1.576 -1.571 -1.571 -1.569 -1.569 -1.568 -1.582 
CEO_Chair 0.057* 0.057* 0.060* 0.059* 0.057* 0.060* 0.057* 0.055* 0.062* 
 
-0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 
Ind_Dir_Own 0.353 0.355 0.354 0.362 0.356 0.37 0.356 0.348 0.356 
 
-0.286 -0.286 -0.286 -0.284 -0.286 -0.285 -0.286 -0.289 -0.287 
Ln(BoardSize) -0.345*** -0.353*** -0.359*** -0.358*** -0.357*** -0.363*** -0.360*** -0.359*** -0.361*** 
 
-0.104 -0.105 -0.104 -0.104 -0.104 -0.104 -0.104 -0.105 -0.104 
Constant 7.544*** 7.653*** 7.701*** 7.701*** 7.700*** 7.735*** 7.703*** 7.720*** 7.670*** 
 
-0.791 -0.807 -0.78 -0.786 -0.786 -0.783 -0.79 -0.786 -0.774 
Observations 9,963 9,963 9,963 9,963 9,963 9,963 9,963 9,963 9,963 




Table 1.5: Industry-CEO Experience or Individual Talents? 
This table estimates effects on firm value when independent directors with industry-CEO experience sit on other 
firms’ boards. Indu_CEO_Exp_Other is an indicator for other firms having independent directors identified as 
having industry-CEO experience in their boards as directors. Indu_CEO_Exp_Other_Indep is an indicator for 
other firms having independent directors identified as having industry-CEO experience in their boards as 
independent directors. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q of other firms and control variables are also of other 
firms. The sample period covers 2000 through 2010. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. 
Regressions control for industry (two-digit SIC), state, and year fixed effects in Columns (1) and (2), and firm- 
and year fixed effects in Columns (3) and (4). Robust standard errors clustered at the CEO-firm pair level are 























EBITDA/TA 5.563*** 5.565*** 3.981*** 3.978*** 
 
-0.603 -0.603 -0.413 -0.414 
Z_Distress -0.284*** -0.284*** -0.199*** -0.199*** 
 
-0.065 -0.065 -0.045 -0.045 
Z_Dum -0.824*** -0.824*** -0.407*** -0.406*** 
 
-0.074 -0.074 -0.074 -0.073 
Ln(Sales) -0.167*** -0.166*** -0.614*** -0.615*** 
 
-0.021 -0.021 -0.087 -0.087 
PPE/TA -0.509*** -0.510*** -0.231* -0.230* 
 
-0.083 -0.083 -0.134 -0.134 
Ln(FirmAge) -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.151* -0.149* 
 
-0.026 -0.026 -0.088 -0.088 
CEO_Own 0.343 0.328 0.748 0.749 
 
-0.822 -0.821 -0.694 -0.694 
CEO_Own
2
 -0.612 -0.587 -2.858* -2.867* 
 
-2.059 -2.055 -1.567 -1.569 
CEO_Chair 0.021 0.02 0.057* 0.057* 
 
-0.037 -0.037 -0.032 -0.032 
Ind_Dir_Own 0.539 0.54 0.367 0.362 
 
-0.331 -0.332 -0.292 -0.286 
Ln(BoardSize) -0.163* -0.163* -0.354*** -0.357*** 
 
-0.086 -0.086 -0.103 -0.104 
Constant 3.071*** 3.069*** 7.699*** 7.703*** 
 
-0.252 -0.253 -0.783 -0.785 
Industry/State/Year FE Y Y N N 
Firm/Year FE N N Y Y 
Observations 9,937 9,937 9,963 9,963 
Adjusted R
2




Table 1.6: Independent Directors’ Industry-CEO Experience and Investment Efficiency. 
This table estimates the impacts of independent directors’ industry-CEO experience on the firm value-investment 
sensitivity. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. Investment is measured by capital expenditures divided by PPE 
in Columns (1)-(2), and R&D expense divided by PPE in Columns (3)-(4). The sample period covers 2000 
through 2010. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. Regressions control for industry (two-digit SIC), 
state, and year fixed effects in Columns (1) and (3), and firm- and year fixed effects in Columns (2) and (4). 
Robust standard errors clustered at the CEO-firm pair level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with 
*, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
  Tobin's Q 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Indu_CEO_Exp 0.29 0.203 -0.143 0.407 
 
-0.284 -0.306 -0.502 -0.571 













   
-0.095 -0.063 
Indu_CEO_Exp*R&D/PPE 1.484** 1.985*** 
   
-0.58 -0.466 
EBITDA/TA 5.358*** 3.833*** 5.935*** 4.971*** 
 
-0.126 -0.155 -0.764 -0.516 
Z_Distress -0.239*** -0.175*** -0.372*** -0.173*** 
 
-0.052 -0.051 -0.098 -0.062 
Z_Dum -0.783*** -0.409*** -0.981*** -0.515*** 
 
-0.036 -0.043 -0.088 -0.1 
Ln(Sales) -0.155*** -0.631*** -0.166*** -0.690*** 
 
-0.011 -0.033 -0.024 -0.106 
PPE/TA -0.395*** -0.172** -0.379*** -0.259 
 
-0.041 -0.076 -0.121 -0.208 
Ln(FirmAge) -0.029* -0.06 -0.087*** -0.223* 
 
-0.016 -0.057 -0.034 -0.123 
CEO_Own 0.099 0.681 1.802 1.895 
 
-0.436 -0.591 -1.227 -1.248 
CEO_Own
2
 0.055 -2.787* -4.292 -7.212** 
 
-1.192 -1.448 -3.545 -3.669 
CEO_Chair 0.022 0.064** 0.052 0.073* 
 
-0.022 -0.025 -0.047 -0.041 
Ind_Dir_Own 0.573** 0.316 1.202** 0.496 
 
-0.235 -0.283 -0.513 -0.557 
Ln(BoardSize) -0.181*** -0.351*** -0.194* -0.431*** 
 
-0.054 -0.071 -0.115 -0.139 
Constant 2.241*** 7.409*** 4.373*** 8.852*** 
 
-0.594 -0.311 -0.355 -0.86 
Industry/State/Year FE Y N Y N 
Firm/Year FE N Y N Y 
Observations 9,893 9,919 6,648 6,667 
Adjusted R
2




Table 1.7: Management-Board Interaction, Independent Directors’ Experience, and Firm Value. 
Panel A: Interactive Effects of Product Market Environment and Independent Directors' Experience on Firm 
Value. 
This table estimates the interactive effects of industry-CEO experience and product market environment. The 
dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. H_Prod_Env and L_Prod_Env are defined by the median of the product market 
index, Prod_Env, which is the sum of L_HHI, H_Fluid, and H_VDshock. L_HHI is equal to one if HHI is below 
the sample median; zero otherwise. H_Fluid is equal to one if Fluidity is above the sample median; zero 
otherwise. H_VDshock is equal to one if VDshock is above the sample median; zero otherwise. HHI is 10-K text 
based Herfindahl-Hierschmann index developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010). Fluidity is 10-K text based 
product market fluidity measure developed by Hoberg, Phillips and Prabhala (2013). It assesses the degree of 
competitive threat and product market changes surrounding a firm. VDshock is annual percentage change in 
NAICS two-digit industry level aggregate demand, measured by the chain-type quantity indexes for gross output 
from the BEA website. The sample period covers 2000 through 2010. Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix 1. Regressions control for industry (two-digit SIC), state, and year fixed effects in Columns (1) and (2), 
and firm- and year fixed effects in Columns (3) and (4). Robust standard errors clustered at the CEO-firm pair 




  H_Prod_Env L_Prod_Env H_Prod_Env L_Prod_Env 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Indu_CEO_Exp 0.799*** 0.965* 2.548*** -0.073 
 
-0.298 -0.542 -0.895 -0.404 
EBITDA/TA 4.706*** 7.020*** 3.123*** 5.434*** 
 
-0.232 -1.053 -0.673 -0.373 
Z_Distress -0.510*** -0.081 -0.305*** -0.095** 
 
-0.115 -0.1 -0.105 -0.041 
Z_Dum -1.105*** -0.607*** -0.677*** -0.124 
 
-0.071 -0.08 -0.151 -0.075 
Ln(Sales) -0.255*** -0.091*** -0.793*** -0.504*** 
 
-0.023 -0.02 -0.163 -0.074 
PPE/TA -0.512*** -0.359*** -0.143 -0.416*** 
 
-0.081 -0.127 -0.201 -0.113 
Ln(FirmAge) -0.073** -0.029 -0.139 -0.054 
 
-0.035 -0.028 -0.226 -0.089 
CEO_Own 0.705 -0.036 -1.475 1.649** 
 
-0.939 -0.857 -1.596 -0.783 
CEO_Own
2
 -2.094 0.813 -0.013 -3.606** 
 
-2.562 -2.033 -3.829 -1.588 
CEO_Chair 0.065 0.005 0.153** 0.01 
 
-0.046 -0.04 -0.071 -0.032 
Ind_Dir_Own 0.342 0.817* 0.086 0.172 
 
-0.543 -0.45 -0.438 -0.266 
Ln(BoardSize) -0.336*** -0.109 -0.619*** -0.174* 
 
-0.113 -0.078 -0.236 -0.095 
Constant 7.995*** 4.107*** 10.061*** 5.729*** 
 
-1.033 -0.568 -1.334 -0.774 
Industry/State/Year FE Y Y N N 
Firm/Year FE N N Y Y 
Observations 3,651 5,836 3,662 5,850 
Adjusted R
2




Table 1.7: Management-Board Interaction, Independent Directors’ Experience, and Firm Value. 
Panel B:  Interactive Effects of Management Activeness and Independent Directors' Experience on Firm 
Value. 
This table estimates the interactive effects of industry-CEO experience and management activeness. The 
dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. H_Act and L_Act are defined by the median of the management activeness 
index, Act, which is the sum of the following variables: (1) total amount of equity a firm has issued during the 
fiscal year divided by total assets; (2) total M&A transaction volume a firm has engaged in during the fiscal year 
divided by total assets; (3) R&D expense during the fiscal year divided by total assets; (4) Capital expenditures 
during the fiscal year divided by total assets. The sample period covers 2000 through 2010. Variable definitions 
are provided in Appendix 1. Regressions control for industry (two-digit SIC), state, and year fixed effects in 
Columns (1) and (2), and firm- and year fixed effects in Columns (3) and (4). Robust standard errors clustered at 
the CEO-firm pair level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
Tobin's Q 
  H_Act L_Act H_Act L_Act 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Indu_CEO_Exp 1.133** 0.431 1.938*** -0.037 
 
-0.534 -0.75 -0.705 -0.59 
EBITDA/TA 4.485*** 7.951*** 3.676*** 4.412*** 
 
-0.749 -0.413 -0.623 -0.419 
Z_Distress -0.429*** -0.034 -0.245** -0.080** 
 
-0.102 -0.048 -0.101 -0.038 
Z_Dum -0.977*** -0.487*** -0.656*** -0.184* 
 
-0.093 -0.088 -0.121 -0.094 
Ln(Sales) -0.181*** -0.114*** -0.715*** -0.362*** 
 
-0.025 -0.023 -0.154 -0.056 
PPE/TA -0.431*** -0.570*** -0.146 -0.255*** 
 
-0.117 -0.072 -0.208 -0.087 
Ln(FirmAge) -0.092** 0.005 -0.14 0.007 
 
-0.038 -0.024 -0.195 -0.062 
CEO_Own 1.994* -0.494 0.527 0.667 
 
-1.193 -0.755 -1.504 -0.676 
CEO_Own
2
 -3.542 1.115 -4.655 -1.895 
 
-2.953 -1.76 -4.042 -1.357 
CEO_Chair -0.032 0.069** 0.073 0.013 
 
-0.052 -0.035 -0.058 -0.031 
Ind_Dir_Own 0.589 0.473 0.496 0.006 
 
-0.46 -0.292 -0.69 -0.36 
Ln(BoardSize) -0.087 -0.289*** -0.584*** -0.116 
 
-0.118 -0.093 -0.191 -0.107 
Constant 5.907*** 2.519*** 8.672*** 4.158*** 
 
-0.329 -0.473 -1.262 -0.53 
Industry/State/Year FE Y Y N N 
Firm/Year FE N N Y Y 
Observations 5,096 4,794 5,111 4,805 
Adjusted R
2




Table 1.7: Management-Board Interaction, Independent Directors’ Experience, and Firm Value. 
Panel C: Interactive Effects of the Frequency of Board Meetings and Independent Directors' Experience on 
Firm Value. 
This table estimates the interactive effects of industry-CEO experience and the frequency of board meetings. The 
dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. H_Meet and L_Meet are defined by the sample median of the number of board 
meetings. The sample period covers 2000 through 2010. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. 
Regressions control for industry (two-digit SIC), state, and year fixed effects in Columns (1) and (2), and firm- 
and year fixed effects in Columns (3) and (4). Robust standard errors clustered at the CEO-firm pair level are 
reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
Tobin's Q 
  H_Meet L_Meet H_Meet L_Meet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Indu_CEO_Exp 1.236** 0.84 2.048*** -0.111 
 
-0.574 -0.664 -0.707 -0.757 
EBITDA/TA 4.255*** 7.369*** 3.261*** 5.094*** 
 
-0.787 -0.747 -0.542 -0.683 
Z_Distress -0.346*** -0.168* -0.275*** -0.094* 
 
-0.084 -0.088 -0.068 -0.055 
Z_Dum -0.761*** -0.996*** -0.317*** -0.563*** 
 
-0.077 -0.12 -0.072 -0.151 
Ln(Sales) -0.174*** -0.148*** -0.695*** -0.568*** 
 
-0.024 -0.03 -0.111 -0.115 
PPE/TA -0.356*** -0.717*** -0.158 -0.348 
 
-0.099 -0.105 -0.146 -0.223 
Ln(FirmAge) -0.033 -0.101*** -0.029 -0.267* 
 
-0.032 -0.036 -0.102 -0.159 
CEO_Own 1.416 -0.143 1.325 1.028 
 
-1.179 -0.897 -1.291 -0.951 
CEO_Own
2
 -2.623 0.077 -3.545 -3.433* 
 
-2.69 -2.237 -3.318 -2.005 
CEO_Chair 0.009 0.004 0.034 0.092* 
 
-0.046 -0.047 -0.043 -0.049 
Ind_Dir_Own 0.601 0.397 0.722 0.532* 
 
-0.488 -0.359 -0.515 -0.297 
Ln(BoardSize) -0.058 -0.291** -0.185 -0.462*** 
 
-0.11 -0.116 -0.133 -0.165 
Constant 4.823*** 4.205*** 7.510*** 7.975*** 
 
-0.294 -0.543 -1.031 -1.039 
Industry/State/Year FE Y Y N N 
Firm/Year FE N N Y Y 
Observations 5,384 4,410 5,392 4,428 
Adjusted R
2




Table 1.8: Determinants of Independent Directors’ Experience. 
The table reports results from multinomial logit regression of the determinants of independent directors’ 
experience. In Model (1), the dependent variable is equal to zero if Indu_CEO_Exp is greater than zero, one if 
Indu_Only_Exp is greater than zero and Indu_CEO_Exp is equal to zero, two if both Indu_Only_Exp and 
Indu_CEO_Exp are equal to zero. In Model (2), the dependent variable is equal to zero if Indu_CEO_Exp is greater 
than zero, one if CEO_Only_Exp is greater than zero and Indu_CEO_Exp is equal to zero, two if both 
CEO_Only_Exp and Indu_CEO_Exp are equal to zero. In Model (1), the independent directors with industry-only 
experience is the baseline, and the coefficients in Column (1) represent changes in the odds ratio of the presence of 
independent directors with industry-CEO experience vs. industry-only experience. In Model (2), independent 
directors with CEO-only experience is the baseline and the coefficients in Column (3) represent changes in the 
odds ratio of the presence of independent directors with industry-CEO experience vs. CEO-only experience. The 
sample period covers 2000 through 2010. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. All regressions control 
for industry (two-digit SIC) and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the CEO-firm pair level are 
reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
 
Type of Independent Director's Experience 
 














VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EBITDA/TAt-1 -0.461 -2.057*** -0.583 0.092 
 
-0.674 -0.702 -0.75 -0.521 
Z-Scoret-1 0.003 0.002 0.006 -0.011 
 
-0.01 -0.009 -0.01 -0.007 
Z_Dumt-1 -1.244 0.15 -1.481 -0.831 
 
-1.1 -0.661 -1.106 -0.513 
Ln(Sales)t-1 -0.168** 0.153** -0.339*** -0.381*** 
 
-0.078 -0.076 -0.082 -0.053 
Ln(FirmAge)t-1 -0.460*** -0.837*** -0.402*** -0.11 
 
-0.115 -0.138 -0.116 -0.082 
Ln(Segment)t-1 -0.024 -0.209* -0.096 -0.231** 
 
-0.148 -0.124 -0.15 -0.091 
Prod_Env 0.384*** -0.146* 0.423*** 0.075 
 
-0.087 -0.078 -0.088 -0.053 
Actt-1 0.296*** -0.267 0.388*** 0.15 
 
-0.113 -0.315 -0.132 -0.119 
CEO_Own -2.53 -0.232 -1.837 0.834 
 
-1.929 -1.384 -2.131 -1.21 
CEO_Chair -0.168 -0.031 -0.143 -0.046 
 
-0.175 -0.159 -0.181 -0.109 
Ln(CEO_Ten) 0.118 -0.242*** 0.179* 0.146** 
 
-0.094 -0.077 -0.095 -0.057 
Ln(BoardSize) 0.632 -0.342 -0.038 -1.543*** 
 
-0.393 -0.325 -0.404 -0.242 
%_Indep_Dir 2.030*** -0.415 0.143 -4.009*** 
 
-0.607 -0.566 -0.635 -0.336 
Constant -4.261*** -0.329 0.198 8.957*** 
 
-1.358 -1.192 -1.404 -0.658 
Industry/Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 8,843 8,843 8,843 8,843 




Table 1.9: Second-Stage IV Regression Results. 
This table reports the second-stage IV regression results of the interactive effects of industry-CEO experience of 
independent directors and management-board interaction. The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. The predicted 
endogenous variables are Indu_CEO_Exp_Hat in Column (1); Indu_CEO_Exp_Hat and 
(Indu_CEO_Exp*H_Prod_Env)_Hat in Column (2); Indu_CEO_Exp_Hat, (Indu_CEO_Exp*H_Act)_Hat, and 
H_Act_Hat in Column (3); Indu_CEO_Exp_Hat, (Indu_CEO_Exp*H_Meet)_Hat, and H_Meet_Hat in Column 
(4). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. The sample period covers 2000 through 2010. First-stage 
regression results are reported in Appendix 2. All regressions control for industry (two-digit SIC), state, and year 
fixed effects. Bootstrapped robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and 
*** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Tobin's Q 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Indu_CEO_Exp_Hat 21.153*** 16.306** -14.899 5.134 
 
















   
8.219 

















   
1.398** 
    
-0.58 
EBITDA/TA 6.000*** 6.110*** 5.275*** 6.618*** 
 
-0.22 -0.222 -0.282 -0.841 
Z_Distress -0.212*** -0.212** -0.009 -0.362*** 
 
-0.082 -0.086 -0.255 -0.088 
Z_Dum -0.780*** -0.864*** -0.534* -0.780*** 
 
-0.056 -0.058 -0.287 -0.067 
Ln(Sales) -0.081*** -0.090*** -0.119*** -0.190*** 
 
-0.026 -0.028 -0.027 -0.034 
PPE/TA -0.418*** -0.371*** -0.642*** -0.433*** 
 
-0.065 -0.067 -0.147 -0.106 
Ln(FirmAge) 0.015 0.015 0.021 0.007 
 
-0.031 -0.033 -0.029 -0.032 
CEO_Own 1.226* 1.300* 1.659 2.189** 
 
-0.703 -0.727 -2.122 -1.02 
CEO_Own2 -1.865 -2.009 -2.61 -3.052 
 
-1.853 -1.897 -5.128 -1.921 
CEO_Chair 0.014 0.005 -0.008 0.117 
 
-0.034 -0.036 -0.095 -0.088 
Ind_Dir_Own 0.980*** 0.998*** 0.492 0.889* 
 
-0.373 -0.381 -0.363 -0.503 
Ln(BoardSize) -0.339*** -0.328*** -0.241*** -0.306*** 
 
-0.091 -0.099 -0.093 -0.087 
HHI 0.275* 0.296* 0.242 0.001 
 
-0.158 -0.167 -0.337 -0.129 
Constant 3.463*** 3.695*** 1.96 2.889*** 
 
-0.626 -0.639 -1.423 -0.732 
Industry/State/Year FE Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,740 9,431 9,632 8,945 
Wald 17941 17088 20665 19663 
F-statistic (the top two instrumented variables) 31.77 2.93 12.6 




Table 1.10: Robustness Checks. 
Panel A: Alternative Measures of Key Variables. 
This table re-estimates key regressions using alternative measures of key variables. Sections 1 through 3 use alternative 
performance measures: 1-year buy-and-hold stock return, asset utilization rate, and ROA. The remaining Sections test 
robustness to alternative measures of industry-CEO experience of independent directors: industry experience based on the 
definition of Faleye et al. (2013) in Section 4; CEO experience based on the definition of Fahlenbrach et al. (2010) in Section 
5; industry-CEO experience excluding former CEOs of the same company in Section 6; and industry-CEO experience based 
on two-digit SIC code and Fama-French 48 industry groupings in Sections 7 and 8. Variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix 1. The sample period covers 2000 through 2010. The same set of control variables as in the baseline specification is 
included, except when ROA is the dependent variable. All regressions include firm- and year fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the CEO-firm pair level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant 
at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Section 1: Buy-Hold Returns 
 
Full H_Prod_Env L_Prod_Env H_Act L_Act H_Meet L_Meet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Indu_CEO_Exp 0.911** 1.463** -0.08 1.033** 0.887 1.351** 0.515 
 
-0.363 -0.648 -0.322 -0.493 -0.694 -0.637 -0.494 
Firm/Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,917 3,643 5,827 5,091 4,779 5,365 4,410 
Adjusted R2 0.293 0.259 0.372 0.242 0.389 0.345 0.372 
Section 2: Sales/TA 
Indu_CEO_Exp 0.132* 0.228** -0.016 0.201*** -0.063 0.173* 0.094 
 
-0.067 -0.102 -0.094 -0.075 -0.139 -0.089 -0.103 
Firm/Year FE Y Y 
 
Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,963 3,662 5,850 5,111 4,805 5,392 4,428 
Adjusted R2 0.94 0.939 0.949 0.935 0.952 0.938 0.958 
Section 3: ROA 
Indu_CEO_Exp 4.795** 7.901** -1.815 7.228** 3.234 -3.711 16.154* 
 
-2.341 -3.686 -3.844 -3.123 -4.645 -7.547 -8.5 
Firm/Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,958 3,646 5,853 5,074 4,838 5,352 4,459 
Adjusted R2 0.423 0.412 0.468 0.431 0.435 0.388 0.529 
Section 4: Tobin's Q 
FHH_Indu_CEO_Exp 0.676* 2.030*** -0.196 1.161** -0.047 1.387*** -0.287 
 
-0.364 -0.714 -0.262 -0.526 -0.34 -0.503 -0.529 
Firm/Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,963 3,662 5,850 5,111 4,805 5,392 4,428 
Adjusted R2 0.644 0.556 0.741 0.56 0.798 0.698 0.704 
Section 5: Tobin's Q 
FLS_CEO_Indu_Exp 1.615*** 2.835** 0.519 2.044** 0.838 1.401** 2.259* 
 
-0.578 -1.105 -0.491 -0.873 -0.527 -0.65 -1.189 
Firm/Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,963 3,662 5,850 5,111 4,805 5,392 4,428 
Adjusted R2 0.645 0.556 0.741 0.561 0.798 0.697 0.707 
Section 6: Tobin's Q 
Indu_CEO_Exp_No_FCEO 1.342** 2.549*** -0.099 2.013*** -0.05 2.178*** -0.133 
 
-0.588 -0.928 -0.489 -0.754 -0.709 -0.775 -0.808 
Firm/Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,963 3,662 5,850 5,111 4,805 5,392 4,428 
Adjusted R2 0.644 0.556 0.741 0.562 0.798 0.699 0.704 
Section 7: Tobin's Q 
Indu_CEO_Exp_SIC2 0.766** 2.049*** -0.049 1.220** 0.025 1.417*** -0.103 
 
-0.363 -0.718 -0.268 -0.523 -0.342 -0.504 -0.518 
Firm/Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,963 3,662 5,850 5,111 4,805 5,392 4,428 
Adjusted R2 0.644 0.556 0.741 0.56 0.798 0.698 0.704 
Section 8: Tobin's Q 
Indu_CEO_Exp_FF48 0.809** 1.707*** -0.241 1.253** 0.11 1.633*** -0.349 
 
-0.339 -0.635 -0.285 -0.51 -0.303 -0.475 -0.494 
Firm/Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,963 3,662 5,850 5,111 4,805 5,392 4,428 




Table 1.10: Robustness Checks. 
Panel B: Outliers. 
This table re-estimates key regressions while winzorizing Tobin’s Q at top 1% in Section 1; dropping firms with within-firm 
standard deviation in Tobin’s Q greater than 4.01 (top 1%) in Section 2; and dropping firms with within-firm standard 
deviation in Indu_CEO_Exp greater than 0.141 (top 1%) in Section 3. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. The 
sample period covers 2000 through 2010. The same set of control variables as in the baseline specification is included but not 
reported. All regressions include firm- and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the CEO-firm pair level are 
reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Section 1: Winzorize Tobin’s Q at Top 1%. 
  Tobin's Q 
 
Full H_Prod_Env L_Prod_Env H_Act L_Act H_Meet L_Meet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Indu_CEO_Exp 1.058** 2.156*** -0.155 1.580** 0.091 1.701*** -0.208 
 
-0.472 -0.738 -0.387 -0.641 -0.448 -0.626 -0.663 
Firm/Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,963 3,662 5,850 5,111 4,805 5,392 4,428 
Adjusted R2 0.704 0.652 0.779 0.634 0.831 0.678 0.765 
Section 2: Drop Firms with Within-Firm Standard Deviation in Tobin's Q Greater than 4.01 (Top 1%). 
  Tobin's Q 
Indu_CEO_Exp 1.162** 2.311*** -0.07 1.784** -0.037 2.045*** -0.309 
 
-0.531 -0.884 -0.404 -0.701 -0.589 -0.706 -0.745 
Firm/Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,875 3,608 5,822 5,037 4,791 5,346 4,394 
Adjusted R2 0.67 0.612 0.74 0.602 0.798 0.646 0.72 
Section 3: Drop Firms with Within-Firm Standard Deviation in Indu_CEO_Exp Greater than 0.141 (Top 1%). 
  Tobin's Q 
Indu_CEO_Exp 1.760*** 3.260*** -0.052 2.573*** -0.054 2.580*** 0.134 
 
-0.615 -1.078 -0.418 -0.795 -0.661 -0.801 -0.911 
Firm/Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,790 3,555 5,792 4,992 4,752 5,306 4,352 




Table 1.10: Robustness Checks. 
Panel C: Alternative Sample Constructions. 
This table re-estimates the key regressions with alternative sample constructions. Section 1 is based on a sample excluding 
firms with non-material business relationships with firms to which the independent director with industry-CEO experience 
belongs; Section 2, on a sample excluding firms in SIC code 7370; Section 3, on a sample excluding financially distressed 
firms; and Section 4, on a sample excluding firms affected by the independent board requirement. Variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix 1. The sample period covers 2000 through 2010. The same set of control variables is included as in the 
baseline specification but not reported. All regressions include firm- and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at 
the CEO-firm pair level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 




Full H_Prod_Env L_Prod_Env H_Act L_Act H_Meet L_Meet 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Indu_CEO_Exp 1.199** 2.363*** -0.054 1.807** -0.037 1.950*** -0.24 
 
-0.55 -0.916 -0.41 -0.726 -0.59 -0.72 -0.767 
Firm/Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,915 3,627 5,838 5,065 4,803 5,368 4,404 
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.566 0.741 0.569 0.798 0.706 0.712 
Section 2: Exclude Firms in IT industries (SIC code 7370). 
  Tobin's Q 
Indu_CEO_Exp 1.233** 2.521*** -0.297 1.857*** -0.038 1.914*** -0.066 
 
-0.549 -0.899 -0.393 -0.72 -0.59 -0.712 -0.766 
Firm/Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,778 3,602 5,746 4,991 4,740 5,258 4,379 
Adjusted R2 0.645 0.556 0.748 0.563 0.795 0.698 0.707 
Section 3: Exclude Financially Distressed Firms. 
  Tobin's Q 
Indu_CEO_Exp 1.324** 2.588*** 0.02 1.963*** -0.002 2.020*** -0.037 
 
-0.552 -0.929 -0.421 -0.725 -0.627 -0.717 -0.811 
Firm/Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,481 3,498 5,570 4,948 4,492 5,108 4,238 
Adjusted R2 0.641 0.551 0.738 0.56 0.794 0.7 0.697 
Section 4: Exclude Firms Affected by the Independent Board Requirement.  
  Tobin's Q 
Indu_CEO_Exp 1.477** 2.806*** 0.254 2.127*** -0.026 2.248*** -0.169 
 
-0.577 -0.977 -0.393 -0.745 -0.681 -0.701 -0.847 
Firm/Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 8,834 3,223 5,209 4,584 4,218 4,845 3,862 




Table 1.11: Variable Definitions and Data Sources. 
Variable Name Definition Source 
Panel A: Independent Directors’ Experience Variables. 
Ind_Only_Exp Fraction of independent directors with at least 5 years of non-CEO 
level employment history in Compustat firms with the same three-
digit SIC code during the last 15 years, excluding those with CEO-




CEO_Only_Exp Fraction of independent directors with CEO level employment history 
in Compustat firms in different three-digit SIC during the last 15 
years, excluding those with CEO-level employment history in the 
same industry. 
 
Indu_CEO_Exp Fraction of independent directors with CEO-level employment history 
in Compustat firms with the same three-digit SIC code during the last 
15 years. 
 
FHH_Indu_Exp  Fraction of independent directors with employment history in 
Compustat firms with the same two-digit SIC code. 
 
FHH_Indu_Only_Exp  Fraction of independent directors with non-CEO level employment 
history in Compustat firms in the same two-digit SIC code, excluding 
those with CEO-level employment history in the same industry. 
 
FHH_Indu_CEO_Exp  Fraction of independent directors with CEO-level employment history 
in Compustat firms with the same two-digit SIC code. 
 
FLS_CEO_Exp  Fraction of independent directors who are current CEOs of Compustat 
firms. 
 
FLS_CEO_Only_Exp  Fraction of independent directors who are current CEOs of Compustat 
firms with different two-digit SIC code. 
 
FLS_Indu_CEO_Exp Fraction of independent directors who are current CEOs of Compustat 
firms with the same two-digit SIC code. 
 
Indu_CEO_Exp_Other An indicator for other firms having independent directors identified as 




An indicator for other firms having independent directors identified as 
having industry-CEO experience in their boards as independent 
directors. 
  
Panel B: Management-Board Interaction Variables.  
Prod_Env The sum of L_HHI, H_Fluid, and H_VDshock. L_HHI is equal to one 
if HHI is below the sample median; zero otherwise. H_Fluid is equal 
to one if Fluidity is above the sample median; zero otherwise. 
H_VDshock is equal to one if VDshock is above the sample median; 
zero otherwise. HHI is 10-K text based Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2010). Fluidity is 10-K text based 
product market fluidity measure developed by Hoberg, Phillips, and 
Prabhala (2013). VDshock is annual percentage change in NAICS 
two-digit industry level aggregate demand, measured by the chain-
type quantity indexes for gross output from the BEA website, as 




BEA website    
Act Management activeness index, the sum of the following four variables 
during the fiscal year divided by total assets: (1) The total amount of 
equity a firm has issued. (2) The total M&A transaction volume 
(including divestitures and spinoffs). When M&A transaction volume 
is missing in SDC, this ratio is replaced by yearly sample median. (3) 
Capital expenditures. (4) R&D expense.  
SDC; 
Compustat 




Table 1.A1: Variable Definitions and Data Sources (continued). 
Num of Meetings The number of board meetings held during the fiscal year. The 




H_Prod_Env An indicator equal to one if Prod_Env is greater than sample median, 
and zero otherwise. 
  
H_Act An indicator equal to one if Act is greater than the sample median, and 
zero otherwise 
 
H_Meet An indicator equal to one if the number of board meetings is greater 
than the sample median, and zero otherwise.  
 
Panel C: Firm Performance and Characteristic Variables.  
Tobin’s Q The market value of common equity plus the book value of total 
liabilities divided by the book value of total assets.  
Compustat 
EBITDA/TA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization divided 
by total assets  
Compustat 
Z-Score Altman’s Z-Score, calculated following Altman (1968). If any 
accounting variable necessary to calculate Z-Score is missing, Z-Score 
is set equal to zero to maintain the sample size. 
Compustat 
Z_Dum An indicator variable equal to zero if any accounting variable 
necessary to calculate Z-Score is missing, and one otherwise.  
Compustat 
Z_Distress An indicator for financial distress, equal to one if Altman’s Z-score is 
less than 1.81, and zero otherwise. Z_Distress is equal to zero when 
Z_Dum is equal to zero to maintain the sample size.  
Compustat 
Ln(Sales) The natural log of sales. Compustat 
PPE/TA Property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. Compustat 
FirmAge The number of years from the firm’s IPO as reported in CRSP or the 
number of years since its first appearance in CRSP. 
CRSP 
Segments The number of business segments reported in Compustat Segment 
database  
Compustat  
Capx/PPE Capital expenditures divided by property, plant, and equipment. Compustat 
R&D/PPE Research and development expense divided by property, plant, and 
equipment.  
Compustat 
Panel D: CEO and Board Characteristic Variables.  
CEO_Own The percentage of outstanding common shares held by the CEO. ExecuComp 
CEO_Chair An indicator for the CEO chairing the board.  ExecuComp 
CEO_Ten The number of years the CEO has been in office. ExecuComp 
Ind_Dir_Own The percentage of total outstanding common shares held by 
independent directors. 
RiskMetrics 
BoardSize Total number of directors in the board. RiskMetrics 
%_Indep_Dir The percentage of independent directors in the board. RiskMetrics 
Panel E: Instrument Variables.  
Similar_Size Number of firms in the same industry (three-digit SIC) with sales 
volume within ±10%  of the sample firm 
Compustat  
Rho A measure of the user cost of R&D capital (per dollar of investment) 




AirHub Indicator for whether a firm’s headquarter is located within 60-mile 
radius of top 20 U.S. hub airports by passenger traffic volume. 
FAA website  
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Table 1.12: First-Stage IV Regression Results. 
This table reports the first-stage IV regression results. The endogenous variable(s) is Indu_CEO_Exp in Model (1); Indu_CEO_Exp and 
Indu_CEO_Exp*H_Prod_Env in Model (2); Indu_CEO_Exp, Indu_CEO_Exp*H_Act, and H_Act in Model (3); and Indu_CEO_Exp, 
Indu_CEO_Exp*H_Meet, and H_Meet in Model (4). The instrumental variable for Indu_CEO_Exp is Similar_Size; for H_Act, Rho; for H_Meet, AirHub. 
The dependent variable is Indu_CEO_Exp in Columns (1), (2), (4) and (7); Indu_CEO_Exp*H_Prod_Env in Column (3); Indu_CEO_Exp*H_Act in Column 
(5); H_Act in Column (6); Indu_CEO_Exp*H_Meet in Column (8); and H_Meet in Column (9). Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1. The sample 
period covers 2000 through 2010. The same set of control variables used in Table 7 and HHI are included in the regressions but not shown for brevity. All 
regressions control for industry (two-digit SIC), state, and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, 
and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 












VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Similar_Size 0.001*** 0.001* -0.001*** 0.032*** 0.026*** 0.054* 0 0 0.010*** 
 








      
Rho 
   
-0.026 -0.052 -0.19 
   
    
-0.076 -0.069 -0.738 
   
Similar_Size*Rho 
   
-0.027*** -0.022*** -0.035 
   
    
-0.005 -0.005 -0.025 
   
AirHub 
      
0.008*** 0.006*** -0.036** 
       
-0.002 -0.001 -0.018 
Similar_Size*AirHub 
      
0.002*** 0.001** -0.004 
       
0 0 -0.003 
Industry/State/Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,881 9,431 9,431 9,816 9,769 9,769 9,213 9,078 9,078 
Adjusted R2 0.106 0.1 0.135 0.101 0.095 0.166 0.098 0.07 0.113 
F-statistic (IVs) 20.71 7.08 55.11 9.63 7.18 28.17 21.59 14.09 8.66 




Chapter 2. Experienced Independent Directors  
2.1 Introduction 
The board of directors is an important governance mechanism to alleviate agency problems. 
However, the evidence on its impacts on firm performance is largely mixed.
13
 This discrepancy 
raises the need to understand how the board works, what are the characteristics of a good board, 
and under which conditions it becomes effective. 
The board’s role of resolving agency problems and protecting shareholder values derives 
from independent directors. They are outsiders of a firm, serving on the board as part-time jobs. 
Independent directors have limited time and resources: They govern a firm mainly through board 
meeting attendance, reviewing firm documents and business proposals, and discussing or voting 
on them. Independent directors rely on management as their primary source of information 
(Dominguez-Martinez, Swank, and Visser 2008; Adams, Hermalin, and  Weisbach, 2010). 
However, the quality of information independent directors get may be limited, because the 
management may be unwilling to share information due to the monitoring role of the 
independent directors (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). Interacting efficiently with management to 
obtain pertinent information within a short period of time is crucial for independent directors to 
be effective.  
While the academic literature has extensively used board independence as a measure of 
board quality, it is not clear how well it works because utilizing directors’ affiliation alone may 
be too simplistic. Researchers have suggested other measures of board quality utilizing the 
heterogeneity of directors’ incentives and experience, such as financial incentives (Shivdasani, 
1993; Fich and Shivdasani, 2005), number of directorships in other firms (Ferris, Jagannathan, 
and Pritchard 2003; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006), industry or CEO experience (Fich, 2005; Faleye, 
Hoitash, and Hoitash, 2013), financial expertise (Burak Güner, Malmendier, and Tate, 2008), 
                                                 
13
 While many papers show positive correlations between board independence and firm value (Weisbach, 1988; 
Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Brickley, Coles, and Terry, 1994; Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani, 1996), still some 
studies do not (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; 




director tenure (Vafeas, 2003), social connections between independent directors and CEO 
(Hwang and Kim, 2009), and connections to the directors on other firms’ boards (Coles, Daniel, 
and Naveen, 2012). 
Extending the previous literature, I propose past independent directorship experience as a 
new proxy of board quality. To make contributions to management proposals, independent 
directors need to identify areas of improvement and ask discerning questions to obtain additional 
information to perform their advising and monitoring duties. Independent directors need skills to 
accomplish tasks quickly during the board meetings, which may be learned through past 
independent director experience. Inside director experience may not provide such skills, because 
those positions are usually full-time commitment with sufficient access to firm resources, 
working for the CEO and hence provide neither outside perspectives nor serve as monitors of the 
management. I argue that independent but inexperienced directors may not be able to perform as 
well as experienced ones, and therefore focusing on the experienced directors rather than all 
independent directors is a better way to measure board quality. I use the fraction of independent 




In addition to the independent directorship experience, I utilize prior experience in 
specific boardroom activities such as CEO turnover events and setting CEO compensation. 
These activities are either rare events that not all independent directors may have experienced, or 
are the responsibility of to a subset of the board of directors (compensation committee members). 
The directors who have experienced certain type of board work may be more suitable to perform 
similar tasks in the board, compared to other directors who do not have such experience.  
To show the validity of the independent director experience measure as proxies for board 
quality, I compare the impact of the independent director experience with board independence, 
the traditional measure of board quality, in enhancing firm performance across various 
environments where board quality is expected to have significant impact. 
My investigation begins with estimations of the effects of board quality measures in 
monitoring management. Replacing CEO in case of deteriorating performance and setting CEO 
compensation are the primary roles of the board of directors. Consistent with Weisbach (1988), I 
find that board independence increases CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. Furthermore, I 
                                                 
14
 I allow double-counting if an independent director has served multiple independent directorships in a given year. 
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find that the monitoring power of the board independence mainly comes from the independent 
directors who have relevant experience in the past: specifically, I find that the fractions of 
independent directors who have at least five years of prior independent directorship experience, 
or have administered at least one CEO turnover event in the past, may increase the CEO 
turnover-performance sensitivity, but the fraction of independent directors without those 
experiences does not have such effect. This result suggests that having independent directors 
alone may not be sufficient to perform proper monitoring role of the board, but independent 
directors with relevant prior experience may perform better monitoring role. When facing forced 
CEO turnover event, a more drastic situation among the CEO turnovers, I find that neither board 
independence nor fraction of independent directors with 5 years of experience or CEO turnover 
experience can enhance forced CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. However, the fraction of 
independent directors who have experience in forced CEO turnover in the past may increase 
forced CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. This result suggests independent directors may 
develop required skills only through relevant experience. Regarding the CEO compensation, I 
also find that while board independence, fraction of experienced independent directors, and 
fraction of independent directors in the compensation committee are not related to the level of 
CEO compensation, the fraction of independent directors in the compensation committee who 
have at least three years of compensation committee experience in the past may decrease the 
level of total CEO compensation, which may be considered as strong monitoring. In sum, these 
findings support my argument that independent directors may accumulate capabilities to perform 
monitoring duties through relevant independent directorship experience, and it is the experienced 
independent directors who can serve as monitors of the management, not just independent and 
inexperienced directors.  
As another test on the effect of board quality, I investigate the interactive effects of board 
quality measures and product market competition on firm performance. Product market 
competition is a governance mechanism that mitigates managerial slack (Giroud and Mueller, 
2010, 2011). Competitive environment keep managers on their toes, striving to enhance firm 
performance for survival. Due to the disciplining role of the competition, there may remain little 
need for the board to monitor management. When competition is high, strong monitoring from 
the board may even harm firm performance. Managers facing fierce competition may need any 
help they can get, including the advice from the board (Kang, Kim, and Lu, 2013). However, 
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strong monitoring from the board may discourage management to seek advice from the board 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2007). When the monitoring intensity is too high, then the negative 
advising effect may dominate the monitoring effectiveness, leading to decrease in firm 
performance. Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash (2011) show that firms suffer greater value losses 
from intense monitoring, especially when the need for board advising is high. Giroud and 
Mueller (2010) show that managers insulated from product market competition may enjoy “quiet 
life”, which can be mitigated by monitoring role of the board. As such, board quality measures 
may have positive relation to performance for firms under relatively weak product market 
competition, where the marginal effect of stronger monitoring is higher.  
Consistent with this argument, I find each measure of board quality, the board 
independence and fraction of independent directors with at least five years of prior experience, is 
positively related to firm performance when a firm operates under weak product market 
competition, but the relation becomes negative under strong competition. When both board 
quality measures are used together, I find the fraction of experienced independent directors may 
increase firm performance, but no such evidence is found from the board independence.
15
 My 
findings suggest that it is the experienced independent directors, not independent but 
inexperienced directors, who can perform the monitoring duty of the board. These results are 
obtained controlling for firm- and year fixed effects. To address the potential endogeneity issue 
between board quality and firm performance, I employ the instrumental variable (IV) regression. 
My IV is based on the exchange regulation that requires all firms listed in NYSE and NASDAQ 
to have majority of independent directors in the board by the end of 2003. When a firm’s board 
independence is low in year 2001, the need to increase board independence thereafter is higher 
for such firms. However, the board independence of year 2001 can be considered as exogenous 
to the regulation because the regulation is first announced in year 2002. The results are robust to 
the use of board independence of year 2001 as IV.  
I find my results robust to various alternative specifications: use of industry fixed effect 
instead of firm fixed effect, alternative proxies of independent directorship experience and 
                                                 
15
 All experienced independent directors belong to independent directors, and there exist mechanical correlation 
between board independence and the fraction of experienced independent directors. Using fraction of inexperienced 
independent directors, the complement of the fraction of experienced independent directors, instead of board 
independence alleviates concern on the mechanical correlation. Both board independence and fraction of 
inexperienced independent directors are used as comparison measures for the fraction of experienced independent 
directors throughout this paper.  
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product market competition, alternative sample constructions, and additional board quality 
measures as control variables.  
Together, my findings support the argument that experienced independent directors 
enhance the effectiveness of the board’s abilities to monitor the management, but inexperienced 
ones may not. The remainder of this paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 describes sample 
construction, data, and summary statistics. Section 3 compares impact of the experienced and 
inexperienced independent directors on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity and CEO 
compensation. Section 4 examines the interactive effects of board quality and product market 
competition. Section 5 concludes.   
2.2 Data 
2.2.1 Sample Construction 
To construct sample, I merge board independence and independent director experience data 
from RiskMetrics, financial and accounting data from CRSP/Compustat, and CEO data from 
ExecuComp. While RiskMetrics data is available during 1996~2010, my sample starts from 2000 
because I need past few years of observations to construct independent director experience 
measure. My sample ends in 2010 due to data availability. Firms in regulated industries are 
excluded from the sample, because the operational and governance environment for those firms 
may be different from others in non-regulated industries (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). The number 
of observations varies across regressions due to data availability of variables required. 
2.2.2 Proxy for Board Quality  
My main proxy for board quality is the fraction of experienced independent directors, 
FracExperience, which is defined as the number of independent directors who have served five 
years or more as independent directors in any firm in the past divided by the board size. I allow 
double-counting if an independent director has served multiple independent directorships in a 
given year. For example, imagine director A who has served firm X during 1997~2000, and firm Y 
during 1999~2003 as independent director. In 1997, she does not have any past independent 
director experience because her experience begins in 1997. In 1999, she has two years of 
experience, from firm X during 1997~1998. During 1999, she accumulates two more years of 
independent directorship experience, one from firm X, and the other from firm Y. As a result, she 
is considered to have four years of experience in year 2000, three from firm X during 1997~1999, 
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and one from firm Y in 1999. Past independent directorship experience is identified based on the 
director appointment history from RiskMetrics. Due to the RiskMetrics coverage, independent 
directorship experience is identified among S&P 1500 firms starting from 1996, and hence 
experience before year 1996 or from non-S&P 1500 firms are not counted. By construction, all 
directors in 1996 are considered to have no prior independent director experience, which is not true. 
To overcome this truncation issue, I use first four years of observations (1996~1999) to allow 
director experience measure to build up, and include observations from 2000 and after in the 
sample for analyses. Inability to capture independent directorship from non-S&P 1500 firms may 
also pose concern on potential downward bias in the board quality measure. However, if the 
governance environment of small and large firms are different (Boone et al., 2007a; Linck, Netter, 
and Yang, 2008), using independent director experience from firms with comparable size may 




While past independent directorship experience may capture general monitoring 
capabilities, it may not be sufficient to perform more specific boardroom activities, such as dealing 
with CEO turnover or determining CEO compensation. To proxy for independent directors’ 
capability regarding CEO turnover events, I use FracTurnoverExperience, which is defined as the 
number of independent directors who have experienced at least one CEO turnover event as 
independent directors in the past. Considering the scope of the board subcommittees, quality of 
compensation committee rather than entire board may be more relevant to setting CEO 
compensation. For this reason, I use CompCommIndependence, the number of independent 
directors in the compensation committee divided by compensation committee size, and 
CompCommExperience, the number of independent directors in the compensation committee who 
have at least three years of prior compensation committee experience as independent directors 
divided by the compensation committee size, as proxies for the quality of compensation committee.  
The benchmark proxy of board quality is board independence (BoardIndependence), the 
fraction of independent directors among the board. Board independence is the most widely used 
measure of the quality of board monitoring in finance and economics literature. Because 
experienced independent directors are a subset of independent directors, comparing the effect of 
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 Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2012) also construct a measure of board quality based on RiskMetrics sample only. 
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the fraction of experienced independent directors and board independence is not straightforward.
17
 
For cleaner comparison, I decompose board independence into the fraction of experienced 
independent directors, and the fraction of independent directors who do not have such experience.  
2.2.3 Proxy for Monitoring Effectiveness   
Monitoring effectiveness of the board may be proxied by the board’s decision to 
retain/replace CEO based on firm performance, and the level of CEO compensation. CEO turnover 
event is identified by CEOTurnover, an indicator variable equal to one in the last year where the 
CEO appears in the ExecuComp database as CEO. While the identification of CEOTurnover is 
straightforward and easy to implement, it is unable to distinguish CEO turnover initiated by board 
due to concern on the CEO’s ability, and voluntary departure by the CEO that are unrelated to the 
monitoring effectiveness of the board. Following Parrino (1997) and Jenter and Kanaan 
(forthcoming), I construct forced CEO turnover indicator, ForcedTurnover, which becomes one 
only when the CEO turnover is a forced one to proxy for the CEO turnover events that are initiated 
by the board.
18
 I use the total direct compensation to the CEO (variable TDC1 in the ExecuComp 
dataset) as the measure of CEO pay level.  
Firm value may also serve as a measure of monitoring effectiveness, because increasing 
firm value is the ultimate goal of monitoring management. As the measure of firm performance, I 
use Tobin’s Q, defined by the sum of the market value of common stocks plus the book value of 
total liabilities divided by the book value of total assets. Tobin’s Q has been the most widely-used 
proxy for firm performance to analyze the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and 
firm performance.  
2.2.4 Control Variables 
 Control variables used in this study are similar to those used in previous studies relating 
governance mechanisms to Tobin’s Q.
19
 They represent the factors which may affect firm value 
and the measure of board quality. Detailed definitions of the control variables and other major 
variables used in this paper are shown in Table 2.1.  
                                                 
17
 Increase in the fraction of experienced independent directors may also lead to increase in the board independence, 
and vice versa. 
18
 The classification of turnover into forced or voluntary closely follows the methodology described in Parrino (1997) 
and Jenter and Kanaan (forthcoming), which utilize the description about the turnover event in the press reports.  
19
 See Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999), 
Bhagat and Black (2002), Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja (2007), and Kim and Lu (2011). 
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Variables that control for firm characteristics are return on assets, ROA; firm size, 
Log(Sales); leverage, Leverage; R&D investment, R&D/Assets; firm age, Log(FirmAge); and asset 
tangibility, PPE/Assets. I set missing observations of R&D/Assets equal to zero to maintain sample 
size. To capture the mean of R&D/Assets for missing values, I also control for R&D_Dum, a 
dummy variable equal to one if R&D data is missing, and zero otherwise.  
Because CEOs may have important influence on firm performance and effectiveness of the 
independent directors (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; Fich and Shivdasani, 2005), I also control 
for relevant CEO characteristics: CEO share ownership, CEOOwnership; and CEO-chairman 
duality dummy, CEOChairman. Board characteristics may also influence firm value and 
effectiveness of the board. I control for the natural log of the total number of directors in the board, 
Log(BoardSize); and the total percentage of shares owned by all independent directors, 
IndDirOwnership. Independent director share ownership may impact their incentive to provide 
helpful advice and hence firm value. Yermack (1996) finds a negative relation between board size 
and firm value. 
2.2.5 Summary Statistics 
Table 2.2 contains summary statistics of the variables used in this study. The means of 
FracExperience and BoardIndependence are 0.394 and 0.709, indicating about half of independent 
directors have at least five years of past independent directorship experience. About one-third of 
the directors have experienced at least one CEO turnover event in the past, but only 8% of the 
directors have experienced forced CEO turnover. Compensation committee is composed of almost 
all independent directors, and about half of the committee members have more than three years of 
past compensation committee experience. The average board has about nine directors, and the 
average total share ownership of all independent directors is 1.2%, while the average CEO share 
ownership is 2.2%. 57% of CEOs chair their boards. 10.4% of CEOs step down from the CEO 
position every year, and about one fourth of the CEO turnovers (2.3% of all CEOs) are forced ones. 
2.3 Board Quality and CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity  
My investigation begins with an estimation of the effects of board quality on the CEO 
turnover-performance sensitivity, which is considered as a direct measure of the monitoring 
management (Weisbach, 1988). The following specification is used for turnover-performance 





                                                                         +β3∙Qualityit+β4∙Controlit+μit)                  (1) 
 
P(CEOTurnoverit) is the probability of firm i’s CEO turnover event happening in year t. F(∙) stands 
for the cumulative probability density function, which I use logistics function. Qualityit is the 
board quality measures, and Performanceit is industry-adjusted stock return of the firm during the 
fiscal year, which reflects firm-specific component of the stock return. Jenter and Kanaan 
(forthcoming) show that CEO turnover decision is influenced not only by the firm specific 
performance, but also by the industry and market-driven component of the stock returns. To 
account for these influences, I include market return and market-adjusted industry stock return 
during the fiscal year in the control variables. To account for the retirement of CEO, an indicator 
variable that equals one when the CEO’s age is between 64 and 66 is included as a control variable, 
and firm- and year-fixed effects are also included. The coefficient of interest is β2, which 
represents the effect of board quality on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. 
If board quality measures are good proxies of monitoring, then the coefficients of the 
interaction of board quality and firm performance will be negative and significant, implying that 
the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity increases with board quality. Table 2.4 provides the 
results using fixed-effect logit regression on specification (1). Column (1) shows results with 
BoardIndependence as the board quality measure. Consistent with Jenter and Kanaan 
(forthcoming), both market- and industry-returns show negative and statistically significant 
influence on CEO turnover. Unlike market- or industry-returns, firm specific return does not show 
statistically significant influence on the CEO turnover. The insignificant coefficient does not imply 
that firm-specific return is not an important determinant of CEO turnover. Rather, the explanatory 
power of the firm-specific return seems to be absorbed by the interaction of board independence 
and firm return.
20
 The negative and statistically significant (at 10% level) coefficient on the 
interaction of firm-specific stock return and board independence suggests that board independence 
increases CEO turnover-performance sensitivity.  
                                                 
20
 When the interaction terms of board quality measures and firm-specific return are excluded from the specification, 
I find negative and significant coefficient on the firm specific return in all specifications used in table 2.4. 
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The fraction of experienced independent directors, FracExperience, is also shown to 
increase CEO turnover-performance sensitivity. In column (2), the coefficient of the interaction of 
FracExperience and firm-specific return is negative and significant (at 5% level), and the 
magnitude of coefficient is comparable to that of the board independence in column (1). When 
both board independence and FracExperience are used together in column (3), I find that only 
interaction of FracExperience retains statistical (at 10% level) and economic significance, while 
the influence of board independence on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity becomes 
statistically insignificant with smaller coefficient compared to the column (1) result. Due to the 
mechanical correlation between board independence and FracExperience, it is hard to directly 
interpret the coefficients in the column (3) result. When board independence is decomposed into 
the fraction of experienced and inexperienced independent directors (FracExperience and 
FracNoExperience, in column (4)), both statistical and economic significance of the effect of 
FracExperience on the turnover-performance sensitivity becomes stronger (5% significance level). 
I interpret these results as the fraction of experienced independent directors, FracExperience, may 
increase the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, while board independence, the conventional 
measure of the board’s monitoring quality, or the inexperienced independent directors, may not 
have explanatory power over FracExperience.  
I achieve similar results when the fraction of independent directors who have experienced 
CEO turnover event in the past, FracTurnoverExperience, is used as the main measure of board 
quality instead of FracExperience. When used as the sole measure of board quality in column (5), 
the coefficient on the interaction of FracTurnoverExperience and firm-specific stock return is 
negative and statistically significant (10% level), suggesting the monitoring effectiveness of the 
independent directors with such experience. Unlike columns (1) to (4) results, the coefficient on 
the firm-specific return becomes negative and significant, suggesting that the interaction term of 
FracCEOTurnover and firm-specific return may explain only part of the influence of the firm 
specific return. When both board independence and FracCEOTurnover are used together in 
column (6), the coefficients on the interaction of both board independence and FracCEOTurnover 
with firm-specific return becomes negative but statistically insignificant. When board 
independence is decomposed into the fraction of independent directors with and without past CEO 
turnover experience (column (7)), the coefficient on the interaction of FracCEOTurnover and firm 
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return becomes negative and significant, while that of FracNoCEOTurnover is statistically 
insignificant.  
When ForcedTurnover, an indicator of forced CEO turnover event, is used instead of 
CEOTurnover in Table 2.5, I find that the influence of board independence, fraction of 
experienced independent directors, and fraction of independent directors with past CEO turnover 
experience all become statistically insignificant (columns (1) to (3), respectively). This change 
may be due to the decreased sample size resulting from forced CEO turnover.
21
 However, when 
the fraction of independent directors who have experienced forced CEO turnover in the past is 
used as the board quality measure in column (4), the coefficient on the interaction term becomes 
statistically significant (at 5% level). When compared with board independence and the fraction of 
independent directors without forced CEO turnover experience in columns (5) and (6) respectively,  
the statistical significance and the magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction of 
FracForcedExperience and firm-specific return remains strong.  
I also find the monitoring effectiveness of experienced independent directors from the 
relation between the level of CEO compensation and board quality using the following 
specification:  
 
CEOCompensationit=αi+αt+β1∙Qualityit+β2∙Controlit+μit                                           (2) 
 
Table 2.6 provides estimation results using the natural log of total direct compensation to CEO as 
dependent variable, and the board quality measures as explanatory variables together with other 
control variables.
22
 When board independence, fraction of experience independent directors, or the 
fraction of independent directors in the compensation committee are used as board quality 
measures in columns (1) to (3), respectively, I do not find statistically significant relation between 
these board quality measures and the level of CEO compensation. However, I find the fraction of 
independent directors in the compensation committee with at least three years of past 
compensation committee experience may decrease the level of CEO compensation (result in 
column (4)). The results in Tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 suggest that independent directors with relevant 
                                                 
21
 Many firms in the sample do not have any forced CEO turnover event during the sample period. Due to the use of 
firm-fixed effects, firms with no forced CEO turnover are dropped out from the analyses.  
22
 OLS with firm- and year fixed effects are used in this analysis. 
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experience may serve as monitors of the management, but without relevant experience, their 
effectiveness becomes weaker.  
2.4 Interactive Effects of Board Quality and Product Market Competition  
The evidence on how boards impact corporate activities and performance is largely 
mixed (see John and Senbet (1998) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) for a review). To 
overcome this ambiguity, recent studies utilize specification that focus on environments where 
impact of board can be more pronounced and easier to detect. I focus on the estimation of the 
interactive effects of board quality and product market competition on firm performance. 
Governance mechanisms that serve as monitoring management tend to work as substitutes with 
product market competition, because high product market competition itself is a strong 
governance tool that reduces managerial slack (Giroud and Mueller, 2010, 2011). The baseline 
specification for the interaction analyses is the following: 
 
Qit=αi+αt+β1∙Qualityit∙H_Competitionit+β2∙Qualityit∙L_Competitionit 
+β3∙L_Competitionit+β4∙Controlit+μit                               (3) 
 
Qit is firm i’s Tobin’s Q in year t. Qualityit contains firm i’s board quality measures in year t, which 
include the board independence and the fraction of experienced independent directors. 
H_Competitionit and L_Competitionit represent the competitive environment around firm i in year t 
that is utilized to find influence of director quality on firm performance. As the measure of high 
(low) product market competition where the impact of the board may be less (more) pronounced, I 
use indicator variables which are equal to one if firm i operates in an industry with below (above) 
yearly median Herfindahl-Hirschman index based on top 4 firms in each 3-digit SIC industry by 
sales, and zero otherwise. Controlit includes the control variables described in section 2.2, together 
with the low product market competition indicator L_Competition.
23
 The effect of board quality on 
firm performance under high/low product market competition may be directly inferred from the 
coefficient β1 and β2. I control for firm- and year fixed effects, αi and αt. Standard errors are 
clustered at the firm level.  
                                                 
23
 H_Competition may be defined by 1 – L_Competition, and hence is perfectly correlated with L_Competition. As 
such, only L_Competition is included in the control variables. 
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2.4.1 Main Results  
The results are reported in Table 2.7. Column (1) shows estimation result using board 
independence as explanatory variable but no interaction terms with H_Competition or 
L_Competition are included. The coefficient on board independence is statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that identifying impact of board quality on firm performance is not straightforward in 
general settings. However, when the interaction terms of BoardIndependence and  product 
market competition are used in Column (2), I find positive and significant coefficient (0.222, 
significant at 10% level) on the interaction of board independence and L_Competition, but 
statistically insignificant negative coefficient (-0.333) on the interaction with H_Competition. 
This result suggests board independence may increase firm value for the firms operating in low 
product market competition, but the influence becomes statistically insignificant for firms 
operating under high product market competition. In terms of economic significance, increasing 
board independence by one standard deviation (0.158) may lead to 0.035 increase in Tobin’s Q, 
which is about 1.8% change from the sample average. In Column (3), the fraction of experienced 
independent directors is included as the board quality measure instead of board independence. 
FracExperience shows similar effects on firm value, significantly increasing Tobin’s Q under 
low product market competition (0.295 at 1% significance level), but associated with negative 
coefficient under high product market competition. Compared to the Column (2) result where 
board independence is used as board quality measure, signs and magnitudes of the interaction 
term coefficients are in similar order. In Column (4), where both BoardIndependence and 
FracExperience are used together as board quality measures, the coefficients of the interaction 
terms between FracExperience and the competition measures are statistically significant, and the 
magnitudes are also similar to the Column (3) result. However, the coefficients of the interaction 
terms of board independence and competition measures become small and statistically 
insignificant. This result suggests that the monitoring effectiveness of board independence is 
mainly driven by the experienced independent directors. Comparing the firm value implication 
of experienced and inexperienced independent directors based on Column (4) result is not 
straightforward, because board independence includes both experienced and inexperienced 
independent directors. For cleaner comparison, Column (5) reports the estimation results by 
decomposing board independence into FracExperience and FracNoExperience, the fraction of 
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experienced and inexperienced independent directors.
24
 The coefficients of the interaction terms 
with FracExperience and competition measures are statistically significant (at 10% level), and 
the magnitudes are also similar to Column (3) result. However, the coefficients on the 
FracNoExperience are statistically insignificant, and the magnitudes are also small. The 
estimation result in Column (5) suggests that increasing the fraction of experienced independent 
directors by 0.11 (i.e., replacing one inexperienced director with experienced one in a nine-
person board) leads to 0.03 increase in Tobin’s Q for firms operating under low product market 
competition, which is about 1.5% increase from the sample average. The negative coefficient on 
the interaction of FracExperience and H_Competition may be interpreted as the experienced 
independent directors harm firm performance when competition is high. This result is consistent 
with Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Faleye et al. (2011), who show that increasing board 
independence may decrease firm performance when the need for board advising is high or the 
monitoring intensity is high.  
I interpret these results as follows: the monitoring effectiveness of board independence on 
firm performance is mainly from experienced independent directors, not from independent but 
inexperienced ones. If a firm operating under low product market competition hires a new 
independent director to increase board independence and thereby firm performance, it will 
achieve the expected result only when the newly hired director is an experienced one. If not, then 
the firm value may not change significantly, as expressed by the statistically insignificant 
coefficients on the interaction terms between BoardIndependence and L_Competition (in 
Column (4)), or between FracNoExperience and L_Competition (in Column (5)). Alternatively, 
if the firm replaces part of its independent directors who are inexperienced with experienced 
ones, then it may achieve firm value increase even without increasing board independence. 
2.4.2 Endogeneity  
The observed results may be due to reverse causation or endogeneity among the board 
quality, firm performance, and product market competition. For example, experienced 
independent directors may choose to join successful firms operating in non-competitive industry, 
because of the prestige of successful firms and light workload from low competition. Or, there 
                                                 
24
 Because independent directors can be classified either experienced or inexperienced, board independence can be 
rewritten as BoardIndependence = FracExperience + FracNoExperience.  
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may be time-varying omitted variables that influence the fraction of experienced independent 
directors and firm performance at the same time.  
Table 2.8 provides estimation result on the determinants of the fraction of experienced 
independent directors, using FracExperience as dependent variable, and proxies of firm 
performance and product market competition as explanatory variables together with other control 
variables.
25
 The control variables are selected to proxy for firm performance and financial 
conditions, organizational and operational environment, and other governance-related factors 
including board and CEO characteristics. Coefficient of return on assets (ROA), a proxy of firm 
performance, is negative and significant, which does not support experienced independent 
directors joining successful firms. The statistically insignificant coefficient on Herfindahl-
Hierschman index (HHI4), the measure of product market competition, also suggests that 
product market competition may not be related with independent directorship experience. 
Positive and significant coefficients on firm size and age suggest that more visible and 
established firms are in better position to attract experienced independent directors.  
To address potential endogeneity of time-varying omitted variables, I employ 
instrumental variable (IV) regression. As the instrument, I utilize the exchange regulation 
mandating majority of independent directors by 2003: In 2002, NYSE and NASDAQ proposed a 
new regulation requiring firms listed in the two exchanges to have majority of independent 
directors by the end of 2003.
26
 Since some firms have had majority of independent directors 
before 2002, this new rule generates exogenous changes in board composition both in cross 
sections and time series. Since part of the newly added independent directors may be 
experienced ones, increasing board independence may also lead to increase in the fraction of 
experienced independent directors. I use the product of Post, an indicator variable for post-
regulation period (year 2004 and after), and the board independence as of year 2001, 
Independence2001, as the instrumental variable. The regulation requires firms to comply by the 
end of year 2003, and hence the effect of regulation will be pronounced after that. Because the 
regulation sets minimum board independence, the lower board independence of firms before the 
regulation, the higher the need to increase board independence.  
                                                 
25
 Firm performance and accounting variables in the explanatory variables are lagged one year because board 
composition is determined at the beginning of fiscal year while the firm characteristics are constructed at the end of 
the year. 
26
 Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) provide a detailed description on the scope and implications of the regulation. 
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Table 2.9 provides the IV regression result based on Table 2.7 Column (5) specification, 
where the fraction of experienced and inexperienced independent directors are used as board 
quality measures. The endogenous variables to be instrumented are the interaction terms of the 
fraction of experienced independent directors and high/low product market competition 
indicators, FracExperience*H_Competition and FracExperience*L_Competition. In the first-
stage regressions, I use the interaction terms of the instrumental variable and the high/low 
product market competition indicators to predict endogenous variables. The negative and 
significant coefficients of the IVs and large F-statistic in Columns (1) and (2) suggest the IV is 
valid. The second stage regression uses the predicted values from the first stage regressions as 
the key explanatory variables. The result is shown in Column (3): the positive and significant 
coefficient on the FracExperience*L_Competition confirms the earlier results that the fraction of 
experience independent directors increases firm value when product market competition is low. 
2.4.3 Cutoff Year for Independent Directorship Experience  
A five year threshold to be classified as experienced independent director is used in the 
paper, but the choice is not grounded in economic theory. Table 2.10 compares the effect of 
different threshold years to be classified as experienced directors, ranging from 2 years to 6 years 
with the same specification used in Table 2.7 Column (4), which uses board independence and 
the fraction of experienced independent directors as board quality measures.
27
 If the cutoff year 
is too short for directors to obtain necessary skills, then the fraction of experienced directors may 
not have explanatory power, and the coefficients associated with it will be small. If the cutoff 
year is long enough, then the effect of board independence will be subsumed by the fraction of 
experienced independent directors, and the coefficients associated with interaction terms of 
board independence and product market competition will be small, while the coefficients on the 
fraction of experienced independent directors being large and statistically significant. Starting 
from Column (2), the cutoff years for experienced independent director increases from 2 years to 
6 years in Column (6). For comparison purpose, Column (1) replicates Table 2.7 Column (2) 
result, which uses board independence as the sole board quality measure. For all cutoff 
thresholds up to 4 years, the coefficients on the interaction of experienced independent directors 
and L_Competition are statistically insignificant. For the 5 years and above thresholds, the 
                                                 
27
 All the control variables used in Table 2.7 Column (5) are included in the analysis, but not shown in the table for 
brevity. This applies to all the following tables. 
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coefficients on the interaction of experienced independent directors and L_Competition become 
statistically significant. The coefficients on the interaction between board independence and 
high/low competition also becomes small in magnitude for the 5 years and above thresholds, 
which suggests that the explanatory power of board independence is absorbed by the fraction of 
experienced independent directors. This result suggests that use of 5 years as cutoff threshold is 
appropriate.  
2.4.4 Non-linear specification  
The effect of experienced independent directors on firm value may have differential 
impact, especially when the fraction of experienced independent director is at the low- or high-
end region. To examine the potential non-linearity, squared term of the fraction of experienced 
independent directors is added to the specification used in Column (5) Table 2.7. Considering 
that the fraction of experienced independent directors is interacted with both high- and low-
product market competition indicator, H_Competition and L_Competition, squared experienced 
independent directors is also interacted with both indicator variables. Column (1) of Table 2.11 
shows the estimation result. For the firms operating in low product market competition, the 
positive and significant coefficient on the FracExperience and the negative and significant 
coefficient on the squared FracExperience suggest that the relation between the fraction of 
experienced independent directors and firm performance is non-linear, with the inflection point 
at 0.56. Coefficients associated with FracExperience and the squared term are insignificant when 
interacted with H_Competition, suggesting that the relation between FracExperience and firm 
value is weak when the product market competition is high. Inflection point at 0.56 may be 
interpreted as having more than majority experienced independent directors may lead to 
decreasing firm value. To further examine this non-linear relation, I include segmented 
FracExperience instead of the squared term and re-run the analyses. In Column (2), 
FracExperience is segmented into three subgroups (below 0.4; between 0.4 and 0.7; and above 
0.7), and interacted with high- and low product market competition. The coefficients on the 
experienced independent directors interacted with low product market competition are all 
positive and significant, suggesting that increasing FracExperience may increase firm 
performance when competition is low. However, the magnitude of the coefficients is decreasing 
in FracExperience, suggesting that the effect of experienced independent directors is also 
decreasing. The decreasing effect of FracExperience on firm value also holds when the product 
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market competition is high: coefficients of the segmented FracExperience are negative and 
significant, and the magnitudes are decreasing. 
2.4.5 Robustness Tests 
I re-estimate the relation of the board quality and firm value using various alternative 
specification, sample constructions, variable definitions, and additional control variables. Control 
variables used in Table 2.7 are included in the robustness analyses but not shown in the table for 
brevity.  
2.4.5.1 Industry fixed effect in place of firm fixed effect  
Use of firm fixed effect focuses on within-firm variations of the variables, which leads 
to not capturing meaningful cross-sectional variation. Panel A of Table 2.12 re-estimates 
Columns (2), (4) and (5) of Table 2.7, with industry and year fixed effects instead of firm and 
year fixed effects. Similar to the firm and year fixed effects results, both board independence and 
the fraction of experienced independent directors are positively (negatively) related to the firm 
value when the product market competition is low (high). When board independence is 
decomposed into fraction of experienced and inexperienced independent directors, the positive 
relation to firm value under low product market competition is observed only for the fraction of 
experienced independent directors, which is consistent with the results obtained under firm and 
year fixed effects shown in Table 2.7.   
2.4.5.2 Influence of Regulatory Changes  
Adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the exchange regulation in 2002 led to large 
changes in the corporate governance environment, especially for the firms with weak corporate 
governance. The main variable of interest in this study, the fraction of experienced independent 
directors, is also strongly influenced by the regulatory changes. It may be the case that regulatory 
changes drive both the changes in the fraction of experienced independent directors and firm 
performance, and the observed relation between the experienced independent directors and firm 
value is endogenous. To examine this possibility, I construct two subsamples, one with the firms 
that are affected by the exchange regulation and the other that are not affected, and analyze the 
relation between experienced independent directors and firm performance based on specification 
used in Column (4) Table 2.7. Columns (1) and (2) of Panel B show the result for the firms that 
are not affected, and affected by the regulation, respectively. In both cases, the coefficients on 
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the interaction of the fraction of experienced independent directors and indicator for low product 
market competition are positive and significant, and those on the interaction with high product 
market competition are negative. The coefficients on the interaction terms of board independence 
and product market competition are all insignificant. These results are consistent with the Table 
2.7 results, which suggest that fraction of experienced independent directors may increase 
(decrease) firm value under low (high) product market competition, and board independence 
does not have influence on firm value over the fraction of experienced independent directors.  
2.4.5.3 Regulated Industries, Distressed firms, and Shorter Sample Period  
Financial and utility firms are excluded in the sample because they are heavily regulated, 
and may face different governance and operational environment. Including the regulated industry 
firms back results in 24% increase in the sample size. The results are shown in Column (1) of 
Panel C Table 2.12. Financial distress is a crisis situation, and during that time both management 
and the board may behave differently from the business as usual. Excluding firms in financial 
distress (defined by Altman’s Z-score below 1.81) does not change the result (shown in column 
(2)). RiskMetrics provides two separate directors datasets, one for 1996~2006, and the other for 
2007 and after. While the definitions of variables in each datasets are very similar, one may 
concern about potential inconsistency between the two datasets. Restricting sample years to 
2000-2006 does not alter the result (shown in column (3)).  
2.4.5.4 Alternative Measures of Independent Directorship Experience  
Following Fich and Shivdasani (2006) who suggest that using the fraction of independent 
directors with certain characteristics (director busyness in their analyses) may serve better than 
using average value or indicator variable of such characteristics, I use the fraction of experienced 
independent directors as the main proxy of independent director experience. Instead of the 
fraction, the number of experienced independent directors in the board (NumExperience) and an 
indicator of majority experienced independent directors in the board (ExperiencedBoard) are 
used as the proxy of independent director experience in Panel D Columns (1) and (2), 
respectively. The positive (negative) and significant coefficients on the interaction terms with 
low (high) product market competition suggest the earlier findings are robust to the use of 
alternative measures.  
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2.4.5.5 Alternative Measures of Product Market Competition 
The estimation results based on the alternative measures of competition are provided in 
Panel E of Table 2.12. Instead of the top four company sales HHI, I use top eight company sales 
HHI (Column (1)), and top four company sales ICR (industry concentration ratio, Column (2)) as 
the measure of product market competition. In Column (3), as a robustness test to the use of three-
digit SIC code as industry definition, top four company sales HHI in two-digit SIC industry is used 
as the measure of product market competition. The results are are consistent with the findings in 
Table 2.7.  
2.4.5.6 Control for Other Board Quality Measures  
I include three additional measures of board quality that may be correlated with 
FracExperience. The first control variable is based on board co-option (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 
2010). Coles et al. shows that if CEO of the firm is engaged in the nomination process of 
independent directors (co-opted), then those directors may not be fully independent. Following 
their logic, I take independent directors who are not co-opted by the management as a board 
quality measure. FracNonCoOpted is defined as the number of independent directors who are 
appointed to the board as independent directors before the current CEO is appointed, divided by 
the board size. The second control is FracNonBusy, defined as the number of non-busy 
independent directors divided by board size. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) show that busy 
independent directors are associated with lower monitoring capacity and worse firm performance. 
Maybe independent directors who are not busy are the ones that can perform as good independent 
directors. The third control variable is TotalQuality, which is the total number of connections of 
independent directors to directors on other boards. Coles et al. (2012) argue that while the number 
of independent directors in the board may serve as quantity of board advising, the number of 
connections per independent directors is the quality of the advising capacity. The total capacity of 
board advising is constructed by multiplying the quantity and quality of the board advising. Panel 
F provides re-estimation results using these additional control variables separately (Columns (1)-
(3)) and all three together (Column (4)). Including these additional board quality measures in the 




2.5 Conclusion  
I show that independent directors who have past independent directorship experience may 
enhance firm value under conditions when board quality matters, but inexperienced independent 
directors may not be effective in monitoring and advising management. Independent directors need 
skills to efficiently interact with management during the board meetings and obtain information 
that are not readily available to them, which may be learnt from past independent directorship 
experience. I also show that what matters is relevant experience. For example, independent 
directors with CEO turnover-related experience may perform better when the need for 
management change is high, but may not be useful in setting the CEO compensation.  
I don’t find evidence that board independence, the traditional measure of board quality, has 
statistically significant influence on firm performance after controlling for the independent 
directorship experience, which implies that experienced independent directors, not inexperienced 
ones, may serve the monitoring and advising role of the board.   
My findings have an important implication for board composition. Recent governance 
regulations mandate increase in the quantity of independent directors (board independence). 
However, what really matters is how many qualified independent directors are in the board, not 
just independent but inexperienced ones. Without proper consideration on the quality (past 
independent directorship experience), such regulations may not be effective in protecting 





Table 2.1: Variable Descriptions  
This table provides variable definitions and the source of data.  
Variable name Description Source 
Panel A: Board quality variables 
FracExperience Fraction of independent directors in the board who have at least 5 
years of independent directorship experience in S&P 1500 firms in 
the past 
RiskMetrics 
FracTurnoverExperience Fraction of independent directors in the board who have experienced 
at least one CEO turnover event as independent directors in S&P 
1500 firms in the past 
RiskMetrics; 
ExecuComp 
FracForcedExperience Fraction of independent directors in the board who have experienced 
at least one forced CEO turnover event as independent directors in 
S&P 1500 firms in the past 
RiskMetrics; 
ExecuComp 
CompCommIndependence Fraction of independent directors in the compensation committee   RiskMetrics 
CompCompExperience Fraction of independent directors in the compensation committee 
who have at least 3 years of compensation committee experience as 
independent directors in S&P 1500 firms in the past  
RiskMetrics 
BoardIndependence Fraction of independent directors in the board  RiskMetrics 
BoardSize Number of directors in the board RiskMetrics 
IndDirOwnership Total share ownership of all independent directors  RiskMetrics  
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
Tobin's Q Market value of total assets divided by book value of total assets, 
where market value is defined as the sum of market value of equity 
and book value of total assets less book value of equity 
Compustat 
ROA EBITDA divided by total assets  Compustat 
Log(Sales) Natural log of firm's sales Compustat 
Leverage Book leverage Compustat 
R&D/Assets R&D divided by total assets (missing R&D expenses values are 
replaced with 0) 
Compustat 
R&D_Dum Indicator variable equal to one when R&D expenses value is missing 
in Compustat database 
Compustat 




PPE/Assets Asset tangibility defined by total net property, plant, and equipments 
divided by total assets 
Compustat 
Panel C: CEO Characteristics and performance management 
CEOOwnership Share ownership of CEO ExecuComp 
CEOChairman Indicator variable equal to one where CEO is also the chairman of 
the board 
ExecuComp 
CEOAge Age of CEO ExecuComp 
CEOTurnover Indicator variable equal to one in the last year where the CEO 
appears in the ExecuComp database as CEO  
ExecuComp 
ForcedTurnover Indicator variable equal to one in the last year where the CEO 
appears in the ExecuComp database as CEO, and the descriptions in 




CEOCompensation Natural log of total direct compensation to the CEO  ExecuComp 
Panel D: Competition and financial distress 
HHI4 Herfindahl-Hirschman index based on top 4 firm sales in same 3-
digit SIC industry  
Compustat 
Z-Score Altman's Z-score Compustat 
Z_Dum Indicator variable equal to one where any one of the components 





Table 2.2: Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics for major variables used in the text of the paper. Variable definitions are 
provided in Table 2.1. 
Variable 
# Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Median Max 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Board quality variables 
FracExperience 12197 0.394 0.241 0 0.417 1 
FracTurnoverExperience 12197 0.329 0.262 0 0.300 1 
FracForcedExperience 12197 0.080 0.158 0 0 1 
CompCommIndependence 12128 0.937 0.158 0 1 1 
CompCompExperience 12197 0.551 0.343 0 0.625 1 
BoardIndependence 12197 0.709 0.158 0 0.733 1 
BoardSize 12197 8.974 2.268 3 9 21 
IndDirOwnership 12197 0.012 0.046 0 0 0.881 
 Panel B: Firm characteristics 
StockReturn 12186 0.130 0.522 -0.977 0.083 7.359 
Tobin's Q 12197 1.986 1.338 0.401 1.595 36.189 
ROA 12197 0.139 0.108 -1.319 0.136 0.949 
Log(Sales) 12197 7.403 1.547 -1.149 7.288 12.96 
Leverage 12197 0.208 0.175 0 0.197 1.743 
R&D/Assets 12197 0.032 0.059 0 0.004 1.129 
R&D_Dum 12197 0.346 0.476 0 0 1 
FirmAge 12197 25.343 19.015 0 19 86 
PPE/Assets 12197 0.267 0.215 0.002 0.203 0.965 
 Panel C: CEO Characteristics and performance management 
CEOOwnership 12197 0.022 0.057 0 0.003 0.612 
CEOChairman 12197 0.574 0.495 0 1 1 
CEOAge 11755 55.427 7.370 31 55 94 
CEOTurnover 12197 0.104 0.305 0 0 1 
ForcedTurnover 12197 0.023 0.151 0 0 1 
CEOCompensation 12142 1.528 0.778 0 1.445 6.399 
 Panel D: Competition and financial distress 
HHI4 11726 0.167 0.148 0.022 0.120 0.970 
Z-Score 12197 4.191 7.686 -57.427 2.839 154.743 





Table 2.3: Correlation Between Variables 















Experience Tobin's Q StockReturn ROA 
FracExperience 0.528*** 
         
FracNoExperience 0.147*** -0.762*** 
        
CompCommIndependence 0.534*** 0.268*** 0.093*** 
       
CompCompExperience 0.292*** 0.644*** -0.528*** 0.328*** 
      
FracTurnoverExperience 0.439*** 0.607*** -0.372*** 0.213*** 0.396*** 
     
FracForcedExperience 0.211*** 0.265*** -0.148*** 0.100*** 0.171*** 0.437*** 
    
Tobin's Q -0.051*** -0.099*** 0.076*** -0.025*** -0.091*** -0.093*** -0.063*** 
   
StockReturn -0.012 -0.017* 0.010 -0.020** -0.021** -0.015* -0.013 0.260*** 
  
ROA 0.007 0.018* -0.015* 0.013 -0.003 -0.013 -0.043*** 0.350*** 0.117*** 
 




Table 2.4: Board Quality And CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity  
This table reports conditional logit estimation results on the interactive effects of board quality and firm 
performance on CEO turnover events. Board quality includes board independence, fraction of experienced 
independent directors, fraction of independent directors who have experienced CEO turnover event in the past as 
independent directors, fraction of independent directors who have experienced forced CEO turnover event in the 
past as independent directors, and the fractions of independent directors who do not have aforementioned 
experiences. Column (1) estimates interactive effect of board independence and industry-adjusted stock return of 
the firm during the fiscal year on the CEO turnover. Columns (2) to (4) estimate interactive effect of the fraction 
of experienced independent directors and firm performance, where fraction of experienced independent director 
alone is used in Column (2), board independence and fraction of experienced independent directors together in 
Column (3), and fraction of experienced and inexperienced independent directors together in Column (4). 
Columns (5) to (7) use fraction of independent directors who have experienced CEO turnover event as board 
quality measure. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one when it is the last year where the 
CEO appears in the ExecuComp database as CEO. The sample period is 2000-2010. Variable definitions are 
provided in Table 2.1. All regressions include firm- and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm 
level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
  
Dependent variable: Indicator for CEO turnover 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Market return -0.534** -0.549** -0.554** -0.554** -0.580** -0.582** -0.582** 
 
(0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.263) (0.258) (0.259) (0.259) 
Market-adjusted industry return -0.351*** -0.374*** -0.372*** -0.372*** -0.374*** -0.377*** -0.377*** 
 
(0.120) (0.121) (0.120) (0.120) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) 
Industry-adjusted firm return 0.132 -0.150 0.019 0.019 -0.250* 0.070 0.070 
 



















 * Industry-adjusted firm return 
 




















-0.572* -0.416 -0.943* 


































































-3.799*** -3.806*** -3.518*** 
   
 
 










CEO age between 64 and 66 1.204*** 1.197*** 1.201*** 1.201*** 1.017*** 1.015*** 1.015*** 
  (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) 
Firm and year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,922 7,922 7,922 7,922 7,922 7,922 7,922 




Table 2.5: Board Quality And Forced CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity  
This table reports conditional logit estimation results on the interactive effects of board quality and firm 
performance on forced CEO turnover events. Board quality includes board independence, fraction of experienced 
independent directors, fraction of independent directors who have experienced CEO turnover event in the past as 
independent directors, fraction of independent directors who have experienced forced CEO turnover event in the 
past as independent directors, and the fractions of independent directors who do not have aforementioned 
experiences. Column (1) estimates interactive effect of board independence and industry-adjusted stock return of 
the firm during the fiscal year on the CEO turnover. Column (2) estimates interactive effect of the fraction of 
experienced independent directors and firm performance. Column (3) uses fraction of independent directors who 
have experienced CEO turnover event as board quality measure. Columns (4) to (6) use fraction of independent 
directors who have experienced forced CEO turnover event as board quality measure, where fraction of 
independent directors with forced CEO turnover experience alone is used in Column (4), board independence and 
fraction of independent directors together in Column (5), and fraction of independent directors with and without 
such experience used together in Column (6). The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one when it 
is the last year where the CEO appears in the ExecuComp database as CEO, and descriptions in the news article 
about the turnover event suggest it is forced turnover. The sample period is 2000-2010. Variable definitions are 
provided in Table 2.1. All regressions include firm- and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm 
level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Indicator for forced CEO turnover 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Market return -0.921 -0.923 -0.923 -1.217** -1.225** -1.225** 
 
(0.595) (0.589) (0.565) (0.553) (0.561) (0.561) 
Market-adjusted industry return -0.827*** -0.840*** -0.793** -0.930*** -0.938*** -0.938*** 
 
(0.309) (0.308) (0.310) (0.319) (0.318) (0.318) 
Industry-adjusted firm return -0.227 -0.541 -0.686** -0.707*** -0.154 -0.154 
 
(0.777) (0.369) (0.290) (0.257) (1.015) (1.015) 
BoardIndependence -1.011 
   
-0.792 
 
 * Industry-adjusted firm return (1.023) 




























   
-2.792** -2.687** -3.480* 
 * Industry-adjusted firm return 
   
(1.206) (1.185) (1.813) 
FracNoForcedExperience 
    
 -0.792 
 * Industry-adjusted firm return 
    
 (1.290) 
BoardIndependence -0.433 































   
-8.099*** -8.094*** -8.714*** 
    
(1.387) (1.388) (1.715) 
FracNoForcedExperience 
    
 -0.620 
     
 (0.870) 
CEO age between 64 and 66 -1.339*** -1.337*** -1.565*** -1.376*** -1.386*** -1.386*** 
  (0.276) (0.275) (0.294) (0.328) (0.325) (0.325) 
Firm and year fixed effects  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2,153 2,153 2,153 2,153 2,153 2,153 
Pseudo-R
2




Table 2.6: Board Quality and CEO Compensation  
This table reports estimation results on the effects of board quality on CEO compensation. Board quality 
includes board independence, fraction of experienced independent directors, fraction of independent directors in 
the compensation committee, and fraction of experienced independent directors in the compensation committee. 
Firm characteristics are based on previous fiscal year. The dependent variable is natural log of total direct 
compensation to CEO (TDC1). The sample period is 2000-2010. Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. 
Regressions include firm- and year fixed effects. Constant is included in the regression but not shown for 
brevity. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, 
and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: CEOCompensation  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
BoardIndendence 0.114 
   
 
(0.078) 
















   
-0.041* 
    
(0.024) 
Log(BoardSize) 0.010 0.003 0.009 0.009 
 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.056) 
Log(Sales) 0.129*** 0.133*** 0.128*** 0.133*** 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
ROA 0.355*** 0.340*** 0.361*** 0.342*** 
 
(0.117) (0.118) (0.117) (0.117) 
StockReturn 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.108*** 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
ReturnVolatility 0.125 0.103 0.137 0.111 
 
(0.236) (0.236) (0.236) (0.236) 
CEOOwnership -0.586** -0.602** -0.631** -0.600** 
 
(0.269) (0.272) (0.280) (0.272) 
CEOChairman -0.007 -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Log(CEOTenure) 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Firm and year fixed effects  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 11,245 11,245 11,179 11,245 
Adjusted R
2




Table 2.7: Board Quality, Product Market Competition, and Firm Value 
This table reports estimation results on the interactive effects of board quality and product market competition on 
firm value. Board quality includes board independence, fraction of experienced independent directors, and 
fraction of inexperienced independent directors. Column (1) estimates without any interaction terms. Columns (2) 
and (3) estimate interaction effect of board independence and product market competition, and the fraction of 
experienced independent directors and product market competition, respectively. Columns (4) and (5) estimate 
interaction effects on the fraction of experienced independent director and board independence, and fractions of 
experienced and inexperienced independent directors, respectively. High/low competition is defined by yearly 
sample median sales HHI of top 4 firms in 3-digit SIC industry. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q. The sample 
period is 2000-2010. Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. Regressions include firm- and year fixed 
effects. Constant is included in the regression but not shown for brevity. Standard errors clustered at the firm 
level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
BoardIndependence -0.054 




   
 


















FracExperience * H_Competition 
  
-0.382*** -0.366*** -0.453* 
   
(0.126) (0.129) (0.232) 
FracExperience * L_Competition 
  
0.295*** 0.295*** 0.268* 
   
(0.099) (0.103) (0.147) 
FracNoExperience * H_Competition 
    
-0.087 
     
(0.222) 
FracNoExperience * L_Competition 
    
-0.027 
     
(0.138) 
L_Competition 0.032 -0.368** -0.245*** -0.282* -0.282* 
 
(0.040) (0.173) (0.080) (0.169) (0.169) 
Log(BoardSize) -0.440*** -0.432*** -0.432*** -0.432*** -0.432*** 
 
(0.125) (0.124) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) 
IndDirOwnership 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
ROA 3.948*** 3.937*** 3.948*** 3.947*** 3.947*** 
 
(0.406) (0.407) (0.412) (0.411) (0.411) 
Log(Sales) -0.475*** -0.476*** -0.466*** -0.467*** -0.467*** 
 
(0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.088) (0.088) 
Leverage -0.890*** -0.875*** -0.853*** -0.853*** -0.853*** 
 
(0.204) (0.202) (0.200) (0.200) (0.200) 
R&D/Assets 3.973*** 3.995*** 3.972*** 3.975*** 3.975*** 
 
(1.129) (1.131) (1.126) (1.126) (1.126) 
R&D_Dum -0.058 -0.048 -0.033 -0.033 -0.033 
 
(0.067) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) 
Log(FirmAge) -0.540*** -0.530*** -0.516*** -0.514*** -0.514*** 
 
(0.183) (0.182) (0.183) (0.183) (0.183) 
PPE/Assets -0.929*** -0.934*** -0.920*** -0.921*** -0.921*** 
 
(0.320) (0.321) (0.322) (0.321) (0.321) 
CEOOwnership -0.105 -0.105 -0.062 -0.070 -0.070 
 
(0.320) (0.323) (0.318) (0.321) (0.321) 
CEOChairman 0.064* 0.063 0.058 0.059 0.059 
  (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) 
Firm and year fixed effects  Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 11,726 11,726 11,726 11,726 11,726 




Table 2.8: Determinant of Independent Directorship Experience  
This table reports estimation result on the determinants of the independent directorship experience. Dependent 
variable is the fraction of experienced independent directors in the board, and explanatory variables include 
board and firm characteristics, product market competition, and CEO characteristics. Firm characteristics are 
based on previous fiscal year. The sample period is 2000-2010. Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. 
Regressions include firm- and year- fixed effects. Constant is included in the regression but not shown for 
brevity. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, 
and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: FracExperience  
ROA 
0.198*** 
  (0.023) 
Z-Score -0.114*** 
  (0.019) 
Log(Sales) -0.003 
  (0.003) 
Log(FirmAge) -0.122*** 
  (0.036) 
Log(Segments) -0.015 
  (0.051) 
HHI4 0.054*** 
  (0.009) 
CEO_Own -0.019 
  (0.025) 
CEO_Chair -0.044 
  (0.084) 
Log(CEOTenure) 0.003 
  (0.016) 
BoardIndependence  -0.072 
  (0.072) 
Log(BoardSize) 0.016 
  (0.055) 








Table 2.9: Instrumental Variable Regression  
This table addresses potential endogeneity in the relation between the fraction of experienced independent 
directors and Tobin's Q. Columns (1) and (2) report the first-stage results, and Column (3) reports the second-
stage result with Tobin's Q as the dependent variable. The instrumental variables are interaction terms of pre-sox 
board dependence and high/low product market competition indicators. High/low competition is defined by 
yearly sample median sales HHI of top 4 firms in 3-digit SIC industry. The sample period is 2000-2010. Variable 
definitions are provided in Table 2.1. Regressions include firm- and year fixed effects. Constant is included in the 
regression but not shown for brevity. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. 
Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  







(1) (2) (3) 
BoardIndependence2001*Post -0.335*** -0.057***  
 * H_Competition (0.019) (0.012) 
 
BoardIndependence2001*Post -0.057*** -0.318***  
 * L_Competition (0.013) (0.016) 
 












FracNoExperience * H_Competition -0.808*** 0.03*** -0.468 
  (0.012) (0.006) (0.445) 
FracNoExperience * L_Competition 0.015*** -0.806*** 0.344 
  (0.006) (0.013) (0.363) 
L_Competition -0.611*** 0.612*** -0.984*** 
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.336) 
Log(BoardSize) -0.011 -0.025*** -0.428*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.127) 
IndDirOwnership 0.000 0.002*** 0.004 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
ROA -0.039* 0.007 4.117*** 
  (0.02) (0.014) (0.455) 
Log(Sales) -0.001 0.004 -0.449*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.090) 
Leverage 0.017 -0.023** -0.909*** 
  (0.015) (0.010) (0.211) 
R&D/Assets -0.005 -0.045** 4.267*** 
  (0.04) (0.019) (1.212) 
R&D_Dum 0.013* -0.010 -0.016 
  (0.007) (0.012) (0.067) 
Log(FirmAge) 0.031*** 0.010 -0.539** 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.237) 
PPE/Assets -0.008 -0.002 -0.766** 
  (0.023) (0.022) (0.336) 
CEOOwnership 0.012 0.048 -0.275 
  (0.028) (0.031) (0.304) 
CEOChairman 0.005* 0.007** 0.039 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.038) 
Firm and year fixed effects  Y Y Y 
Observations 9,536 9,536 9,536 
Adjusted R
2
 0.835 0.831 0.200 
F-statistic 246.49 294.84 
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Table 2.10: Threshold Cutoff Year for Independent Directorship Experience   
This table reports estimation results on the interactive effects of independent director experience and product 
market competition on firm value with different threshold value for being categorized as experienced. From 
Column (1) to (6), independent director experience is defined by at least 2 to 6 years of prior independent 
directorship experience accordingly. High/low competition is defined by yearly sample median sales HHI of top 4 
firms in 3-digit SIC industry. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q. The sample period is 2000-2010. The same set 
of control variables used in table 2.7 are used but not shown in the table for brevity. Variable definitions are 
provided in Table 2.1. Regressions include firm- and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level 
are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
  
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
BoardIndependence * H_Competition -0.333 -0.139 -0.096 -0.047 -0.087 -0.125 
 
(0.218) (0.217) (0.211) (0.217) (0.222) (0.224) 
BoardIndependence * L_Competition 0.222* 0.119 0.119 0.024 -0.027 -0.012 
 
(0.135) (0.144) (0.146) (0.145) (0.138) (0.137) 
2-YearExperience * H_Competition 
 
-0.259* 
    
  
(0.146) 
    
2-YearExperience * L_Competition 
 
0.083 
    
  
(0.092) 
    
3-YearExperience * H_Competition 
  
-
0.357***    
   
(0.133) 
   
3-YearExperience * L_Competition 
  
0.054 
   
   
(0.098) 
   
4-YearExperience * H_Competition 
   
-
0.452***   
    
(0.137) 
  
4-YearExperience * L_Competition 
   
0.166 
  
    
(0.101) 
  
5-YearExperience * H_Competition 
    
-
0.366***  
     
(0.129) 
 
5-YearExperience * L_Competition 
    
0.295*** 
 
     
(0.103) 
 
6-YearExperience * H_Competition 
     
-0.307** 
      
(0.138) 
6-YearExperience * L_Competition 
     
0.320*** 
  
     
(0.107) 
Firm and year fixed effects  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 11,726 11,726 11,726 11,726 11,726 11,726 
Adjusted R
2




Table 2.11: Nonlinear Effect Of Independent Director Experience On Firm Value  
This table reports estimation results on the interactive effects of independent director experience and product 
market competition on firm value with nonlinear specification. Column (1) includes both linear and squared 
value of independent director experience decomposed into fraction of experienced and inexperienced 
independent directors. Column (2) includes piecewise independent director experience variable. High/low 
competition is defined by yearly sample median sales HHI of top 4 firms in 3-digit SIC industry. The dependent 
variable is Tobin's Q. The sample period is 2000-2010. The same set of control variables used in table 2.7 are 
used but not shown in the table for brevity. Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. Regressions include 
firm- and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients 
marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q 
  (1) (2) 






















































FracNoExperience * H_Competition -0.089 -0.085 
 
(0.221) (0.221) 
FracNoExperience * L_Competition -0.057 -0.047 
  (0.138) (0.137) 
Firm and year fixed effects  Y Y 
Observations 11,726 11,726 
Adjusted R
2




Table 2.12: Robustness Test  
This table reports the results of robustness checks to the use of industry fixed effect in place of firm fixed effect, control for 
exchange regulation mandating majority independent board, alternative measure of key variables, sample constructions, and 
additional control variables. Panel A reports the results of using industry and year fixed effects instead of firm and year fixed 
effects. Other than the choice of fixed effects, regression specification is identical to that of Table 2.7 Columns (2), (4) and (5); 
Panel B reports the results controlling for exchange regulation mandating majority independent board by 2003: Column (1) is 
based on subsample consisting of firms that are not affected by the regulation, and Column (2) consisting of firms affected by 
the regulation. Other than the sample construction, regression specification is identical to that of Table 2.7 column (3); Panel C 
reports the results based on alternative samples: Column (1) including firms in regulated industries, Column (2) excluding 
financially distressed firms, and Column (3) over shorter sample period of 2000-2006. Other than the choice of sample, 
regression specification is identical to that of Table 2.7 Column (3); Panel D reports the results of using alternative measures of 
independent directorship experience: Column (1) uses number of experienced independent directors instead of fraction in the 
board, and Column (2) indicator of majority experienced independent directors in the board. Other than the choice of 
independent directorship experience measure, regression specification is identical to that of Table 2.7 Column (4); Panel E 
reports the results estimated with the alternative measures of product market competition: Column (1) based on top 8 company 
sales HHI, Column (2) based on top 4 company sales ICR, and Column (3) based on top 4 company sales HHI where industry 
is defined by 2-digit SIC code; Panel F reports estimation results using additional control variables: Column (1) adding the 
fraction of non co-opted independent directors, Column (2) adding the fraction of non-busy independent directors, Column (3) 
adding TotalAdvising, a measure of board advising (Coles et al., 2012), and Column (4) includes all three additional control 
variables. Other than the additional control variables, regression specification is identical to that of Table 2.7 Column (3). 
Except panel D where different competition measure is used, high/low competition is defined by yearly sample median sales 
HHI of top 4 firms in 3-digit SIC industry. The dependent variable is Tobin's Q. The sample period is 2000-2010 except 
Column (3) of Panel E, where the sample period is 2000-2006. Variable definitions are provided in Table 2.1. Regressions 
include firm- and year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the firm level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked 
with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Control variables used in Table 2.7 are included in 
the estimation but not shown in the table for brevity.  
Panel A: Industry and year fixed effect regression  
  Dependent variable: Tobin's Q 
  (1) (2) (3) 


















FracNoExperience * H_Competition 
  
-0.015 
   
-0.195 
FracNoExperience * L_Competition 
  
-0.244* 
    -0.131 
3-digit SIC industry and year fixed effects  Y Y Y 
Observations 11,726 11,726 11,726 
Adjusted R2 0.374 0.376 0.376 
 Panel B: Controlling for exchange regulation mandating majority independent board  
  
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q 
Firms not affected by regulation Firms subject to regulation 
(1) (2) 
BoardIndependence * H_Competition -0.087 -0.19 
 
-0.312 -0.423 
BoardIndependence * L_Competition -0.103 -0.111 
 
-0.165 -0.298 
FracExperience * H_Competition -0.471*** -0.036 
 
-0.162 -0.322 
FracExperience * L_Competition 0.381*** 0.515** 
  -0.12 -0.236 
Firm and year fixed effects  Y Y 
Observations 7,828 1,800 




Table 2.12: Robustness Test (continued)  
 Panel C: Alternative sample construction  
  
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q 
Including financial 
and utility firms 
Excluding financially 
distressed firms 
Sample period over 
2000-2006 
(1) (2) (3) 
BoardIndependence * H_Competition -0.196 -0.09 -0.073 
 
-0.186 -0.224 -0.325 
BoardIndependence * L_Competition -0.119 0.009 -0.119 
 
-0.15 -0.158 -0.16 
FracExperience * H_Competition -0.245** -0.211 -0.731*** 
 
-0.104 -0.149 -0.188 
FracExperience * L_Competition 0.243*** 0.420*** 0.468*** 
  -0.088 -0.124 -0.131 
Firm and year fixed effects  Y Y Y 
Observations 14,564 8,873 7,577 
Adjusted R2 0.655 0.721 0.665 
 Panel D: Alternative proxies of independent director experience  
  
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q 
(1) (2) 
BoardIndependence * H_Competition -0.115 -0.237 
 
-0.227 -0.223 
BoardIndependence * L_Competition -0.045 0.115 
 
-0.139 -0.133 













ExperiencedBoard * L_Competition 
 
0.078** 
    -0.031 
Firm and year fixed effects  Y Y 
Observations 11,726 11,726 
Adjusted R2 0.645 0.644 
 Panel E: Alternative measures of product market competition  
  
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q 
Competition based on 
HHI8 
Competition based on 
ICR4 
Competition based on  
2-digit SIC industry HHI4 
(1) (2) (3) 
BoardIndependence  -0.092 -0.058 -0.295 
     * H_Competition -0.238 -0.219 -0.205 
BoardIndependence  -0.007 -0.06 0.186 
     * L_Competition -0.145 -0.141 -0.133 
FracExperience  -0.404*** -0.373*** -0.300** 
     * H_Competition -0.142 -0.134 -0.116 
FracExperience  0.242** 0.293*** 0.210** 
     * L_Competition -0.107 -0.102 -0.094 
Firm and year fixed effects  Y Y Y 
Observations 10,572 11,726 12,178 




Table 2.12: Robustness Test (continued)  
 Panel F: Additional control variables  
  
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
FracExperience * H_Competition -0.312*** -0.352*** -0.385*** -0.381*** 
 
-0.119 -0.124 -0.118 -0.126 
FracExperience * L_Competition 0.281*** 0.258*** 0.300*** 0.348*** 
 
-0.09 -0.094 -0.099 -0.102 




























TotalQuality * H_Competition 0.001 0.001 
   
-0.001 -0.001 
TotalQuality * L_Competition -0.001* -0.001 
      -0.001 -0.001 
Firm and year fixed effects  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 11,726 11,726 11,726 11,726 





Chapter 3. Determinants and Consequences of Appointing Affiliated 
Directors 
3.1 Introduction 
The board of directors is at the apex of corporate governance, and directors are considered to have 
fiduciary duty of representing the shareholders by monitoring and advising management. While 
the board is composed of inside, affiliated, and independent directors, both practitioners and 
academics have stressed the importance of independent directors as the key of good corporate 
governance.
28
 For example, the regulatory pressure on the composition of the board after 
accounting scandals in early 2000s mandates listed firms to have majority of independent directors 
among the board. If independent directors are so important, then why shouldn’t firms construct 
their boards with entire independent directors? Why do firms maintain inside or affiliated directors 
at all?  
Several studies suggest that inside directors may contribute to better firm performance, 
because they have better knowledge on firm-specific environments (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 
2007; Raheja, 2005; Harris and Raviv, 2008). However, relatively little attention has paid on the 
affiliated directors, who are outsiders but not independent due to their affiliated relations with the 
hiring firms. In this paper, we investigate the characteristics and governance implications of 
affiliated directors, an important but ignored part of corporate boards. 
Similar to the inside directors, affiliated directors also have both benefits and concerns on 
corporate governance. Affiliated directors have closer material relation to the appointing firm, 
which may make them less willing to monitor the management because monitoring can make the 
                                                 
28
 See Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) and Bebchuk and Weisbach (2010) for review.  
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management uncomfortable, which in turn disturb the relation between the affiliated directors and 
the firm. On the other hand, firm-specific knowledge and strong incentive alignment arising from 
the close relation may make them do better job monitoring and advising. We start by investigating 
the determinants of the composition of affiliated directors, followed by their implications on the 
monitoring and advising functions of the board and firm performance.  
Based on the RiskMetrics director dataset during 1996-2008, we find that affiliated 
directors are more prevalent in firms that are suffering from under-performance, matured, and with 
larger board. Powerful CEO and regulatory pressure for majority independent directors among the 
board are associated with lower fraction of affiliated directors among the board. These results may 
be interpreted as affiliated directors are symptoms of agency problem and associated with low 
performance. However, a different interpretation is also possible: the close relation may be the 
source of firm-specific knowledge or expertise, reducing the cost of information about the 
company and management. And the relation itself may serve as a strong incentive mechanism for 
the affiliated directors, because the success of the appointing firm can directly influence the 
success of the affiliated directors.
29
 If this is the case, then the above results may be the outcome of 
the suffering firms’ effort to bolster the board by increasing affiliated directors and enhance firm 
performance.  
To tease out these confronting views, we analyze the impact of affiliated directors on firm 
performance, and find that on average affiliated directors increase CEO pay-for-performance 
sensitivity, reduce management entrenchment, and enhance M&A performance and firm overall 
performance. These results suggest that on average affiliated directors can strength monitoring on 
management and providing advices.  
Not all directors are the same. Previous literature show heterogeneity in the independent 
and inside directors, and some of them may function better than others in facilitating good 
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 This channel of incentive alignment would be particularly strong if the relation between them are built base on 





 Similarly, affiliated directors may also be heterogeneous and have different firm 
performance implications. For this reason, we classify affiliated directors into several subgroups 
and investigate them separately. Based on RiskMetrics director classification and hand-collected 
data about the relation to the appointing firms, we classify affiliated directors into six major 
subgroups: (1) business partner directors (directors or directors’ employers have business 
transaction with the appointing firm); (2) former executive directors (former employees of the 
appointing or affiliated firms); (3) relative directors (directors are immediate family members or 
relatives of the appointing firms’ current or former executives); (4) blockholder directors 
(directors or directors’ employers are significant shareholders of the appointing firm; (5) interlock 
directors (executives of firms that have board interlock with the appointing firm; (6) charity 
directors (trustee, director, or employee of a charitable organization that receives “material” grants 
from the appointing firm).
31
 For the first three major subgroups, we further separate them into 
more detailed subgroups: Business partner directors into service provider, supplier, customer, and 
merged firm directors;
32
 Former executive directors into former CEO, CFO, COO, chairman, and 




Among the subgroups of affiliated directors, business partner directors and blockholder 
directors may be most strongly correlated with firm performance, given that they may have the 
strongest incentive alignment with the appointing firms. Indeed, we find that underperforming 
firms are associated with more business partner and blockholder directors, while other types of 
                                                 
30
 Masulis and Mobbs (2011) show that inside directors with outside directorships may strengthen board monitoring 
on management. 
31
 Detailed description on the definition of each subgroup is in 2013 U.S. Proxy Voting Manual of ISS. 
32
 Service providers include the suppliers of professional services such as consulting, HR, and legal counsel; Merged 
firm directors are the executives or directors of firms that are merged into the appointing firm. 
33
 Older (younger) generation relative directors include parents and grandparents (children and grandchildren) of the 
firm executives.  
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affiliated directors are not influenced by firm performance.
34
 In addition to the firm performance, 
the power of CEO also seems to reduce the appearance of business partner and blockholder 
directors, who may increase monitoring intensity on the management. Relation between the 
business partner and blockholder directors on firm performance support the argument that they 
enhance both the monitoring and advising function of the board: increase CEO pay-for-
performance sensitivity, reduce management entrenchment, and enhance M&A performance and 
ROA of the firm. 
Unlike business partners or blockholder directors, former employee directors are not 
affected by firm performance but strongly influenced by the CEO characteristics: proxies of CEO 
power are associated with lower frequency of former employee directors, suggesting that strong 
CEOs may not need former employees in the boardroom because there are little that former 
executives can contribute in addition to already successful CEOs, or CEOs may not need support 
or protection from intense monitoring. This result can also be interpreted as weak CEOs trying to 
capture the board with more former employee directors, who are more likely to be under his 
influence. Firm performance implications of the former employee directors suggest that they are 
detrimental: they are associated with lower CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity, higher 
management entrenchment, and lower M&A performance. Among the former employee director, 
however, the founder directors seem to be different from others: founder directors are more likely 
to be found in firms suffering from financial distress, and they are positively related with higher 
CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity, lower management entrenchment, and better firm 
performance. Maybe the status as founder gives them stronger incentive to enhance firm 
performance and influence over the management to make changes.  
                                                 
34
 Relative directors as a whole show negative and significant relation with previous year firm performance. 
However, we do not find such relation at more detailed subgroup analyses on the relative directors, rendering 
concern on the robustness of the results.  
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Existence of relative directors in the board is affected by CEO characteristics more than 
other factors such as firm performance. While relative directors at aggregated level show negative 
and significant relation with past firm performance, operational complexity, and CEO tenure and 
age, we don’t find strong relation in most of the subcategories of relative directors. Only the 
fraction of old-generation relative directors shows negative relation with the CEO tenure, which 
may be explained as family seniors remaining in the board to nurture the younger generation as a 
competent managers. In line with this reasoning, the CEO age is positively (negatively) related 
with the fraction of young- (old) generation relative directors, suggesting that aged (young) CEOs 
training (be trained by) younger-generation (older-generation) relative directors. Contrary to the 
previous studies on the value of families in firm performance (see Bertrand and Schoar (2006) for 
a review), we find that existence of older and younger generation relative directors are positively 
related to firm performance (higher CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity and lower managerial 
entrenchment). 
We also investigate the determinants and performance implications of interlock directors 
and charity directors, but find little patterns regarding the determinants of them. We find both 
interlock and charity directors are positively and significantly related to monitoring and advising 
functions of the board, suggesting they may enhance firm performance. However, considering the 
small sample size of each type of affiliated directors, we need caution in interpreting the results 
(less than one percent of directors are classified as interlock or charity directors).  
These findings demonstrate corporate governance and performance implications of the 
affiliated directors. Affiliated directors due to business relations or blockholding tend to be 
beneficial to the firm. The roles of affiliated directors due to former employment except founder 
directors are more detrimental than beneficial. Relative directors across different generations may 
be beneficial, while relative directors in the same generation are harmful for efficiency of their 
monitoring and advising roles. For our knowledge, this is the first attempt to investigate the role of 
affiliated directors, important but ignored members on corporate board. Fahlenbrach, Minton, and 
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Pan (2011) is an exception, demonstrating that hiring former CEOs as directors may enhance firm 
performance especially when the quality of succeeding CEOs are highly uncertain or 
unsatisfactory. Unlike Fahlenbrach et al. who focus on former CEO directors only, we examine a 
wide array of affiliated directors. We identify heterogeneity in the composition of affiliated 
directors, and show that different types of affiliated directors may have different firm performance 
implications.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II describes affiliated director 
classification and variables. Section III describes the data and sample construction. Section IV 
discusses the empirical designs. Section V provides empirical results on the determinants and 
performance implications of the affiliated directors as a whole and by subgroups. Section VI 
concludes. 
3.2 Affiliated Director Classification and Variables 
RiskMetrics classifies directors in the following categories: Inside directors, affiliated 
outside directors, and independent outside directors. Both affiliated directors and independent 
directors are considered as outside directors. If an outside director is not independent from the 
appointing firm, then this director is considered as an affiliated director. RiskMetrics determines 
outside director’s independence based on the following criteria: board attestation, past employment 
history, family relation, business transactions with the appointing firm, charitable donations, board 
interlock, and other material relationship.  
In this study, we denote the percentage of total affiliated directors, as Pct_Affiliated. An 
outside director becomes not independent when 1) one provides or receives (or is associated with a 
company that provides or receives) professional services or has material transactional relationship 
with the appointing company;
35
 2) one is a former executive officer of the appointing company or 
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 Transaction in excess of $10,000 per year is considered as material transaction. 
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a company that was acquired by the appointing company within the past five years;
36
 3) one is an 
immediate family member of a current or former executive officers; 4) one is associated with an 
organization which receives material grants or endowments from the appointing company;
37
 5) one 
is the employee of a firm which has interlocking directorship with the appointing firm;
38
 6) the 
board attest that one is not independent;
39




Considering characteristics of different relations between the directors and the appointing 
firms, we separate affiliated directors into six types. In some types, depending on the availability 
of more detailed information on the relation between a director and the appointing firm, we 
separate them into detailed subgroups. The characteristics of the relationship may influence 
affiliated directors’ incentives and abilities to monitor and advise the management. Additionally, 
the grouping of directors may not be mutually exclusive: A director may fall into multiple types or 
subgroups (e.g., a director who is former employee (a former CEO) and relative of current officers 
(father of current CEO)). 
The first type is business partner directors, who (or their employer) have business 
transactions with the appointing firm. Percentage of this type of directors is denoted as Pct_Bus. 
Business transaction with the appointing firm may be further separated into four subgroups: (1) 
                                                 
36
 Executive officer positions include (but not limited to) the SEC section 16 officer (e.g., CEO/CFO/COO, 
president/treasurer/secretaries of the appointing or affiliated companies). For some positions that are less important 
(e.g., non-CEO positions), only the past five years employment history counts.  
37
 Transactions over certain criteria (e.g., $200,000 or 5% of the recipient’s gross revenues for NASDAQ listed 
companies, and $1,000,000 or 2% for NYSE/Amex listed companies) are considered as material. 
38
 Board interlock forms when executive officers of two companies sit in each others’ board (and especially in the 
compensation or similar committees).  
39
 Board may determine its members’ independence based on similar criteria that RiskMetrics use. 
40
 Material relationship is defined as relationship that a reasonable person might conclude could potentially influence 
one’s objectivity in the boardroom in a manner that would have a meaningful impact on an individual’s ability to 






 (e.g., legal, financial, or consulting); (2) suppliers; (3) customers; (4) or 
acquisition/divestiture by the appointing firm.
42
 The percentage of the above four subgroups of 
directors is denoted as Pct_Service, Pct_Supplier, Pct_Customer, and Pct_Merged, respectively.  
The second type is former employee directors, who are former employees of the board or 
its affiliated firms. Percentage of this type of directors is denoted as, Pct_FormEmp. Based on the 
positions a director served in the appointing firm (or affiliated firms), we separate former 
employee directors into five subgroups: (1) former CEO; (2) former CFO; (3) former COO; (4) 
former chairman of the board; (5) founder of the appointing firm. The percentage of the above five 
subgroups of directors are denoted as Pct_CEO, Pct_CFO, Pct_COO, Pct_Chair, and 
Pct_Founder, respectively.  
The third type is relative directors who are immediate family members or relatives of the 
appointing firm’s current or former executives. Percentage of the relative directors is denoted as 
Pct_Relative. Based on the relations with the appointing firm’s executives, we separate relative 
directors into three subgroups: (1) parents or grandparents (older generation); (2) children or 
grandchildren (younger generation); (3) siblings; (4) spouses. The percentage of the above four 
subgroups of directors are denoted as Pct_OldGen, Pct_YoungGen, Pct_Sibling, and Pct_Spouse, 
respectively.  
The fourth type is blockholder directors who are significant shareholders or whose 
employer has equity investment in the appointing firm (i.e., more than 5%). The percentage of 
blockholder directors is denoted as Pct_Blockholder.  
                                                 
41
 RiskMetrics characterizes professional services as advisory in nature, generally involving access to sensitive 
company information or to strategic decision-making.  
42
 Executive officers of companies that are acquired or spun-off by the appointing firm may also be categorized as 
former employee directors. However, the relation between the directors and management of appointing firms are 
built mainly through the business transactions rather than personal/hierarchical relation. For this reason, we classify 
such relation into business transaction.  
91 
 
The fifth and sixth types are interlock directors and charity directors. Interlock directors are 
the executives of firms that have board interlock with the appointing firm, and the charity directors 
are trustees, directors, or employees of a charitable organization that receives material grants from 
the appointing firm. The percentage of this type of directors is denoted as Pct_Interlock and 
Pct_Charity, respectively. 
We classify affiliated directors based on both RiskMetrics and hand collected information 
from regulatory filings, company IR reports, and news search. First we consider directors as 
affiliated directors when we find RiskMetrics data item “CLASSIFICATION” equals “L”. Among 
the identified affiliated directors, we classify directors as business partner directors when 
“BUSINESS_TRANSCATION” or “PROF_SERVICES_YN” in the RiskMetrics data items equal 
one; former employee directors when “FORMER_EMPLOYEE_YN” equals one; relative directors 
when “RELATIVE_YN” equals one; interlock directors when “INTERLOCKING” equals one; 
charity directors when “CHARITY” equals one. RiskMetrics does not identify blockholder 
directors separately, but it provides director shareholdings. We classify blockholder director when 
the director’s (or the employer of director) shareholding is larger than 5%.  Some affiliated 
directors are associated with none of above identifiers (missing values or zeros). To supplement 
RiskMetrics dataset, we collect additional information about the relation between affiliated 
directors and appointing firms from other data sources in the order of 10-K filings to SEC, investor 
relation section of company websites, and news article searches based on the company and director 
names.
43
 Business transaction or interlocking relations are often formed between the appointing 
firm and primary employers of directors. We include the name of primary employers in the news 
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 We look for the past employment history, family relationship with executive officers, business transaction 
between appointing firm and employers of the directors, and other miscellaneous details.  
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search whenever it is provided by RiskMetrics. Information search stops when we find relevant 
information, or we reach 100th news article.
44
  
RiskMetrics also provides “TYPE_OF_SERVICES” and “RELATION”, which describe 
scope of professional services business partner directors are involved, and the family relationship 
of relative directors respectively. We utilize above information together with hand-collected data 
to classify business transaction, relative, and former employee directors into detailed subgroups.  
Table 3.1 provides definitions of affiliated director classifications.  
3.3 Data 
In this section, we describe the sample construction, followed by the summary statistics of 
affiliated director variables. 
3.3.1 Sample Construction  
The sample is constructed by merging director data from RiskMetrics, financial and 
accounting data from Compustat, stock return data from CRSP, M&A data from SDC Platinum, 
CEO related data from ExecuComp, institutional investor ownership data from Thomson Reuters, 
and the anti-takeover index from Lucian Bebchuk’s website.
45
 The merged data allow us to track 
the time-series variation in the composition of affiliated directors and their influences on corporate 
governance and firm performance while controlling for other relevant information.  
The sample is based on S&P 1500 firms, which are covered by both RiskMetrics and 
ExecuComp during 1996-2010. We use unbalanced panel data allowing firms to enter and exit 
from the sample during the sample period, which may reduce potential survivorship bias. Using 




                                                 
44
 We search for about 10,000 director-firm pairs, and the large volume of search makes us stop searching at this 
point. Usually relevant information about the relation between directors and appointing firms are found within first 
20 news search results. 
45
 Bebchuk’s website: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml  
46
 Using balanced panel may reduce potential noise caused by bankruptcy, delisting, or IPOs. 
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Table 3.2 reports the sample distribution by year. The total number of firm-year 
observations with the affiliated director information available over the fifteen year period covers 
18,766 observations. Due to availabilities of certain variables, the number of observations may 
change over regressions. Column (2) reports the number of observations in each year, suggesting 
that the number of observations is more or less balanced across sample years. Column (3) reports 
the percentage of firms with at least one affiliated directors in the board. Unlike inside or 
independent directors, not all firms appoint affiliated directors. In our sample, 63.8% of firm-year 
observations have affiliated directors in the boards. The percentage of firms with affiliated 




Columns (4)-(9) report the percentage of firms with each of the six major groups of 
affiliated directors respectively. The most popular group of affiliated directors is business partner 
directors, followed by former employee, relative, blockholder, interlock, and charity directors. 
About half of the sample firms have business partner directors, but less than 1% of firms have 
charity directors in their boards. After the majority independent directors requirement in 2002, all 
major groups of affiliated directors tend to shrink except charity directors.
48
   
3.3.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 3.3 contains the summary statistics of the variables used in this study. The mean 
and median values of Pct_Affiliated are 13.1% and 11.1%. Given that the median board size is 
10, these numbers suggest that on average each board includes about one affiliated director. The 
                                                 
47
 By construction, increasing any one of the percentages of independent, inside, or affiliated directors will lead to 
decrease in the others. Table 3.A2 shows piece-wise correlation coefficients across the percentage of different types 
of directors. As expected, the correlation among independent, inside, and various types of affiliated directors are all 
negative and statistically significant. The correlation coefficients among the affiliated directors are positive and 
significant in general, suggesting firms that have one type of affiliated directors are likely to have other types, too. 
48
 The peculiar movement in the number of charity directors may stem from its rarity: appointment of a few more 
charity directors may be seen as doubled up.  
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minimum and maximum values of Pct_Affiliated is 0 and 0.9, suggesting that some firms don’t 
have any affiliated directors, while others choose to have almost all of directors as affiliated ones. 
Mean values of the fraction of each group of affiliated directors in the board, Pct_Bus, 
Pct_FormEmp, Pct_Relative, Pct_Blockholder, Pct_Interlock, and Pct_Charity are 8.5%, 5.4%, 
1.5%, 1.2%, 0.8% and 0.1%, respectively.
49
 This result confirms that among the different types 
of affiliated directors, business partner, former employee, and relative directors are the most 
popular ones. Business partner directors account for more than half of the total affiliated 
directors, and former employee directors representing about a third. Interlock directors and 
charity directors are the two smallest types of affiliated directors.  
At the subgroup level, the mean values of Pct_Service, Pct_Supplier, Pct_Customer, and 
Pct_Merged are 6%, 0.2%, 0.2%, and 0.7% for business partner directors, which suggests that 
about 70% of business partner affiliated directors are service provider directors.
50
 For former 
employee directors, the mean values of Pct_CEO, Pct_CFO, Pct_COO, Pct_Chair and 
Pct_Founder are 1.7%, 0.2%, 0.3%, 1.6%, and 0.5%. Among the former employee directors, 
former CEO and former chairman directors account for the largest two portions. For relative 
directors, the mean values of Pct_OldGen, Pct_YoungGen, Pct_Sibling and Pct_Spouse are 0.3%, 
0.2%, 0.3% and 0.1%. This implies that the four subgroups of relative directors are more or less 
evenly distributed.  
3.4 Empirical Designs  
It is important to understand the factors affecting the composition of affiliated directors 
before investigating their influence on firm performance. We start empirical investigation on the 
determinants of the affiliated directors, and then proceed to the test of affiliated directors’ impact 
on monitoring and advising management.  
                                                 
49
 Sum of the fraction of each type of affiliated directors are greater than the fraction of affiliated directors in the 
board, because director types are not mutually exclusive. 
50
 Sum of the subgroup affiliated directors may be smaller than the major group, because no detailed information on 
the detailed relation is found, and hence not included in the subgroup construction for some observations. 
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3.4.1 Determinant of Affiliated Directors  
Following prior literature of board composition (e.g., Boone et al., 2007a; Linck, Netter, 
and Yang, 2008; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2008, Masulis and Mobbs, 2011), we estimate the 
following specification 
Pct_(Type)it = αi + αt + β1∙Xit + μit          (1) 
where Pct_(Type)it is the variable measuring the percentage of the affiliated directors as a whole or 
at the major type/subgroup level. Xit represents a vector of variables which may influence the 
occurrence of affiliated directors. We use past performance, financial conditions, organizational 
and operational complexity, strength of CEO influence, and board-related factors as the 
explanatory variables. To control for unobservable characteristics that may influence the 
composition of affiliated directors, we include firm- and year fixed effects, αi and αt in the 
regression. Since CEOs have important influence on corporate decisions, auto-correlation among 
observations with the same CEO-firm pairs is of a concern. For this reason, we cluster standard 
errors at the CEO-firm pair level.  
3.4.2 Factors Affecting the Composition of Affiliated Directors 
The structure of the board is determined based on the costs and benefits of monitoring and 
advising by the board. Following prior literature, we examine the influence of the following four 
sets of firm characteristics on the composition of affiliated directors: 
3.4.2.1 Firm Performance and Financial Conditions  
Firm performance and financial conditions are important indicators for needs for better 
monitoring, advising and even help from outside the firm (Linck, Netter, and Yang, 2008). We use 
return to assets, ROA, to proxy for past firm performance; and Altman’s Z-score, Zscore, to proxy 
for financial conditions. Low value of Zscore suggests that the firm is financial constrained. To 
avoid potential reverse-causality problem, lagged values of ROA and Zscore are used. 
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3.4.2.2 Organizational and Operational Complexity  
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008) suggest that firm’s organizational and operational 
complexity may affect the costs and needs for monitoring, and the needs for advising to the 
management. To proxy for firm organizational complexity, we use the number of business 
segments, Ln(Segments), total asset as firm size, Ln(TA), and firm age, Ln(FirmAge) from 
CRSP/Compustat. We take natural logs of the variables to account for skewness. For the firms that 
do not report segment information, we consider it as a single-segment firm (Segments equals one). 
Value of total assets is adjusted to the 2000 U.S. dollars in millions. Firm age is counted from the 
IPO date or the year when a firm first appears in CRSP database. To proxy for operational 
environment of a firm, we use product market competition, ICR, measured as the industry 
concentration ratio: the sum of the percentage market share (in sales) of the four biggest firms 
among all firms in Compustat in each three-digit SIC industry. 
3.4.2.3 CEO Characteristics  
As a central player of a firm, CEO may influence the composition of the board (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 1998). We include four CEO characteristics that proxy for the strength of CEO 
influence. The first proxy is the share ownership of CEO, CEO_OWN, measured as the number of 
shares held by CEO divided by the number of total common shares outstanding. High CEO 
ownership may serve as either CEO entrenchment or better incentive alignment. The second and 
third CEO variables about the ability of the CEO: an indicator for a CEO also chairing the board, 
CEO-Chair, and CEO tenure, CEO_Tenure, measured as the number of years a CEO has been in 
office. Successful CEOs may stay in position for longer period, and also assume the chairmanship 
at the same time. The last CEO variable is CEO age, Ln(CEO_Age), measured as the logged value 
of CEO age. Age may be related to retirement or succession plan of the CEO, which may have 
bearings on the structure of the board.  
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3.4.2.4 Board Characteristics  
Affiliated directors need to split board seats with inside and independent directors. The 
competition for board seats among inside, affiliated, and independent directors will be less severe 
when the number of board seats are plenty. Board size, Ln(BoardSize), measured by the natural log 
of one plus the total number of directors in the board is included in the regression.  
Given the board size is fixed, when firms need to increase the fraction of independent 
directors, it is likely that the number of affiliated directors goes down. The board independence 
regulation requires firms listed in NYSE and NASDAQ to have a majority of independent 
directors. The proposal for the regulation was submitted to the SEC in 2002 and approved in 2003, 
setting the deadline for compliance as October 31, 2004. This regulation directly affects the 
percentage of independent directors and hence may affect the percentage of affiliated directors.
51
  
Firms with high board dependence (low board independence) before the regulation are 
under stronger pressure to increase board independence. Hence, we construct a variable which is 
the product of Affect, the fraction of non-independent directors in year 2001, and Post, an indicator 
variable for post-regulation period (year 2003 and after). We use 2001 as the  reference year 
because many firms began changing their board structure once the recommendations were 
promulgated by the exchanges in 2002. Affect_Post, the product of Affect and Post, proxies the 
regulatory pressure to increase the fraction of independent directors (and possibly decrease the 
fraction of affiliated directors) in the board, and is included in Regression (1).  
Table 3.A1 describes definitions of these variables and Table 3.3 provides the summary 
statistics.  
3.4.3 Effectiveness of Affiliated Directors in Enhancing Firm Performance  
There are two primary roles of board of directors through which they influence firm 
performance: monitoring and advising management. Compared with independent directors, 
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 Kim and Lu (2012) find that on average firms replaced existing non-independent directors by independent 
directors, rather than just simply added more independent directors when they are affected by the regulation. 
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affiliated directors have closer relation to the appointing firm. On one hand, the close relation may 
help reduce information asymmetry between firm insiders and affiliated directors. Information 
asymmetry has been considered as an important barrier for outside directors to become effective 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas, 2010). Thus, such relation may 
enhance the efficiency of the monitoring and advising functions of affiliated directors. 
Additionally, if the close relation strengthens interdependence of affiliated directors’ interest with 
success of appointing firm, such relation may enhance the incentive of affiliated directors to 
perform better monitoring. On the other hand, if appointing certain affiliated directors reflects 
CEO’s or management’s private interest and entrenchment, such relation may reduce affiliated 
directors’ incentive for monitoring. How do affiliated directors affect firm performance through 
their monitoring and advising roles? To answer this question, we investigate the impacts of the 
fraction of affiliated directors as a whole and by subgroups on CEO wealth-performance sensitivity, 
managerial entrenchment, M&A announcement returns, and operational performance.  
3.4.3.1 CEO Wealth-Performance Sensitivity  
Broadly speaking, monitoring role of the board requires scrutinizing management to guard 
against harmful behaviors such as shirking or stealing. A number of studies show that in the 
absence of adequate monitoring, CEOs manipulate the compensation process to pay themselves 
what they can (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2000, 2001; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; and Morse, 
Nanda, and Seru, 2011). The evidence also suggests that more effective monitoring makes CEO 
pay more sensitive to performance. In this regard, wealth-performance sensitivity has been widely 
used to test the efficiency of monitoring management. We estimate the impact of affiliated 
directors on monitoring effectiveness by estimating the following specification: 
CEO_Deltait = αi + αt + β1Pct_(Type)it + β2Controlit + μit          (2) 
CEO_Deltait is measures as the dolloar change in CEO wealth for a percentage change in firm 
value scaled by total compensation, which is downloaded from Alex Admans’ website (Edmans, 
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Gabaix, and Landier, 2009).
52
 Pct_(Type)it is the variable measuring the percentage of the affiliated 
directors as a whole and by subgroups. Controlit includes a vector of control variables which may 
affect CEO pay for performance sensitivity: accounting performance, ROAt-1; firm value, Tobin’s 
Qt-1; financial conditions, Zscoret-1 and Leveraget-1; organizational complexity variables, 
Ln(Segment), Ln(TA) and Ln(FirmAge); assets tangibility, PPE/TA; and product market 
competition, ICR. Board size, Ln(BoardSize), and institutional investor concentration, IOC, are 
also included in the control variables because they are widely documented to have influence on 
firm monitoring. We also control for proxies of CEO power, CEO-Chair and CEO_Tenure, 
because they may influence the monitoring intensity on management.
53
 Firm- and year fixed 
effects αi and αt are also included to account for unobservable factors, and standard errors are 
clustered at the CEO-firm pair level. 
3.4.3.2 Managerial Entrenchment  
Another important indicator of the effectiveness in monitoring management is the level of 
managerial entrenchment. We measure the managerial entrenchment by Eindex, which consists of 
six provisions that are negatively related to the shareholder rights regarding the market for 
corporate control, one of the external governance mechanisms that alleviate managerial 
entrenchment (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009). We investigate how affiliated directors affect 
managerial entrenchment by estimating the following specification:     
Ln(Eindex+1)it = αi + αt + β1Pct_(Type)it + β2Controlit + μit          (3) 
Eindex is a count data variable ranging from 0 to 6, and histograms indicate a bell shaped 
distribution with no obvious truncations at either zero or six. Thus, we use OLS to estimate the 
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http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~aedmans/data.html; Previous studies suggest two other ways to measure pay-
performance sensitivity: dollar change in wealth for a dollar change in firm value (Jensen and Murphy, 1990) and 
dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value (Hall and Liebman, 1998). We use Edmans et al.’s 
compensation-scaled wealth-sensitivity measure because, as they point out, it is independent of firm size and 
accounts for multiplicative effects of CEO actions on firm value and CEO utility. 
53
 We do not control for CEO ownership, another important proxy of CEO power, because it is included in the 
construction of the dependent variable. 
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model and use the logged value of one plus the Eindex as the dependent variable. Eindex is 
available only for 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. For missing years, we use the closest 
previous year’s value.
54
 As a robustness check, we re-estimate the model using ordered logistic 
regressions. Pct_(Type)it is as defined earlier, and Controlit includes all control variables in 
Regression (2) together with CEO ownership, CEO_OWN, another factor that may influence 
managerial entrenchment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). We control for firm- and year fixed effects 
αi and αt, and standard errors are clustered at the CEO-firm pair level 
3.4.3.3 M&A Announcement Returns  
The board’s advising function is to help management make good decisions on firm 
strategies and actions. Advising will be more important when firms conduct important corporate 
activities such as M&A (Kang, Kim, and Lu, 2013). Following previous studies (e.g., Kroll, 
Walters, and Wright, 2008; Faleye, Hoitash, and Hoitash, 2012), we estimate how affiliated 
directors affect M&A performance to examine their advising function.   
Acquisition bid data are obtained from Thompson Reuters’ SDC M&A database. We 
include all acquisition bids made by our sample firms over 1996-2008 for domestic and foreign 
targets. When a firm makes multiple acquisition bids within a year, we only include the acquisition 
bid with the largest transaction value for that year. The specification is as follows:  
CAR(-3,+5)it = αi + αt + β1Pct_(Type)it + β2Controlit + μit          (5) 
where CAR(-3,+5) stands for cumulative abnormal returns over (-3,+5) event days surrounding the 
announcement day. Cumulative abnormal returns are estimated using the market model over (-
255,-6) event day window using the value weighted market return provided by CRSP. The mean 
and median CAR(-3,+5) is 0.8% and 0.5%, respectively.
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 Explanatory variables are the same to 
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 For example, we use the index in 2002 for 2003. 
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 The mean is comparable to Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), who report a mean abnormal return of 1.1% 




the ones used in Regression (3) including firm- and year fixed effects, and standard errors are 
clustered at the CEO-firm pair level.  
3.4.3.4 Overall Firm Performance  
Finally, we examine the relation between affiliated directors and overall firm performance 
by estimating the following specification:     
ROAit = αi + αt + β1Pct_(Type)it + β2Controlit + μit          (6) 
We use returns to assets, ROAit, as the measure of firm performance. Explanatory variables are the 
same to the ones used in Regression (3) including firm- and year fixed effects, and standard errors 
are clustered at the CEO-firm pair level.  
3.4.3.5 IV Regression   
Board composition variables are well known for their endogenous relation with other firm 
characteristics. Given the concern on endogeneity problem, the results of OLS regressions may be 
biased. For example, affiliated directors may be related to strong monitoring, not because they 
serve as good monitors, but because CEOs require friendly board to offset tight monitoring from 
high wealth-performance sensitivity or threat from the market for corporate control. Or, CEOs who 
achieved good performance may retain stronger bargaining power over the board, and exert 
influence to construct more friendly board by appointing affiliated directors. If this is the case, we 
may find positive relation between the affiliated directors and firm performance, even though 
affiliated directors may not lead to increased firm performance or monitoring. To alleviate this 
problem, we incorporate instrumental variables (IV) regression. We employ two IVs. The first is 
Affect_Post, the indicator of 2002 majority independent board regulation. The regulatory change is 
exogenous to firm decision (satisfying exclusion restriction), and directly affects the fraction of 
affiliated directors (satisfying relevance condition).
56
 The second IV we use is the fraction of 
affiliated directors among industry peer, Pct_(Type)iy(-i). It is constructed by taking the average of 
the fraction of affiliated directors (as a whole and by subgroups) for firms in the same three-digit 
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 See Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) for a discussion on the 2002 majority independent board regulation. 
102 
 
SIC industry in the same year except the firm itself. The rational of this instrumental variable is 
that board composition may be similar to firms in its peer group, but it is less likely to directly 
affect the monitoring and advising functions of the affiliated directors and other firm 
characteristics. In the first stage, we regress each affiliated director variable on all control variables 
and the two IVs. In the second stage, we regress each outcome variable on the predicted value 
from the first stage regression and other control variables.  
3.5 Estimation Results 
We investigate the determinants of the composition of affiliated directors, and the 
monitoring and advising roles of affiliated directors as a whole and by types/subgroups based on 
the specifications outlined in Section V. 
3.5.1 Total Affiliated Directors 
3.5.1.1 Determinants of the Total Affiliated Directors 
We begin by analyzing the fraction of total affiliated directors. The results of estimating 
what determines the fraction of total affiliated directors are reported in Table 3.4a. Among firm 
performance and financial condition variables, Pct_Affiliated is negatively related to ROAt-1 and 
Zscoret-1, suggesting that underperforming or financially distressed firms tend to have more 
affiliated directors. Among the complexity factors, Ln(Segments) and Ln(FirmAge) are 
negatively related to Pct_Affiliated, but the relation of Ln(TA) is positive. This mixed result 
suggests firm complexity may not be important in determining the composition of affiliated 
directors. Among all CEO characteristics variables, only CEO_Tenure shows significantly 
negative impacts on Pct_Affiliated. Negative impact of CEO_Tenure may be explained as 
powerful CEO, who maintains the CEO position for a long time, may be less likely to appoint 
affiliated directors. Not surprisingly, Ln(BoardSize) is positively and significantly related to 
Pct_Affiliated, suggesting larger board tend to include more affiliated directors. Affect_Post is 
negatively and significantly related to Pct_Affiliated, suggesting that firms increase board 
independence at the cost of reducing the fraction of affiliated directors.  
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3.5.1.2 Monitoring and Advising Roles of the Total Affiliated Directors 
The second-stage IV regression results of the monitoring and advising roles for the fraction 
of total affiliated directors are reported in Table 3.4b. The results show that Pct_Affiliated is 
positively and significantly related to CEO_Delta, negatively related to Ln(Eindex+1), and 
positively related to CAR(-3,+5) and ROA. These results suggest that on average affiliated 
directors may increase CEO wealth-performance sensitivity, reduce managerial entrenchment, and 
enhance M&A performance and firm overall performance. Overall, these imply that on average 
appointing affiliated directors may be beneficial to firm performance. The first stage regression 
results for the fraction of total affiliated directors are reported in Appendix 3.A2. The coefficients 
of control variables other than IVs are not shown for brevity. F-statistics for the joint tests of IVs 
are all above 10, indicating that our IVs are valid.  
3.5.2 Business Partner Directors 
Determinants and firm value implications of affiliated directors may differ along the type 
of relation affiliated directors have. To investigate this possibility, we run the same set of 
analyses we perform with the fraction of total affiliated directors using each type and subgroup 
of affiliated directors. We start the type/subgroup analyses with business partner directors, which 
consists the largest portion among the affiliated directors.  
3.5.2.1 Determinants of the Business Partner Directors 
The results of estimating what determines the fraction of total and each subgroup of 
business partner directors are reported in Table 3.5a. Column (1) reports the results on the 
fraction of total business partner directors. The negative and significant coefficient of ROAt-1 
suggests that underperforming firms tend to appoint directors whose employer are their business 
partners, who may provide valuable advice. The negative and significant coefficient of 
Ln(FirmAge) suggests that younger firms are more likely to appoint their business partners on 
their board, maybe because they need more support from business partners than their matured 
peers. The coefficient of Affect_Post is significantly negative, implying that firms may replace 
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business partner directors with independent directors when they are required to increase 
independent directors. 
Columns (2)-(5) report what determines the fraction of each subgroup of business partner 
directors. Pct_Service shows similar results compared to the total business partner directors, and 
negatively affected by Ln(FmriAge) and CEO_Chair. There is no factor showing significant 
impact on Pct_Supplier. Pct_Customer is affected by Ln(Segments), CEO_Chair, and 
Affect_Post. Pct_Merged is affected by LN(TA) only.  
3.5.2.2 Monitoring and Advising Roles of the Business Partner Directors 
The second-stage regression results of the monitoring and advising role of the business 
partner directors and its subgroups are reported in Table 3.5b. Column (6) results show that 
Pct_Bus is related positively and significantly to CEO_Delta, negatively to Ln(Eindex+1), and 
positively to both CAR(-3,+5) and ROA. These results suggest that on average business partner 
directors can increase CEO wealth-performance sensitivity, reduce managerial entrenchment, 
and enhance M&A performance and firm overall performance. Overall, these results imply that 
on average business partner directors can strength monitoring on management and provide 
advices. The first stage regression results are reported in Appendix 1.  
Columns (7)-(10) report the second-stage regression results of the subgroups of business 
partner directors. In general, service provider, supplier, and customer directors show similar results 
to that of total business partner directors, suggesting that they may enhance both monitoring and 
advising roles.  
The fraction of merged firm directors shows significant positive relation to managerial 
entrenchment and M&A performance. Considering that merged firm directors are directly related 
to M&A activities, it seems reasonable that they increase M&A performance. It is likely that 
management of the firm directly involves in the decision to have directors from M&A partners in 
their board or not, which may make merged firm directors not strong monitors.  
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In sum, the directors who have business transaction with the board firm generally play 
positive monitoring and advising roles to enhance firm performance. Among all types of business 
partner directors, directors from service providers seem to be most beneficial to firm performance, 
while directors from merged firms are least beneficial. 
3.5.3 Former Employee Directors 
Fahlenbrach, Minton, and Pan (2011) show that unlike the general perception that having 
former CEO, who may be entrenched with current management, as outside directors may harm 
corporate governance, former CEO directors may be beneficial because they have firm specific 
knowledge and serve as interim- or replacement CEO when needed. Generalizing to a variety of 
former executive directors, we investigate determinants and performance implications of former 
employee directors.  
3.5.3.1 Determinants of the Former Employee Directors 
Table 3.6a reports the estimation results on the determinants of former employee 
directors as a whole and by subgroups. Column (1) shows that former employee directors as a 
whole are mostly affected by CEO characteristics, but not by firm performance or complexity 
variables. Proxies of CEO power (CEO_OWN, CEO_Chair, CEO_Tenure, and Ln(CEO_Age)) 
are all negatively and significantly related to Pct_FormEmp. They are all consistent with the 
notion that powerful CEOs may not need former executives in the board. Board size is positively 
and significantly related to Pct_FormEmp, which is expected.  
Columns (2)-(6) report estimation results on the subgroups of former employee directors. Similar 
to the total former employee directors, CEO power variables are in general negatively and 
significantly related to the subgroups of former employee directors. Interestingly, former COO 
directors are positively related to CEO share ownership, and founder directors are positively 
related to firm size and financial strength (Ln(TA) and Zscore).   
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3.5.3.2 Monitoring and Advising Roles of the Former Employee Directors 
The second-stage regression results on the monitoring and advising roles of former 
employee directors as a whole and by subgroups are reported in Table 3.6b. Column (7) reports the 
second-stage regression results on the fraction of total former employee directors. Unlike business 
partner directors, the relations between former employee directors and monitoring and advising 
functions are all insignificant.  
Columns (8)-(12) report the second-stage regression results based on the subgroups of 
former employee directors. Interestingly, we find that former CEO and chairman directors are 
related negatively to CEO wealth-performance sensitivity, positively to managerial entrenchment, 
and negatively to firm performance (chairman directors are negatively related to M&A returns, 
too). This suggests that appointing former CEO or chairman directors may weaken both 
monitoring and advising function of the board.  
The results of CFO and COO directors are somewhat mixed: CFO directors are positively 
related to monitoring functions (increase wealth-performance sensitivity and decrease 
entrenchment), but no significant relation is found to advising role. COO directors are positively 
related to CEO wealth-performance sensitivity and overall firm performance (ROA), suggesting 
they may increase both monitoring and advising. However, COO directors are positively related to 
managerial entrenchment, suggesting detrimental effect on monitoring management.  
Finally, founder directors are related positively to CEO wealth-performance sensitivity and 
overall performance, and negatively to managerial entrenchment, suggesting they are the most 
beneficial subgroup affiliated directors among former employee directors.  
3.5.4 Relative Directors 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) propose that board structure depends on CEO’s bargaining 
power and that the CEO’s bargaining power efficiently derives from his/her perceived ability. 
CEO ownership may affect his/her bargaining power relative to the board, and hence affect his/her 
ability to appoint inside directors or his/her family members on the board.  
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3.5.4.1 Determinants of the Relative Directors 
Table 3.7a provides estimation results on the determinants of relative directors. Column 
(1) shows that relative directors as a whole is related negatively to firm performance and 
complexity. They are also negatively related to CEO_Tenure and Ln(CEO_Age), but positively 
to CEO_Tenure. The majority independent board requirement, Affect_Post, is negatively related 
to relative directors.  
Columns (2)-(5) report estimation results on the subgroups of relative directors.  Sibling 
and spouse directors are not influenced by any of the factors considered. Old and young 
generation directors are both influenced by the age of CEO, but with opposite signs: old (young) 
generation directors are negatively (positively) related to Ln(CEO_Age), suggesting that CEOs 
tend to appoint relative directors that are in complementary generation (old CEOs prefer young 
relatives, and young CEOs prefer old relatives). 
3.5.4.2 Monitoring and Advising Roles of the Relative Directors 
The second-stage regression results on the monitoring and advising roles of the relative 
directors as a whole and by subgroups are reported in Table 3.7b. Column (6) shows that 
Pct_Relative is significantly positively related to CEO_Delta, negatively related to Ln(Eindex+1), 
and positively related to both CAR(-3,+5) and ROA, suggesting relative directors may enhance 
both monitoring and advising functions of the board and beneficial to firm performance.  
Columns (7)-(10) report the second-stage regression results on the subgroups of relative 
directors. Old generation directors are negatively related to managerial entrenchment, and 
positively to both M&A returns and firm performance. Young generation directors are positively 
related to CEO wealth-performance sensitivity and overall performance, and negatively to 
managerial entrenchment. Sibling directors are positively related to wealth-performance sensitivity, 
M&A returns, and overall firm performance, and negatively to managerial entrenchment. These 
results suggest that in general, relative directors enforce monitoring and advising functions of the 
board, and beneficial to firm performance. However, spouse directors do not seem to have such 
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beneficial influence: they are negatively related to M&A returns and firm performance, and 
positively related to managerial entrenchment.  
3.5.5 Blockholder Directors 
3.5.5.1 Determinants of the Blockholder Directors 
Estimation result on the determinants of blockholder directors is reported in Table 3.8a. 
Pct_Blockholder is negatively related to ROAt-1, suggesting that there are more blockholder 
directors on the board of underperforming firms. This is consistent with the notion that 
blockholder investors tent to intervene and play important role when firms are in trouble. Among 
the CEO characteristics variables, blockholder directors are negatively and significantly related 
to three of the CEO power variables, CEO_OWN, CEO_Chair, and CEO_Tenure. This result 
may arise if powerful CEOs resist appointing blockholder directors due to their strong 
monitoring role. Board size is positively related to blockholder directors, which is expected.  
3.5.5.2 Monitoring and Advising Roles of the Blockholder Directors 
Table 3.8b provides estimation results on the influence of blockholder directors on 
monitoring and advising roles of the board. Consistent with the literature that blockholders 
strengthen corporate governance, we find that the fraction of blockholder directors is positively 
and significantly related to CEO wealth-performance sensitivity and overall firm performance, and 
negatively related to managerial entrenchment. We do not find significant relation between 
blockholder directors and M&A performances. Maybe blockholders enhance monitoring role of 
the board, which may result in better overall firm performance, but may not influence M&A 
returns because specific knowledge and expertise are required to contribute in M&A deal process.  
3.5.6 Interlock Directors 
3.5.6.1 Determinants of the Interlock Directors 
Estimation result on the determinants of interlock directors is reported in Table 3.9a. 
Among all factors, Pct_Interlock is negatively related to Ln(Segments), Founder, and Affect_Post, 
but insignificantly related to the other factors.  
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3.5.6.2 Monitoring and Advising Roles of the Interlock Directors 
Table 3.9b provides estimation results on the influence of interlock directors on monitoring 
and advising roles of the board. We find that interlock directors are positively and significantly 
related to CEO_Delta, CAR(-3,+5) and ROA, and negatively related to Ln(Eindex+1), suggesting 
interlock directors may strengthen monitoring and advising functions of the board.  
3.5.7 Charity Directors 
3.5.7.1 Determinants of the Charity Directors 
Table 3.10a provides the estimation result of the determinants of charity directors, where 
we don’t find any significant relation. This may be due to the small sample size of charity 
directors (less than 1% of the total firm-year observations).  
3.5.7.2 Monitoring and Advising Roles of the Charity Directors 
Estimation result of the influence of charity director on monitoring and advising roles, shown in 
Table 3.10b, suggests that charity directors are positively and significantly related to CEO_Delta, 
CAR(-3,+5) and ROA, and negatively related to Ln(Eindex+1). However, considering the small 
sample size of the firms with charity directors, interpreting these results as charity directors 
beneficial for governance and firm performance may need caution.  
3.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we study affiliated directors, a group of important but ignored members in 
corporate boards. We empirically investigate what determines the composition of affiliated 
directors and their influences on monitoring and advising roles on the management, at both 
aggregated affiliated directors as a whole and separated by the types of relation they have with the 
appointing firm.  
Supplemented with the hand-collected data on the relation between affiliated directors and 
appointing firms, we find: affiliated directors as a whole, business partner directors, and 
blockholder directors are negatively related to firm performance and CEO power; former 
employee directors are negatively related to CEO power; relative directors are negatively related to 
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firm performance; interlock directors are negatively related to complexity of the firm and CEO 
power.  
We also find: all types of affiliated directors except former employee directors are in 
general positively and significantly related to the monitoring and advising functions of the board, 
suggesting affiliated directors may be beneficial to firm performance. Among the former employee 
directors, founder directors show generally beneficial influence on firm performance, but former 





Table 3.1: Affiliated Director Classifications and Definitions. 




Pct_Affiliated Number of affiliated directors divided by the board size. Affiliated directors are directors 
who RiskMetrics classifies as “L” in the CLASSIFICATION variable of the “Director” 
data file. 
Business Partner Directors 
Pct_Bus The number of directors who or whose employers have business transaction with the 
appointing firm divided by the board size. 
Pct_Service The number of directors who's employer is a service provider (e.g., legal, financial, or 
consulting) of the board firm divided by the board size. 
Pct_Supplier The number of directors who's employer is a supplier of the board firm divided by the 
board size. 
Pct_Customer The number of directors who's employer is a customer of the board firm divided by the 
board size. 
Pct_Merged The number of directors who's previous employer was acquired by the hiring firm, or 
have merged/formed alliance with the hiring firm divided by the board size. 
Former Employee Directors 
Pct_FormEmp The number of directors who are former employees of the focal or affiliated firms divided 
by the board size. 
Pct_CEO The number of directors who were former employees served as CEOs divided by the 
board size.  
Pct_CFO The number of directors who were former employees served as CFOs divided by the 
board size.  
Pct_COO The number of directors who were former employees served as COOs divided by the 
board size.  
Pct_Chair The number of directors who were former employees served as Chairmen divided by the 
board size.  
Pct_Founder The number of directors who were the founders of the board firms 
Relative Directors 
Pct_Relative The number of directors who are immediate family members or relatives of the focal 
firms’ current or former executives divided by the board size. 
Pct_OldGen The number of directors who are parents or grandparent of employee divided by the board 
size. 
Pct_YoungGen The number of directors who are child or grandchild of employee divided by the board 
size. 
Pct_Sibling The number of directors who are the sibling of employee divided by the board size.  
Pct_Spouse The number of directors who are the spouse of employee divided by the board size. 
Block Investor Directors 
Pct_Blockholder The number of directors who are significant shareholder of the board firm (i.e., more than 
5%) or, who's employer has equity investment in the board firm (i.e., more than 5%) 
divided by the board size. 
Interlock Directors 
Pct_Interlock The number of directors who are the executives of firms that have board interlock with 
the focal firm divided by the board size.  
Charity Directors 
Pct_Charity The number of directors who are trustee, director, or employee of a charitable 
organization that receives material grants from the board firm divided by the board size. 
The definition of "material" differs by company (usually 2~5% of total endowment 









Table 3.2: Sample Distribution by Years. 
This table shows the sample distribution by years. Column (2) reports the number of firms for which we have 
information on the percentage of affiliated directors. Columns (3)-(9) report the percentage of firms with 
business partner directors, percentage of firms with former employee directors, percentage of firms with relative 
directors, percentage of firms with blockholder directors, percentage of firms with interlock directors, percentage 






































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1996 1,141 0.785 0.637 0.449 0.105 0.032 0.138 0.003 
1997 1,429 0.749 0.584 0.425 0.115 0.086 0.119 0.001 
1998 1,541 0.738 0.602 0.398 0.134 0.099 0.119 0.003 
1999 1,535 0.721 0.565 0.406 0.122 0.107 0.115 0.004 
2000 1,537 0.705 0.552 0.412 0.107 0.100 0.098 0.005 
2001 1,564 0.684 0.527 0.402 0.123 0.099 0.077 0.005 
2002 1,412 0.664 0.499 0.378 0.098 0.083 0.067 0.006 
2003 1,443 0.644 0.463 0.372 0.100 0.094 0.051 0.009 
2004 1,466 0.608 0.469 0.362 0.102 0.076 0.038 0.013 
2005 1,439 0.582 0.405 0.352 0.129 0.076 0.031 0.013 
2006 1,405 0.590 0.397 0.347 0.127 0.082 0.019 0.014 
2007 1,429 0.419 0.266 0.305 0.094 0.054 0.006 0.010 
2008 1,425 0.404 0.246 0.293 0.081 0.059 0.006 0.007 
2009 1,444 0.417 0.273 0.273 0.078 0.193 0.007 0.012 
2010 1,452 0.395 0.255 0.242 0.075 0.197 0.009 0.006 




Table 3.3: Summary Statistics. 
This table reports summary statistics of the variables used in this paper. Definitions of the variables are provided in Table 
3.1 and Table 3.A1. 
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Affiliated Director Variables 
Pct_Affiliated 18766 0.131 0.111 0.138 0.000 0.900 
Pct_Bus 18766 0.085 0.000 0.116 0.000 0.800 
Pct_Service 18766 0.060 0.000 0.096 0.000 0.800 
Pct_Supplier 18766 0.002 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.400 
Pct_Customer 18766 0.002 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.375 
Pct_Merged 18766 0.007 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.700 
Pct_FormEmp 18766 0.054 0.000 0.082 0.000 0.727 
Pct_CEO 18766 0.017 0.000 0.044 0.000 0.400 
Pct_CFO 18766 0.002 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.286 
Pct_COO 18766 0.003 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.250 
Pct_Chair 18766 0.016 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.333 
Pct_Founder 18766 0.005 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.400 
Pct_Relative 18766 0.015 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.600 
Pct_OldGen 18766 0.003 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.333 
Pct_YoungGen 18766 0.002 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.300 
Pct_Sibling 18766 0.003 0.000 0.020 0.000 0.600 
Pct_Spouse 18766 0.001 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.273 
Pct_Blockholder 18766 0.012 0.000 0.044 0.000 1.100 
Pct_Interlock 18766 0.008 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.500 
Pct_Charity 18766 0.001 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.778 
Other Variables 
CEO_Delta 17992 0.113 0.007 2.294 0.000 121.028 
Eindex 15794 2.608 3.000 1.365 0.000 6.000 
CAR(-3,+5) 7244 0.008 0.005 0.073 -0.599 0.635 
ROA 18521 0.038 0.041 0.087 -0.695 0.267 
Zscore 13869 9.240 4.179 23.491 -24.319 1314.372 
Leverage 18178 0.195 0.174 0.171 0.000 1.604 
Ln(segments) 17581 2.512 2.565 0.666 0.693 4.466 
ICR 18766 0.555 0.542 0.227 0.135 1.000 
CEO_OWN 17383 0.023 0.003 0.059 0.000 0.761 
CEO_Chair 17985 0.623 1.000 0.485 0.000 1.000 
CEO_Tenure 17382 8.007 6.000 7.218 1.000 58.000 
Ln(CEO_Age) 17167 4.012 4.025 0.133 3.466 4.522 
Ln(BoardSize) 16000 2.328 2.303 0.260 1.099 3.689 
Ln(FirmAge) 18040 2.939 2.996 0.792 0.000 4.431 
Ln(TA) 18225 7.592 7.479 1.507 1.835 11.357 
IOC 18764 0.232 0.242 0.132 0.000 0.948 
Affect 13387 0.169 0.000 0.374 0.000 1.000 





Table 3.4a: What Determines the Percentage of Affiliated Directors? 
This table reports estimates of the determinants of the percentage of total affiliated directors 
and each type of affiliated directors. The dependent variable is the percentage of total 
affiliated directors. The sample period is 1996 – 2010 and includes all industries. Definitions 
of all variables are provided in Table 3.1 and Table 3.A1. All regressions control for firm- 
and year-fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at CEO-firm pair level are reported 
in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
VARIABLES Pct_Affiliated 
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Table 3.5b: Impacts of Total Percentage of Affiliated Directors on Firm Monitoring and 
Performance. 
This table reports the estimates of the impacts of the percentage of total affiliated directors on monitoring and firm performance. The key 
independent variable, Pct_Affiliated is the percentage of total affiliated directors. The dependent variable is CEO_Delta in Columns (1) and (5); 
Ln(Eindex+1) in Columns (2) and (6); CAR(-3,+5) in Columns (3) and (6); and ROA in Columns (4) and (8). Panel A reports the OLS 
regressions and Panel B reports the second-stage results of IV regressions. The sample period is 1996 – 2010 and includes all industries. 
Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix 1. All regressions control for firm- and year-fixed effects. Robust standard errors reported 
in parentheses are clustered at CEO-firm pair level. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 


















VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Pct_Affiliated 0.096** -0.182*** 0.016** -0.009 0.987*** -1.446*** 0.357** 0.213** 
 
(0.037) (0.052) (0.008) (0.008) (0.316) (0.542) (0.145) (0.094) 
ROA 0.064** -0.065 -0.029* 
 
0.096** -0.038 -0.051* 
 
 
(0.026) (0.069) (0.017) 
 
(0.046) (0.059) (0.030) 
 Zscore 0.067* -0.062** 
 










) -0.039* 0.227*** -0.006 -0.007 -0.155** 0.130** -0.033** -0.020 
 
(0.020) (0.039) (0.005) (0.006) (0.066) (0.059) (0.014) (0.013) 
Ln(FirmAge) -0.008 0.014 0.000 -0.002 0.017 0.008 0.049*** 0.010 
 
(0.005) (0.013) (0.002) (0.006) (0.030) (0.053) (0.018) (0.009) 
Ln(segments) 0.008 0.023* -0.001 -0.009*** 0.006 0.001 0.002 -0.010*** 
 
(0.006) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.014) (0.006) (0.003) 
Leverage -0.090*** 0.024 
 






(0.011) (0.057) (0.059) 
 
(0.014) 
Ln(TA) 0.013*** -0.018** -0.002*** 0.013*** -0.002 0.009 -0.009* 0.008 
 
(0.004) (0.008) (0.001) (0.004) (0.021) (0.016) (0.005) (0.007) 
PPE/TA 
   
-0.052*** 
   
-0.056*** 
    
(0.009) 
   
(0.012) 
ICR 0.047 -0.168* 0.005 0.004 0.049 -0.064 -0.062*** 0.004 
 
(0.032) (0.091) (0.005) (0.013) (0.045) (0.090) (0.024) (0.017) 
IOC -0.104*** 0.067 -0.010 -0.051*** -0.033 0.015 -0.002 -0.057*** 
 
(0.035) (0.064) (0.010) (0.011) (0.032) (0.061) (0.024) (0.014) 








  CEO_Tenure 0.003*** -0.003** 
 






(0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
(0.000) 
Founder 0.040** -0.063** -0.004 0.002 0.058** -0.096*** 0.014 -0.007 
 
(0.018) (0.031) (0.004) (0.005) (0.026) (0.033) (0.009) (0.006) 
CEO_OWN 
 
-0.677*** 0.069*** 0.026 
 
0.159 0.108 -0.028 
  
(0.155) (0.022) (0.028) 
 
(0.177) (0.078) (0.037) 
Constant -0.007 0.717*** 0.035*** 0.064* 0.187 0.975*** 0.006 0.050 
 
(0.052) (0.106) (0.013) (0.034) (0.296) (0.202) (0.066) (0.061) 
Firm/Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 14,276 12,292 6,186 13,844 7,686 6,758 3,850 7,475 







Table 3.6a: What Determines the Percentage of Each Type of Business Partner Directors? 
This table reports estimates of the determinants of the percentage of each type of directors who have business 
transaction with the board firm. The dependent variable is percentage of total business partner directors in 
Column (1); the percentage of directors whose employer is a service provider (e.g., legal, financial, or 
consulting) of the board firm in Column (2); the percentage of directors whose employer is s supplier of the 
board firm in Column (3), the percentage of directors whose employer is a customer of the board firm in 
Column (4), and the percentage of directors whose previous employer was acquired by the hiring firm, or have 
merged/formed alliance with the hiring firm in Column (5). The sample period is 1996 – 2010 and includes all 
industries. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 3.1 and Table 3.A1. All regressions control for 
firm- and year-fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at CEO-firm pair level are reported in parentheses. 
Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
VARIABLES Pct_Bus Pct_Service Pct_Supplier Pct_Customer Pct_Merged 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ROAt-1 -0.027* -0.027** -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 
 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.003) (0.001) (0.004) 
Zscoret-1 -0.005 -0.004 0.000 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln(segments) -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001* 0.000 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Ln(FirmAge) -0.020** -0.020** 0.001 0.000 -0.003 
 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
Ln(TA) -0.004 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.003** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
ICR 0.034 0.047** -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 
 
(0.023) (0.019) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) 
CEO_OWN 0.041 0.037 0.003 0.001 0.005 
 
(0.046) (0.034) (0.011) (0.003) (0.012) 
CEO_Chair -0.005 -0.008*** 0.000 0.001* -0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
CEO_Tenure -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(CEO_Age) 0.001 0.008 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) 
Founder 0.013 -0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Ln(BoardSize) 0.016 0.008 0.003 0.000 0.002 
 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
Affect_Post -0.041*** -0.015** -0.002 -0.003** -0.000 
 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) 
Constant 0.134* 0.060 -0.013 0.008 0.034** 
 
(0.068) (0.057) (0.010) (0.008) (0.017) 
Firm FE & Year 
FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,841 9,841 9,841 9,841 9,841 
Adjusted R-





Table 3.7b: Impacts of Each Type of Business Partner Directors on Firm Monitoring and Performance. 
This table reports estimates of the impacts of each type of directors who have business transaction with the board firm on monitoring and firm performance. The key independent variable, Pct_Bus_Var 
is the percentage of total business partner directors in Columns (1)-(6), the percentage of directors whose employer is a service provider (e.g., legal, financial, or consulting)of the board firm in Column 
(2)-(7), the percentage of directors whose previous employer was acquired by the hiring firm, or have merged/formed alliance with the hiring firm in Columns (3)-(8), the percentage of directors whose 
employer is s supplier of the board firm in Columns (4)-(9), and the percentage of directors whose employer is a customer of the board firm in Columns (5)-(10). The dependent variable is CEO_Delta in 
Section 1; Ln(Eindex+1) in Section 2; CAR(-3,+5) in Section 3; and ROA in Section 4. Unreported control variables in Section 1-4 are the same as the control variables in Columns (1)-(4) in Table 3.4b, 
respectively. Panel A reports the OLS regressions and Panel B reports the second-stage results of IV regressions. The sample period is 1996 – 2010 and includes all industries. Definitions of all variables 
are provided in Table 3.1 and 3.A1. All regressions control for firm- and year-fixed effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at CEO-firm pair level. Coefficients marked with 
*, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: OLS Panel B: IV Regressions 
VARIABLES Seciton1: CEO_Delta 
 
Pct_Bus Pct_Service Pct_Supplier Pct_Customer Pct_Merged Pct_Bus Pct_Service Pct_Supplier Pct_Customer Pct_Merged 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Pct_Bus_Var 0.166** 0.074** 0.053 0.052* 0.245 1.208*** 2.470*** 19.468*** 13.723*** -40.090 
 
(0.076) (0.035) (0.142) (0.030) (0.181) (0.386) (0.800) (5.637) (4.290) (49.529) 
Observations 14,276 14,276 14,276 14,276 14,276 7,686 7,686 10,271 10,271 7,686 
Adj-Rsquare 0.125 0.123 0.122 0.122 0.123 0.328 0.328 0.297 0.298 0.328 
VARIABLES Section2: Ln(Eindex+1) 
Pct_Bus_Var -0.192*** -0.175** 0.181 -0.449* -0.287 -1.954*** -4.942*** 4.085 -12.400* 31.341*** 
 
(0.071) (0.086) (0.287) (0.258) (0.277) (0.726) (1.853) (12.216) (6.333) (11.752) 
Observations 12,292 12,292 12,292 12,292 12,292 6,758 6,758 9,030 9,030 6,758 
Adj-Rsquare 0.305 0.305 0.771 0.771 0.304 0.767 0.767 0.763 0.764 0.767 
VARIABLES Section3: CAR(-3,+5) 
Pct_Bus_Var 0.011 0.008 -0.100 -0.008 0.021 0.544*** 1.001** 3.026* 2.492 19.046*** 
 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.094) (0.122) (0.055) (0.201) (0.394) (1.837) (1.935) (7.006) 
Observations 6,186 6,186 6,186 6,186 6,186 3,850 3,850 4,983 4,983 3,850 
Adj-Rsquare 0.084 0.084 0.085 0.084 0.084 0.086 0.085 0.069 0.068 0.086 
VARIABLES Section4: ROA 
Pct_Bus_Var -0.010 -0.024* 0.009 0.030 -0.025 0.277** 0.277** 2.820* 3.627*** 6.090 
 
(0.010) (0.012) (0.052) (0.063) (0.030) (0.121) (0.121) (1.673) (1.085) (13.506) 
Observations 13,844 13,844 13,844 13,844 13,844 7,475 7,475 9,984 9,984 7,475 










Table 3.8a: What Determines the Percentage of Each Type of Former Employee Directors? 
This table reports estimates of the determinants of the percentage of each type of directors who were former employee 
of the firm. The dependent variable is the percentage of total former employee directors in Column (1), the percentage 
of directors who were former employees served as CEOs in Column (2), the percentage of directors who were former 
employees served as CFOs in Column (3), the percentage of directors who were former employees served as COOs in 
Column (4), the percentage of directors who were former employees served as Chairman in Column (5), and the 
percentage of directors who were founder in Column (6). The sample period is 1996 – 2010 and includes all industries. 
Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 3.1 and 3.A1. All regressions control for firm- and year-fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors clustered at CEO-firm pair level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, 
and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
VARIABLES Pct_FormEmp Pct_CEO Pct_CFO Pct_COO Pct_Chair Pct_Founder 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ROAt-1 0.004 0.012 -0.006 0.000 0.011 -0.005 
 
(0.016) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) 
Zscoret-1 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.003* 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln(segments) -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.002* 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Ln(FirmAge) 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
Ln(TA) 0.004 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.003* 0.002** 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
ICR 0.015 0.004 -0.002 -0.005 -0.003 0.007 
 
(0.018) (0.011) (0.002) (0.004) (0.010) (0.006) 
CEO_OWN -0.076** -0.041*** 0.005 0.018*** -0.029** -0.018** 
 
(0.038) (0.014) (0.008) (0.006) (0.015) (0.008) 
CEO_Chair -0.006* -0.003* 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
CEO_Tenure -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Founder -0.009 -0.005 0.001 0.000 -0.017*** -0.003 
 
(0.008) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
Ln(CEO_Age) -0.022* -0.005 -0.005* 0.001 -0.004 -0.006* 
 
(0.012) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003) 
Ln(BoardSize) 0.045*** 0.017*** -0.001 0.002* 0.012*** -0.000 
 
(0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
Affect_Post -0.004 0.006* -0.000 -0.001 0.001 -0.003 
 
(0.007) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 0.037 -0.006 0.029** -0.005 0.002 0.021 
 
(0.059) (0.039) (0.014) (0.017) (0.035) (0.017) 
Firm FE & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,841 9,841 9,841 9,841 9,841 9,841 











Table 3.9b: Impacts of Each Type of Former Employee Directors on Firm Monitoring and Performance. 
This table reports estimates of the impacts of each type of directors who were former employee of the firm on monitoring and firm performance. The key independent variable, Pct_FormEmp_Var is 
the percentage of total form employees in Columns (1) and (7), the percentage of directors who were former employees served as CEOs in Columns (2) and (8), the percentage of directors who were 
former employees served as CFOs in Columns (3) and (9), the percentage of directors who were former employees served as COOs in Columns (4) and (10), the percentage of directors who were 
former employees served as Chairman in Columns (5) and (11), and the percentage of directors who were founder in Columns (6) and (12). The dependent variable is CEO_Delta in Section 1; 
Ln(Eindex+1) in Section 2; CAR(-3,+5) in Section 3; and ROA in Section 4. Unreported control variables in Section 1-4 are the same as the control variables in Columns (1)-(4) of Table 3.4b, 
respectively. Panel A reports the OLS regressions and Panel B reports the second-stage results of IV regression. The sample period is 1996 – 2010 and includes all industries. Definitions of all 
variables are provided in Table 3.1 and 3.A1. All regressions control for firm- and year-fixed effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at CEO-firm pair level. Coefficients 
marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: OLS Panel B: IV Regressions 
VARIABLES Section 1: CEO_Delta 
 
Pct_FormEmp Pct_CEO Pct_CFO Pct_COO Pct_Chair Pct_Founder Pct_FormEmp Pct_CEO Pct_CFO Pct_COO Pct_Chair Pct_Founder 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Pct_Affiliated_Bus_Var 0.59 -0.217** -0.831* 0.775* -0.362** 2.580*** 0.740 -5.809*** 6.605** 38.679** -22.616*** 22.870*** 
 
(0.675) (0.085) (0.475) (0.409) (0.184) (0.514) (1.616) (1.838) (3.133) (15.361) (6.731) (6.532) 
Observations 14,276 14,276 14,276 14,276 14,276 14,276 7,686 7,686 7,686 7,686 7,686 7,686 
Adj-Rsquare 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.123 0.124 0.298 0.299 0.299 0.299 0.299 0.299 
  Section 2: Ln(Eindex+1) 
Pct_Affiliated_Bus_Var -0.095 0.290** 0.425* -0.334* 0.438*** -0.315** -2.322 12.521*** -12.547* -40.263*** 22.300*** -42.227*** 
 
(0.087) (0.145) (0.239) (0.187) (0.137) (0.140) (3.338) (4.120) (6.648) (13.057) (7.723) (13.909) 
Observations 12,292 12,292 12,292 12,292 12,292 12,292 6,758 6,758 6,758 6,758 6,758 6,758 
Adj-Rsquare 0.304 0.305 0.772 0.304 0.305 0.304 0.757 0.758 0.758 0.758 0.758 0.758 
  Section 3: CAR(-3,+5) 
Pct_Affiliated_Bus_Var 0.026 0.023 0.071 -0.124** 0.049 0.040 0.438 0.007 -1.491 1.244 -1.838*** -0.855 
 
(0.021) (0.033) (0.075) (0.063) (0.038) (0.068) (0.405) (4.812) (2.845) (4.526) (0.706) (3.728) 
Observations 6,186 6,186 6,186 6,186 6,186 6,186 3,850 3,850 3,850 3,850 3,850 3,850 
Adj-Rsquare 0.085 0.084 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.084 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.076 0.074 
  Section 4: ROA 
Pct_Affiliated_Bus_Var 0.003 0.015 -0.044 0.031 0.076*** -0.084* 0.299 -1.539** 1.064 8.533** -4.022** 4.534** 
 
(0.014) (0.022) (0.069) (0.046) (0.024) (0.051) (0.746) (0.626) (1.886) (4.006) (1.848) (1.864) 
Observations 13,844 13,844 13,844 13,844 13,844 13,844 7,475 7,475 7,475 7,475 7,475 7,475 











Table 3.10a: What Determines the Percentage of Each Type of Relative Directors? 
This table reports estimates of the determinants of the percentage of each type of directors who are relative of current or 
former employee. The dependent variable is the percentage of total relative directors in Column (1), the percentage of 
directors who are parents or grandparent of employee in Column (2), the percentage of directors who are child or grandchild 
of employee in Column (3), the percentage of directors who are the sibling of employee in Column (4), and the percentage 
of directors who are the spouse of employee in Column (5). The sample period is 1996 – 2010 and includes all industries. 
Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 3.1 and 3.A1. All regressions control for firm- and year-fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors clustered at CEO-firm pair level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and 
*** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
VARIABLES Pct_Relative Pct_OldGen Pct_YoungGen Pct_Sibling Pct_Spouse 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ROAt-1 -0.011* -0.007 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Zscoret-1 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(segments) -0.002* -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Ln(FirmAge) -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 0.002 -0.003* 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ln(TA) -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
ICR -0.005 -0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.003 
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
CEO_OWN -0.016 -0.010 0.013 0.000 -0.003 
 
(0.020) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.003) 
CEO_Chair 0.003** 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
CEO_Tenure -0.000** -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Founder 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln(CEO_Age) -0.010* -0.007** 0.007** -0.001 0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
Ln(BoardSize) 0.007** 0.005*** 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Affect_Post -0.012*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.047* 0.028* -0.023** -0.003 -0.003 
 
(0.025) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.006) 
Firm FE & Year FE Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 9,841 9,841 9,841 9,841 9,841 









Table 3.11b: Impacts of Each Type of Relative Directors on Firm Monitoring and Performance. 
This table reports estimates of the impacts of each type of directors who are relative of current or former employee on monitoring and firm performance. The key independent variable, 
Pct_Relative_Var is the percentage of total relative directors in Columns (1) and (6), the percentage of directors who are parents or grandparent of employee in Columns (2) and (7), the percentage of 
directors who are child or grandchild of employee in Columns (3) and (8), and the percentage of directors who are the sibling of employee in Columns (4) and (9), and the percentage of directors who 
are the spouse of employee in Columns (5) and (10). The dependent variable is CEO_Delta in Section 1; Ln(Eindex+1) in Section 2; CAR(-3,+5) in Section 3; and ROA in Section 4. Unreported 
control variables in Section 1-4 are the same as the control variables in Table 3.5-3.8, respectively. Panel A reports the OLS regressions and Panel B reports the second-stage results of IV regression. 
The sample period is 1996 – 2010 and includes all industries. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 3.1 and 3.A1. All regressions control for firm- and year-fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors reported in parentheses are clustered at CEO-firm pair level. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Section 1: CEO_Delta 
 
Pct_Relative Pct_OldGen Pct_YoungGen Pct_Sibling Pct_Spouse Pct_Relative Pct_OldGen Pct_YoungGen Pct_Sibling Pct_Spouse 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Pct_Relative_Var 0.354 0.102 1.299** -0.135 -0.124 4.709*** -0.058 12.844*** 43.291*** -2.093 
 
(0.215) (0.196) (0.617) (0.192) (0.304) (1.491) (4.659) (3.706) (14.193) (15.951) 
Observations 14,276 14,276 14,276 14,276 14,276 9,912 9,912 9,912 9,912 9,912 
Adj-Rsquare 0.124 0.122 0.125 0.122 0.122 0.298 0.297 0.297 0.298 0.297 
  Section 2: Ln(Eindex+1) 
Pct_Relative_Var -0.600*** -0.051 -1.111*** -0.495** -1.170 -6.473*** -13.992** -10.087* -118.197*** 65.549*** 
 
(0.191) (0.315) (0.320) (0.221) (0.964) (2.094) (6.120) (5.444) (42.133) (20.877) 
Observations 12,292 12,292 12,292 12,292 12,292 8,748 8,748 8,748 8,748 8,748 
Adj-Rsquare 0.306 0.304 0.305 0.304 0.304 0.763 0.762 0.762 0.763 0.763 
  Section 3: CAR(-3,+5) 
Pct_Relative_Var -0.039 -0.052 0.018 0.002 -0.247* 1.252* 1.934* 0.186 17.006** -9.726** 
 
(0.046) (0.082) (0.119) (0.062) (0.141) (0.642) (1.034) (1.200) (8.537) (4.856) 
Observations 6,186 6,186 6,186 6,186 6,186 4,818 4,818 4,818 4,818 4,818 
Adj-Rsquare 0.085 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.085 0.069 0.069 0.068 0.069 0.069 
  Section 4: ROA 
Pct_Relative_Var -0.048 -0.048 -0.014 -0.021 0.121 1.019*** 4.765*** 3.497** 9.785*** -13.948*** 
 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.092) (0.058) (0.159) (0.358) (1.562) (1.726) (3.522) (4.885) 
Observations 13,844 13,844 13,844 13,844 13,844 9,688 9,688 9,688 9,688 9,688 











Table 3.12a: What Determines the Percentage of Blockholder Directors? 
This table reports estimates of the determinants of the percentage of blockholder investor 
directors. The dependent variable is the percentage of directors who are significant 
shareholder of the board firm (more than 5%) or whose employer has equity investment in the 
board firm (more than 5%). The sample period is 1996 – 2010 and includes all industries. 
Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 3.1 and 3.A1. All regressions control for 
firm- and year-fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at CEO-firm pair level are 
reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, 
and 1%, respectively. 
VARIABLES Pct_Blockholder 











































Firm FE & Year FE Y 
Observations 9,841 













Table 3.13b: Impacts of Blockholder Investor Directors on Firm Monitoring and 
Performance. 
This table reports estimates of the impacts of blockholder investor directors on firm monitoring 
and performance. The key independent variable is the percentage of directors who are significant 
shareholder of the board firm (more than 5%) or whose employer has equity investment in the 
board firm (more than 5%). The dependent variable is CEO_Delta in Section 1; Ln(Eindex+1) in 
Section 2; CAR(-3,+5) in Section 3; and ROA in Section 4. Unreported control variables in 
Section 1-4 are the same as the control variables in Columns (1)-(4) of Table 3.4b, respectively. 
Panel A reports the OLS regressions and Panel B reports the second-stage results of IV 
regression. The sample period is 1996 – 2010 and includes all industries. Definitions of all 
variables are provided in Table 3.1 and 3.A1. All regressions control for firm- and year-fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at CEO-firm pair level. 
Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
VARIABLES Panel A: OLS Panel B: IV Regressions 
 
Section 1: CEO_Delta 
  (1) (2) 
Pct_Blockholder 0.255*** 16.730** 
 
(0.075) (6.653) 
Observations 14,276 7,686 
Adj-Rsquare 0.268 0.328 
  Section 2: Ln(Eindex+1) 
Pct_Blockholder -0.183** -4.545*** 
 
(0.085) (1.166) 
Observations 12,292 6,758 
Adj-Rsquare 0.772 0.286 
  Section 3: CAR(-3,+5) 
Pct_Blockholder -0.036 1.919 
 
(0.036) (1.374) 
Observations 6,186 3,850 
Adj-Rsquare 0.084 0.086 
  Section 4: ROA 
Pct_Blockholder -0.031 5.837** 
 
(0.023) (2.295) 
Observations 13,844 7,475 












Table 3.14a: What Determines the Percentage of Interlock Directors? 
This table reports estimates of the determinants of the percentage of interlock directors. 
The dependent variable is the percentage of directors who are interlocking directors. The 
sample period is 1996 – 2008 and includes all industries. Definitions of all variables are 
provided in Table 3.1 and 3.A1. All regressions control for firm- and year-fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors clustered at CEO-firm pair level are reported in parentheses. 
Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
VARIABLES Pct_Interlock 











































Firm FE & Year FE Y 
Observations 9,841 











Table 3.15b: Impacts of Interlock Directors on Firm Monitoring and Performance. 
This table reports estimates of the impacts of interlock directors on firm monitoring and 
performance. The key independent variable is the percentage of directors who are interlocking 
directors. The dependent variable is CEO_Delta in Section 1; Ln(Eindex+1) in Section 2; CAR(-
3,+5) in Section 3; and ROA in Section 4. Unreported control variables in Section 1-4 are the same 
as the control variables in Columns (1)-(4) of Table 3.4b, respectively. The sample period is 1996 – 
2008 and includes all industries. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 3.1 and 3.A1. 
Panel A reports the OLS regressions and Panel B reports the second-stage results of IV regression. 
All regressions control for firm- and year-fixed effects. Robust standard errors reported in 
parentheses are clustered at CEO-firm pair level. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are 
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
VARIABLES Panel A: OLS Panel B: IV Regressions 
 
Section 1: CEO_Delta 
  (1) (2) 
Pct_Interlock -0.088 4.685*** 
 
(0.194) (1.518) 
Observations 14,276 7,686 
Adj-Rsquare 0.268 0.328 
  Section 2: Ln(Eindex+1) 
Pct_Interlock -0.248* -6.021*** 
 
(0.142) (2.173) 
Observations 12,292 6,758 
Adj-Rsquare 0.304 0.767 
  Section 3: CAR(-3,+5) 
Pct_Interlock 0.047 1.826*** 
 
(0.044) (0.626) 
Observations 6,186 3,850 
Adj-Rsquare 0.085 0.086 
  Section 4: ROA 
Pct_Interlock -0.037 0.892** 
 
(0.030) (0.414) 
Observations 13,844 7,475 










Table 3.16a: What Determines the Percentage of Charity Directors? 
This table reports estimates of the determinants of the percentage of interlock directors. The 
dependent variable is the percentage of directors who are trustee, directors, or employee of 
charitable organizations that receives material grants (usually 2-5% of total endowment 
coming from the board firm) from the board firm. The sample period is 1996 – 2010 and 
includes all industries. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 3.1 and 3.A1. All 
regressions control for firm- and year-fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at CEO-
firm pair level are reported in parentheses. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are 
significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
VARIABLES Pct_Charity 











































Firm FE & Year FE Y 
Observations 9,841 












Table 3.17b: Impacts of Charity Directors on Firm Monitoring and Performance. 
This table reports estimates of the impacts of charity directors on firm monitoring and 
performance. The key independent variable is the percentage of directors who are trustee, 
directors, or employee of charitable organizations that receives material grants (usually 2-5% of 
total endowment coming from the board firm) from the board firm. The dependent variable is 
CEO_Delta in Section 1; Ln(Eindex+1) in Section 2; CAR(-3,+5) in Section 3; and ROA in 
Section 4. Unreported control variables in Section 1-4 are the same as the control variables in 
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 3.4b, respectively. Panel A reports the OLS regressions and Panel B 
reports the second-stage results of IV regression. The sample period is 1996 – 2010 and includes 
all industries. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table 3.1 and 3.A1. All regressions 
control for firm- and year-fixed effects. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are 
clustered at CEO-firm pair level. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 
5%, and 1%, respectively. 
VARIABLES Panel A: OLS Panel B: IV Regressions 
 
Section1: CEO_Delta 
  (1) (2) 
Pct_Charity -0.094 26.508*** 
 
(0.138) (8.880) 
Observations 14,276 7,686 
Adj-Rsquare 0.267 0.328 
  Section 2: Ln(Eindex+1) 
Pct_Charity 0.016 -32.179** 
 
(0.262) (14.263) 
Observations 12,292 6,758 
Adj-Rsquare 0.771 0.766 
  Section 3: CAR(-3,+5) 
Pct_Charity 0.123 7.151*** 
 
(0.102) (2.656) 
Observations 6,186 3,850 
Adj-Rsquare 0.085 0.086 
  Section 4: ROA 
Pct_Charity 0.014 4.477* 
 
(0.065) (2.403) 
Observations 13,844 7,475 






Table 3.18A1: Variable Descriptions. 
Descriptions of other variables used in this paper. 
 
Outcome Variables             Definitions 
CEO_Delta Dollar change in wealth for a percentage change in firm value scaled by 
compensation, a delta measure suggested by Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009). 
Downloaded from Edmans’ website. 
Eindex Entrenchment index based on the number of anti-takeover devices adopted by a firm, 
as constructed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). 
Forced_CEO_Turnover Forced CEO turnover indicator equal to one if the turnover is involuntary; zero, 
otherwise. The identification procedure is the same as in Parrino (1997) and Jenter 
and Kanaan (forthcoming).  
CAR(-3,+5) Cumulative abnormal returns to acquisition bids during the event days (-3, +5) 
surrounding the announcement day. They are estimated using the market model over 
[-255, -6] event days with the value weighted market index. 
ROA Return to assets. 
Other Variables 
Ch_SV Changes in shareholder value, as measured by the product of shareholder value in 
2000 dollars at year t-2 and the geometric mean of shareholder rates of returns from 
t-2 to t.  
Tobin's Q The market value of common equity plus the book value of total liabilities divided by 
the book value of total assets.  
Zscore Altman’s Z-score. 
Leverage Long term debt divided by total assets. 
Ln(segments) Logged value of the number of business segments a firm has in a given year as 
reported by Compustat/Segment plus one. 
ICR Industry concentration ratio: The sum of the percentage market share (in sales) of the 
four biggest firms among all firms in Compustat in each industry as defined by 3-
digit SIC code. 
CEO_OWN The percentage of outstanding common shares held by a CEO. 
Ln(BoardSize) Logged value of the total number of directors on the board plus one.  
Ln(FirmAge) Logged value of one plus the number of years from the firm’s IPO as reported in 
CRSP or the number of years since its first appearance in CRSP.  
Ln(TA) The logged value of total assets in 2000 US dollars in millions. 
IOC Institutional ownership concentration: The sum of the shareholder ownership held by 
the top five institutional investors 
CEO_Chair Indicator for CEO also chairing the board and zero otherwise. 
CEO_Tenure The number of years a CEO has been in office. 
Ln(CEO_Age) The logged value of CEO age. 
Affect Dependent board indicator equal to one if a firm does not have a majority of 
independent directors in 2001; zero, otherwise. 




Mean Pct_Affiliated or (Pct_Affiliated_XX) of all firms in the same industry and the 
same year as firm i, excluding firm i’s own Pct_Affiliated or (Pct_Affiliated_XX). It 
is treated as a missing value if there is no other firm in the same industry and same 
year. Industry is defined as based on 3-digits of SIC code. Pct_Affiliated_XX reflects 








Table 3.19A2: Correlation Among the Percentage of Independent, Inside, and Affiliated Directors 
This table shows correlation between the percentage of independent directors, inside directors, and various types of affiliated directors. Percentage of 
inside directors, Pct_Inside, is defined as the number of directors who are current employees of the firm divided by board size. By construction, the sum of 




Pct_Independent Pct_Inside Pct_Affiliated Pct_Bus Pct_FormEmp Pct_Relative Pct_Blockholder Pct_Interlock 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Pct_Inside -0.631*** 
       
Pct_Affiliated -0.767*** -0.014* 
      
Pct_Bus -0.600*** 0.032*** 0.747*** 
     
Pct_FormEmp -0.392*** -0.070*** 0.562*** 0.196*** 
    
Pct_Relative -0.266*** 0.054*** 0.297*** 0.136*** 0.185*** 
   
Pct_Blockholder -0.270*** -0.024*** 0.367*** 0.212*** 0.254*** 0.248*** 
  
Pct_Interlock -0.215*** 0.074*** 0.217*** 0.090*** 0.020*** 0.077*** 0.009 
 

















Table 3.20.A3: First-stage Regression Results for Table 3.4b 
 
Section 1: CEO_Delta Section 2: Ln(Eindex+1) Section 3: CAR(-3,+5) Section 4: ROA 
VARIABLES Pct_Affiliated 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pct_Affiliated_IY(-i) -0.003 0.023 -0.069 0.010 
 
(0.038) (0.040) (0.056) (0.038) 
Affect_post -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.058*** -0.058*** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) 
F-statistics (IVs) 29.37 24.25 13.92 29.23 




Table 3.21A4: First-stage Regression Results for Table 3.5b 
 
Section 1: CEO_Delta 
VARIABLES Pct_Bus Pct_Service Pct_Supplier Pct_Customer Pct_Merged 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pct_Bus_IY(-i) -0.000 
    
 
(0.038) 
    Pct_Service_IY(-i) 
 
-0.035 
   
  
(0.039) 




   
(0.011) 
  Down_HHI 
   
0.014** 
 
    
(0.006) 
 Pct_Merged_IY(-i) 
    
0.013 
     
(0.034) 
Affect_post -0.047*** -0.022*** -0.001 -0.003*** 0.001 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
F-statistics (IVs) 30.49 9.26 2.88 10.23 0.13 
Prob > F (IVs) 0.0000 0.0001  0.0560 0.0000  0.8759 
 
Section 2: Ln(Eindex+1) 
VARIABLES Pct_Bus Pct_Service Pct_Supplier Pct_Customer Pct_Merged 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pct_Bus_IY(-i) 0.044 
    
 
(0.040) 
    Pct_Service_IY(-i) 
 
-0.000 
   
  
(0.041) 




   
(0.013) 
  Down_HHI 
   
0.019** 
 
    
(0.008) 
 Pct_Merged_IY(-i) 
    
-0.001 
     
(0.036) 
Affect_post -0.043*** -0.017*** -0.000 -0.004*** 0.003** 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
F-statistics (IVs) 21.12 4.41 3.52 9.33 1.94 
Prob > F (IVs) 0.0000 0.0122  0.0297 0.0001 0.1432 
 
Section 3: CAR(-3,+5) 
VARIABLES Pct_Bus Pct_Service Pct_Supplier Pct_Customer Pct_Merged 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pct_Bus_IY(-i) -0.020 
    
 
(0.056) 
    Pct_Service_IY(-i) 
 
-0.025 
   
  
(0.056) 




   
(0.021) 
  Down_HHI 
   
0.026** 
 
    
(0.013) 
 Pct_Merged_IY(-i) 
    
0.008 
     
(0.038) 
Affect_post -0.043*** -0.022*** -0.003* -0.002* -0.001 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
F-statistics (IVs) 11.05 4.12 2.76 3.22 0.32 
Prob > F (IVs) 0.0000 0.0163 0.0633 0.0400 0.7266 
 
Section 4: ROA 
VARIABLES Pct_Bus Pct_Service Pct_Supplier Pct_Customer Pct_Merged 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Pct_Bus_IY(-i) 0.005 
    
 
(0.040) 
    Pct_Service_IY(-i) 
 
-0.029 
   
  
(0.040) 




   
(0.012) 
  Down_HHI 
   
0.014** 
 
    
(0.006) 
 Pct_Merged_IY(-i) 
    
0.008 
     
(0.036) 
Affect_post -0.045*** -0.020*** -0.001 -0.003*** -0.000 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
F-statistics (IVs) 26.7 7.12 3.64 9.97 0.03 
Prob > F (IVs) 0.0000 0.0008 0.0263 0.0000 0.9662 
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Table 3.22A5: First-stage Regression Results for Table 3.6b 
  Section 1: CEO_Delta 
VARIABLES Pct_FormEmp Pct_CEO Pct_CFO Pct_COO Pct_Chair Pct_Founder 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pct_FormEmp_IY(-i) -0.025 
     
 
(0.019) 
     Pct_CEO_IY(-i) 
 
-0.016 
    
  
(0.020) 
    Pct_CFO_IY(-i) 
  
-0.061*** 
   
   
(0.018) 
   Pct_COO_IY(-i) 
   
0.012 
  
    
(0.023) 
  Pct_Chair_IY(-i) 
    
-0.015 
 
     
(0.024) 
 Pct_Founder_IY(-i) 
     
-0.001 
      
(0.019) 
Affect_post -0.001 0.009*** -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) 
F-statistics (IVs) 0.98 9.4 5.77 0.89 0.3 0.41 
Prob > F (IVs) 0.3746 0.0001 0.0031 0.4113 0.7427 0.6607 
  Section 2: Ln(Eindex+1) 
VARIABLES Pct_FormEmp Pct_CEO Pct_CFO Pct_COO Pct_Chair Pct_Founder 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pct_FormEmp_IY(-i) -0.028 
     
 
(0.018) 
     Pct_CEO_IY(-i) 
 
-0.007 
    
  
(0.022) 
    Pct_CFO_IY(-i) 
  
-0.066*** 
   
   
(0.020) 
   Pct_COO_IY(-i) 
   
0.017 
  
    
(0.029) 
  Pct_Chair_IY(-i) 
    
-0.021 
 
     
(0.021) 
 Pct_Founder_IY(-i) 
     
-0.001 
      
(0.017) 
Affect_post -0.002 0.006*** -0.002** -0.002* 0.002 -0.002 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
F-statistics (IVs) 1.37 3.66 7.03 2.09 0.98 0.84 
Prob > F (IVs) 0.2530 0.0258 0.0009 0.1233 0.3764 0.4326 
  Section 3: CAR(-3,+5) 
VARIABLES Pct_FormEmp Pct_CEO Pct_CFO Pct_COO Pct_Chair Pct_Founder 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pct_FormEmp_IY(-i) -0.057** 
     
 
(0.024) 
     Pct_CEO_IY(-i) 
 
-0.013 
    
  
(0.031) 
    Pct_CFO_IY(-i) 
  
-0.101** 
   
   
(0.045) 
   Pct_COO_IY(-i) 
   
0.041 
  
    
(0.043) 
  Pct_Chair_IY(-i) 
    
-0.047* 
 
     
(0.028) 
 Pct_Founder_IY(-i) 
     
-0.031 
      
(0.035) 
Affect_post -0.014** -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.009*** -0.001 
 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) 
F-statistics (IVs) 5.42 0.1 3.01 0.58 6.18 0.53 
Prob > F (IVs) 0.0044 0.9020 0.0495 0.5616 0.0021 0.5912 
  Section 4: ROA 
VARIABLES Pct_FormEmp Pct_CEO Pct_CFO Pct_COO Pct_Chair Pct_Founder 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pct_FormEmp_IY(-i) -0.023 
     
 
(0.019) 
     Pct_CEO_IY(-i) 
 
-0.013 
    
  
(0.021) 
    Pct_CFO_IY(-i) 
  
-0.059*** 
   
   
(0.019) 
   Pct_COO_IY(-i) 
   
0.009 
  
    
(0.023) 
  Pct_Chair_IY(-i) 
    
-0.019 
 
     
(0.020) 
 Pct_Founder_IY(-i) 
     
-0.002 
      
(0.015) 
Affect_post -0.003 0.007*** -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002* 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
F-statistics (IVs) 0.94 5.66 5.28 0.82 0.58 1.75 













Table 3.23A6: First-stage Regression Results for Table 3.7b 
 
Section 1: CEO_Delta 
VARIABLES Pct_Relative Pct_OldGen Pct_YoungGen Pct_Sibling Pct_Spouse 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(CEOAge) -0.008* -0.006** 0.006*** -0.001 0.002* 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Affect_post -0.010*** -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
F-statistics (IVs) 11.54 2.8 8.19 0.77 1.95 
Prob > F (IVs) 0.0000 0.0608 0.0003 0.4638 0.1426 
 
Section 2: Ln(Eindex+1) 
VARIABLES Pct_Relative Pct_OldGen Pct_YoungGen Pct_Sibling Pct_Spouse 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(CEOAge) -0.011** -0.008*** 0.007*** 0.001 0.000 
 
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Affect_post -0.011*** -0.002 -0.003*** -0.001 0.001* 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
F-statistics (IVs) 11.85 6.63 8.17 0.14 2.1 
Prob > F (IVs) 0.0000 0.0013 0.0003 0.8732 0.1228 
 
Section 3: CAR(-3,+5) 
VARIABLES Pct_Relative Pct_OldGen Pct_YoungGen Pct_Sibling Pct_Spouse 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(CEOAge) -0.012** -0.009*** 0.010*** -0.001 0.001 
 
(0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) 
Affect_post -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
F-statistics (IVs) 6.04 10.23 3.96 0.18 1.93 
Prob > F (IVs) 0.0024 0.0000 0.0191 0.8355 0.1460 
 
Section 3: CAR(-3,+5) 
VARIABLES Pct_Relative Pct_OldGen Pct_YoungGen Pct_Sibling Pct_Spouse 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(CEOAge) -0.007 -0.006** 0.007*** -0.001 0.002** 
 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Affect_post -0.011*** -0.001 -0.002*** -0.001 0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
F-statistics (IVs) 13.15 3.85 8.53 0.82 3.31 










Table 3.24A7: First-stage Regression Results for Table 3.8b 
 
Section 1: CEO_Delta Section 2: Ln(Eindex+1) Section 3: CAR(-3,+5) Section 4: ROA 
VARIABLES Pct_Blockholder 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pct_Blockholder_IY(-i) -0.028 -0.452*** -0.038 -0.013 
 
(0.045) (0.067) (0.031) (0.075) 
affect_post -0.001 0.009*** -0.003 0.006 
 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) 
Affect_post 0.24 26.57 1.09 0.82 
Prob > F (IVs) 0.7884  0.0000 0.3358 0.4398 
     
     Table 3.25A8: First-stage Regression Results for Table 3.9b 
 
Section 1: CEO_Delta Section 2: Ln(Eindex+1) Section 3: CAR(-3,+5) Section 4: ROA 
VARIABLES Pct_Interlock 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pct_Interlock_IY(-i) -0.052 -0.050 0.108* -0.056 
 
(0.054) (0.061) (0.065) (0.055) 
affect_post -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.013*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Affect_post 16.41 17.7 10.85 18.81 
Prob > F (IVs) 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
     
     Table 3.26A9: First-stage Regression Results for Table 3.10b 
 
Section 1: CEO_Delta Section 2: Ln(Eindex+1) Section 3: CAR(-3,+5) Section 4: ROA 
VARIABLES Pct_Charity 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pct_Chrity_IY(-i) -0.037* -0.042** 0.067 -0.038* 
 
(0.020) (0.021) (0.109) (0.020) 
affect_post -0.002* -0.002* -0.003* -0.002* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Affect_post 2.57 2.57 1.78 2.41 
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